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ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT

A.

Jurisdiction

1. Definitions
a. confidential employees
The protections of the National Labor Relations Act (Act or
NLRA) are conferred upon employees,' but the definition of employee
is limited. 2 Although not expressly excluded by the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) has excluded personnel who have a
"confidential relationship" with management from bargaining units.3
The rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in
a position which may create potential conflicts of interest between the
employer and the union.4
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hendricks County
1. Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) provides:
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or
any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined.
2. Id
3. See Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir. 1979); B.F. Goodrich Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956); Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318-22 (1946); Hoover
Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1322-23 (944).
4. Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d at 853; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1968); Retail Clerks Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967).
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Rural Electric Membership Corp.,5 addressed the issue of whether an
employee with mere access to confidential information of his/her employer is impliedly excluded from the definition of "employee" as
found in section 2(3) of the Act6 and thus denied all protections under
the Act. A conflict among the circuit courts of appeals had developed
challenging the propriety of "the Board's practice of excluding from
collective bargaining units only those confidential employees with a 'labor-nexus,' while rejecting any claim that all employees with access to
confidential information are beyond the reach of section 2(3)'s definition of 'employee.' "I
The labor-nexus test excludes from bargaining units, and thus the
protection of the NLRA, only those confidential employees "who assist
and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial'
functions in the field of labor relations." 8 Under this test, the central
inquiry is whether the employee is in a confidential work relationship
with a managerial employee responsible for formulating and effectuating labor policy.9 The criteria for the labor-nexus test are cumulative
and both must be met; that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employer and a managerial employee and the managerial
employee must be responsible for labor policy if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee under this rule.
In Hendricks, the Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari
to determine whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev5. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
6. See supra note 1 for text of § 2(3).
7. 454 U.S. at 176. Compare Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853-54 (9th
Cir. 1979) (computer operators not confidential employees despite alleged access to restricted company information); NLRB v. Allied Prods. Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1977) (secretaries are not confidential employees unless the managers for whom they work
are sufficiently engaged in labor-management negotiations); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 671 (6th Cir. 1968) (secretary to management personnel participating
in labor matters only to extent of furnishing factual data regarding their immediate responsibilities was not a confidential employee); NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570, 573-74
(10th Cir. 1945) (employees with knowledge of a confidential nature that if disclosed to
competitors might result in injury to employer, does not constitute confidential employee
status) with NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690, 694 (4th Cir. 1963) (inclusion
in bargaining unit of office clerk in privity to confidential communications concerning labor
relations was improper); NLRB v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 210-11 (3d Cir.
1943) (secretary who may have access to confidential information pertaining directly to the
labor relations of her employer is a confidential employee).
8. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322; Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 35 N.L.R.B. 739
(1941). See also B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956), in which the Board approved and applied the definition of "confidential employee" as promulgated in Ford
Motor.
9. Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir. 1979).
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enth Circuit correctly relied on language from a footnote in NLRB v.
BellAerospace Co. ,1o to reject the labor-nexus test in favor of a finding

that all employees with mere access to confidential business information of their employers must be excluded from the protections of the

Act." Respondent employers argued that the legislative history surrounding the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act disapproved of
the Board's pre-amendment practice of applying the
labor-nexus test
2
and that the test had been applied inconsistently.1
The Supreme Court held that the Board's application of the labornexus test was proper and should be applied to determine whether individuals are to be excluded from bargaining units as confidential em-

ployees. 3 In rejecting respondents' contentions, the Court emphasized
the Board's pre-amendment practice of consistently applying the labornexus test 14 and concluded that nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act's legis-

lative history supported any inference that Congress intended to alter
or disapprove of the Board's pre-amendment policy. 5 The Court also
10. 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 n.12 (1974). Footnote 12 states in pertinent part:
In 1946 in FordMotor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322, the Board had narrowed its
definition of "confidential employees" to embrace only those who exercised
"'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." The discussion of "confidential employees" in both the House and Conference Committee Reports, however, unmistakably refers to that term as defined in the House bill, which was not
limited just to those in "labor relations." Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did not cover "confidential employees" even under a broad definition of that term.
Id at 284 n.12.
11. See Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 766 (7th
Cir. 1980) (HendricksIf), and Malleable Iron Range Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.
1980). The Seventh Circuit had rejected the Board's application of the labor-nexus test in
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), and held
that all secretaries working in a confidential capacity, even though not assisting in labor
relations, must be excluded from the Act. Hendricks, 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th Cir. 1979) (Hendricks 1). On remand, 247 N.L.R.B. 498 (1980), the Board once again applied the labornexus test to which the court of appeals denied enforcement. Hendricks, 627 F.2d at 770
(Hendricks II). Similarly, in Malleable Iron Range Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.
1980), an unreported opinion, the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's finding
in Malleable Iron Range Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 485 (1979), inwhich the Board had applied the
labor-nexus test and refused to exclude eighteen employees from a collective bargaining unit
because they had access to confidential business information. Id. See Hendricks, 454 U.S.
at 175.
12. 454 U.S. at 173-74, 177.
13. Id at 176.
14. Id at 179-80. The Court cited over fifty NLRB cases decided between 1941 and
1946 in which the Board applied the labor-nexus test to identify those individuals to be
classified as confidential employees. Id at 179-80, nn.l 1-12.
15. 454 U.S. at 181-83. The Court explained that when the NLRA was amended, both
the Senate and the House of Representatives proposed definitions of "employee." Id at 181;
S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1947); H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1947).
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mere dictum that could
found that the footnote in BellAerospace was
6

not be squared with congressional intent.'
The Court found no merit to the argument that the Board had

applied the labor-nexus test inconsistently. 17 To the contrary, a review
of the Board's decisions demonstrated that the Board had consistently
applied the labor-nexus criterion for over 40 years and had never followed a practice of excluding all employees with mere access of confi-

dential business information "from the full panoply of rights afforded
by the Act."' 8
Four Justices,' 9 while concurring with the Court's holding that
employees with mere access to confidential information of their employers should not, for that reason, be excluded from the NLRA as

confidential employees,20 dissented from the Court's application of the
labor-nexus test to executive secretaries. 2 1 The dissenting Justices em-

phasized that "a basic purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was to establish
a sharp line between management and labor"2 2 and that the labor-

nexus test is but a means to achieve that end.23 Mr. Justice Powell
rejected the Board's adherence to the labor-nexus test in the cases of
confidential secretaries, arguing that the labor-nexus, as it now stan-

dards, "is antithetical to any common-sense view or understanding of
the role of confidential secretaries."'2 4
b. supervisors
Unlike confidential employees, the NLRA specifically excludes su-

pervisors25 from its protections, privileges and benefits.2 6 The Ninth
Both Houses explicitly excluded "supervisor" from the definition of "employee"; however,
only the House proposal included confidential employees within its definition of supervisor.
454 U.S. at 181-82. The Senate proposal, containing no reference to confidential employees,
prevailed and was subsequently adopted. Id at 183-84; 93 CONG. REc. 6393 (1947)
(House); id at 6536 (Senate).
16. 454 U.S. at 186-87; see supra note 10.
17. 454 U.S. at 188.
18. Id at 189; but see Pullman Standard Div. of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 762 (1974),
where the Board included persons with regular "access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which may result from collective bargaining negotiations" as confidential employees. 214 N.L.R.B. at 762-63.
19. Justice Powell, the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor, joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
20. 454 U.S. at 192.
21. Id
22. Id at 193.
23. Id at 194.
24. Id at 196-97.
25. Section 2(11) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), provides:
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Circuit has advanced the position that an individual is a supervisor

under the meaning of section 2(11) if he or she exercises any one of the
powers enumerated in that section and uses independent judgment in
conjunction with the exercise of the power.27 At the same time, how-

ever, the Board must not construe supervisory status too broadly, for a
worker who is deemed to be a supervisor loses his organizational

rights.28 Thus, occasional and limited acts of supervision do not necessarily establish the existence of a supervisory power.2 9
Applying these rules to the specific facts in NLRB v. Dick Seidler
Enterprises,3" the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that a head

bartender was not a supervisor, even though his duties included hiring,
firing, training, evaluating, disciplining and scheduling employees, or-

dering, inventorying, receiving a salary and bonus, and possessing
keys. 3 ' The court justified its decision by emphasizing that judicial deference to the Board's expertise is particularly compelling when distin-

guishing between employees and supervisors, because the distinctions
to be made are "so infinite and subtle" that they necessitate the Board's
experience and informed discretion.32
c. politicalsubdivisions

Although the NLRA expressly excludes certain "employers" from
its protections, state or federal political subdivisions are not included

within the definition of employer, 33 and as such, employees of political
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
26. See supra note 1.
27. Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 420 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); accord Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRLB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
29. In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc., 611 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979) (occasional
and limited acts of supervision do not necessarily establish the existence of a supervisory
power); accord NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1967).
30. 666 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1982).
31. Id at 385; compare note 15, supra.
32. 666 F.2d at 385 (quoting Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d at
613).
33. Section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), provides:
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the-United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
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subdivisions are not included within the coverage of the NLRA.3 4
In Ayres v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers,35 the
Ninth Circuit applied the "public entity" test used by the United States
Supreme Court in NLRB v. NaturalGas Utility District,36 to determine
whether a public utility district should be classified as a political subdi-

vision. The test requires that the entity in question be "administered
by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general
electorate." 3 7
InAyres, the court upheld the Board's finding that the public util-

ity district in question was a political subdivision in that the utility
district is formed by a vote of the public under the authority of state
law; its commissioners are elected and subject to recall; it holds public

meetings and adopts its budget subject to public hearings; it is granted
the power of eminent domain, and its revenue is exempt from federal

taxation. 39 Thus, employees of the public utility district were not entitled to coverage under the NLRA nor under the Labor Management

Relations Act.4'
The definition of "employees" '4 I expressly provides that employees
protected by the Act "shall not be limited to the employees of a particu-

lar employer. ' 42 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Villa
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.
34. Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
"(3) The term 'employee' shall include any employee,.., but shall not include any individual employed.., as a supervisor, or by any... person who is not an employer as herein
defined."
35. 666 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1982).
36. 402 U.S. 600 (1971).
37. Id at 605 (citing Natural Gas Util. Dist., 167 N.R.L.B. 691, 691-92 (1967)).
38. Clark County, Washington, Public Utility District of which the plaintiff, William
Ayres, was an employee. 666 F.2d at 442.
39. 666 F.2d at 442.
40. Subchapter II of the LMRA was enacted in 1935 as the Wagner Act, commonly
referred to as the NLRA. In section 2 of Subchapter II, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), "employer," see
supra note 33, and "employee," 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), see supra note 1, are defined. Political
subdivisions of states are expressly excluded from the definition of employer. See supra note
33, and accompanying text. The remainder of the LMRA was enacted in 1947 (the TaftHartley Act) and it adopted by reference the definitional provisions of the 1935 Act. Thus,
section 501, 29 U.S.C. § 142, states in part: "(3) The terms 'commerce,' 'labor disputes,'
'employer,' 'employee,' 'labor organization,'. . . shall have the same meaning as when used
in subchapter II of this chapter as amended by this chapter."
41. See supra note I and accompanying text.
42. Id
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Avila,43 decided that when union workers are brought onto a construction worksite to perform subcontracts, the union employees are entitled
to the rights and protections of the Act.' In Villa Av/la, nonunion general contractors refused union representatives permission to enter the
construction sites to visit union workers who had been brought on the
premises to perform subcontracts. 45 The court held that the union
workers were entitled to the protections of the Act, and that the rights
and protections of the Act attach even if the general contractor in
charge of the worksite is nonunion and is not the primary employer of
the union employees.46
In addition to the express provisions of the Act, various tests have
developed to determine whether a person is an employee within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the Act.47 In determining whether a person
is an independent contractor or has achieved employee status, the standard followed by the Ninth Circuit is the "common law agency test."48
This test focuses on the degree of control to which the employee is
49

subj ect.

In General Teamsters Local 162 v. Mitchell Brothers Truck Lines,"°

the Ninth Circuit reviewed the standard applied by an arbitrator in
determining whether workers who owned and operated their own
trucking equipment were independent contractors or employees." In
Mitchell Brothers, the employer trucking company transported goods
in intra and interstate commerce, employing a substantial number of
tractors leased from owner-operators to carry its freight. In addition,
the employer maintained its own fleet of tractors driven by company
employees. 2 A dispute arose when the employer announced that the
owner-operators would not be required to maintain union membership,
43. 673 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Id at 283.
45. Id
46. Id The Ninth Circuit held that even though the construction companies in this case
were not the primary employers of the union employees, the companies were nevertheless
"employers" for the purposes of § 2(2) of the Act. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272, 1273 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980).
47. See supra note 1.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957) reads, in part:
(I) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered: . ...
49. Id
50. 682 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1982).
51. Id at 766.
52. Id at 764.
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and thus, the employer would not withhold contributions for health,
welfare and pension benefits from their pay.5 3 The arbitrator determined that the owner-operators
were employees and thus subject to the
4
provisions of the Act.1
The Ninth Circuit held that the arbitrator's finding of employee
status was proper, even though it did not expressly rely on the common
law agency test and was allegedly based upon an erroneous standard.
The Ninth Circuit found that the common law agency test had indeed
been met, since the result reached by the arbitrator was the same as if
the common law agency test had been used.5 6 Thus, the arbitrator's
reliance on the outdated standard was of no consequence and was simply an instance "of nothing more than doing the right thing for the
57
wrong reason.
In addition to determining employee status, the courts have developed tests to determine employer status within the meaning of section
2(2) of the Act. To determine whether two businesses are alter egos,
and thus a single employer for the purposes of the Act, the Ninth Circuit follows the test promulgated by the United States Supreme Court
in Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast
Service ofMobile, Inc. ,58 which requires (1) centralized control of labor
relations; (2) common management; (3) interrelation of operations; and
(4) common ownership and financial control.5 9 The Ninth Circuit had
repeatedly held, and affirmed in JM.Tanaka Construction, Inc. v.
NLRB,6 0 that none of these factors is controlling and all need not be
present,6' but that the single most important factor is centralized control of labor relations.6
In Tanaka, a family owned construction company, J.M. Tanaka,
closed down operations and discharged its workers as a result of heavy
53. Id at 765.
54. Id
55. The arbitrator based his determination of employee status on the outdated standard
of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill (1944). The arbitrator made the following
statement concerning the classification of the employees: "The degree of control which a
Carrier has a right to exercise will determine the outcome." 682 F.2d at 766.
56. 682 F.2d at 766.
57. Id
58. 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam). See also NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 295
(9th Cir. 1979); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir.
1979); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 384 (9th Cir. 1979).
59. 380 U.S. at 256.
60. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. Id at 1033; accord Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d at 1305.
62. 675 F.2d at 1034; accord NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d at 295; NLRB v. Don Burgess
Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d at 384.
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financial losses.6 3 One month prior to the closure, the president of J.M.
Tanaka incorporated another construction company, R.M. Tanaka,
and subsequently acquired the bulk of J.M. Tanaka's equipment and
hired many former J.M. Tanaka employees including all of J.M.
Tanaka's engineers.' R.M. Tanaka, however, refused to honor an existing collective bargaining agreement between J.M. Tanaka and the
engineer's union, an agreement which had two years remaining.6 5
To determine whether R.M. Tanaka was required to recognize the
union and honor its agreement depended on whether the two companies were alter egos.66 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding
that the two construction companies were alter egos, and thus constituted a single employer within the meaning of the Act.6 7 The court
found that substantial evidence supported findings that a single person
controlled labor relations,68 that the two companies shared common
management, 69 and that a close interrelation between the operations of
the two companies existed.7" The element of common ownership was
questionable in that R.M. Tanaka was solely owned, whereas J.M.
Tanaka was owned by approximately twenty-two individuals. 7 1 However, the court held that, although important, common ownership is but
one of a number of factors and not a necessary prerequisite to an alter
ego finding.72 The court indicated that, in this case, since both companies were still family owned and dominated, the common ownership
factor should not be the turning point in a finding of alter ego status.7 3
63. 675 F.2d at 1032.
64. Id at 1032-33.

65. Id
66. Id at 1033.
67. Id at 1035.
68. Id at 1034. Testimony at the hearing indicated that Takeo Wakida, the former
general manager of J.M. Tanaka and the vice-president of R.M. Tanaka, and Raymond
Tanaka, president of both companies and sole owner of R.M. Tanaka, were jointly responsible for labor relations at both companies. Id
69. Id Despite the fact that J.M. Tanaka was a statewide operation and R.M. Tanaka's
activities were local in nature, the court found that the two corporations shared common
management in that Wakida and Tanaka were also in charge of management of both companies. Id
70. Id R.M. Tanaka took over J.M. Tanaka's complete "office and staff, shop, asphalt
plant, quarry, supervisors. . . engineers and virtually all of its other employees." In addition, R.M. Tanaka acquired almost 100 per cent of J.M. Tanaka's equipment and succeeded
J.M. Tanaka on two unfinished projects. Id
71. Id at 1034-35.
72. Id at 1035.
73. Id
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2.

Concurrent jurisdiction

Generally, suits involving unfair labor practice charges come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, whereas the federal district courts have primary jurisdiction for claims of breach of collective
bargaining agreements.7 4 Jurisdictional conflicts arise when the NLRB
and the district courts share concurrent jurisdiction in cases legitimately involving both types of disputes.7 5
In Northern California District Council of Hod Carriers v. Opin-

ski, 6 a union filed suit in district court claiming a violation of a collective bargaining agreement which was closely related to an unfair labor
practice charge that the employer had already presented to the NLRB.
In such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the district

court must exercise its discretion to determine whether judicial proceedings should be stayed until final disposition of the action before the

Board.7 7 Often, appropriate deference to the Board's expertise requires
a stay of the district court's proceedings.78 In Opinski, however, the
district court dismissed the union's claim without prejudice. The Ninth
Circuit held that no abuse of discretion would have occurred had the
district court stayed the action until resolution of the NLRB -litiga-

tion.79 But, by relinquishing its jurisdiction, the district court had
abused its discretion and had exceeded its authority. 80 Thus, a stay of
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) provides in part: "[t]he Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. . . affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), which provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
.. . or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 191-93 (1978); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 242-43 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
75. E.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72 (1982); Amalgamated Ass'n of St.
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-301 (1971); Castaneda
v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1981).
76. 673 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. Id at 1075 (citing Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. Maloney Specialties, Inc., 639 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1980)).
78. 673 F.2d at 1075; Moshlak v. American Broadcasting Co., 423 F. Supp. 774, 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 1349, 1351-52 (D. Conn. 1971).
79. 673 F.2d at 1076; United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of.the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Indus. Local 525 v. Foley, 380 F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
80. 673 F.2d at 1076; see, e.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. Chula Vista, 596 F.2d

LOYOL.

OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 17

proceeding is the proper action to be taken when a court suspends proceedings4o give preliminary deference to an independent adjudicating
body and further judicial proceedings are contemplated.,
3.

Non-profit organizations

Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the
Board to prevent the commission of unfair labor practices by "any person . . . affecting commerce. ' 82 Subject to specific exemptions, this
gives the Board the broadest jurisdiction permitted under the commerce clause.13 Since the Act does not specifically exempt non-profit
organizations, the Board, with court approval, has asserted jurisdiction
over non-profit charitable and religious organizations engaged in commerce.8 4 However, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,ss the
United States Supreme Court held that the Board had no jurisdiction
over teachers in church-operated schools because of the delicacy of first
amendment issues involved in religious expression. 6
In NLRB v. Southeast Associationfor RetardedCitizens, Inc. ,7 and
NLRB v. World Evangelism, Inc. ,8" the Ninth Circuit explored the
Board's jurisdictional power over non-profit organizations in light of
CatholicBishop. In Southeast, an incorporated non-profit association
established to train handicapped citizens, was charged with unfair labor practices. The association challenged the Board's jurisdiction contending that Congress did not intend for the Board to exercise
jurisdiction over non-profit organizations except in "extraordinary circumstances."8 9 The court recognized CatholicBishop as a limit on the
Board's discretion in exercising its statutory jurisdiction, but found that
the first amendment was not in issue in Southeast. 9° Thus, Catholic
Bishop did not interfere with the Board's longstanding policy of assert838, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1979); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Combustion Eng'g., Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (D. Conn. 1971).
81. 673 F.2d at 1076.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
83. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam); NLRB v.
Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 258 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. NLRB v. Kent County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 590 F.2d 19, 21-23 (1st Cir.
1978); NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 553 (Ist Cir. 1975).
85. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
86. Id at 507.
87. 666 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1982).
88. 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
89. 666 F.2d at 431.
90. Id at 431-32.
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ing jurisdiction over non-profit organizations. 91
The court recognized that although the Board's policy had once
been to decline jurisdiction over non-profit organizations unless such

organizations had a "massive impact" on commerce, the Board had reevaluated its policy when Congress deleted the non-profit hospital exemption from the Act. 92 By doing so, "'Congress appear[ed to agree]
that non-profit institutions 'affect commerce'. . . ."9 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit found that the Board and the courts have consistently held that

the Board has jurisdiction over any enterprise with more than a "de

minimus impact on the flow of interstate commerce."' 94 In fact, the
Board has established jurisdictional guidelines expressed as a dollar
amount of business volume for use in determining whether it will assert

jurisdiction over an enterprise: the guideline for non-retail enterprises
such as Southeast is purchases or sales of, at least, $50,000 annually.95
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp.,96 the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Southeast's argument that
the Board could only assert jurisdiction over an enterprise directly selling or purchasing goods out of state,97 and held that Southeast's interstate sales in excess of $50,000 were sufficient to establish the Board's
jurisdiction.98
In World Evangelism, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the

issue of the Board's jurisdiction infringing first amendment rights. The
NLRB sought enforcement of its order against World Evangelism, Inc.
91. Id
92. See H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprintedin

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT (1974); see also Rhode Island Catholic Orphans Asylum a/k/a St. Aloysius

Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1344-45 (1976).
93. 666 F.2d at 431 (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681 n.ll (1980)).
94. NLRB v. Kent County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 590 F.2d at 24; First Church of
Christ Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1008 (1972); NLRB v. Westside Carpet Cleaning Co.,
329 F.2d 758, 760 (6th Cir. 1964).
95. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 85 (1958); Rhode Island Catholic Orphans
Asylum a/k/a St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. at 1345; NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home,
576 F.2d at 258 n.l.
96. 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
97. 666 F.2d at 430. The court held that the jurisdictional guidelines encompass enterprises directly selling to or purchasing from out-of-state enterprises, or indirectly selling to
interstate users meeting the Board's jurisdictional standards, or by purchasing from local
businesses goods which originated out of state. Id; see NLRB v. Timberland Packing
Corp., 550 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
98. 666 F.2d at 430; see Southeast Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 488-89
(1980) (Southeast stipulated that it had sold products valued in excess of $50,000 to four
firms in the state which in turn either sold or purchased goods in excess of $50,000 out of the
state).
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(WEI), a non-profit organization which, after acquiring a building
complex occupying a city block, 99 unilaterally altered the terms of a
pre-existing employees' contract and refused to bargain with the employees' union."°°
The Ninth Circuit held that a finding of Board jurisdiction would
not conflict with the Court's holding in Catholic Bishop in that the
Board had long asserted jurisdiction over non-profit religious organizations engaged in commerce, 01 whereas in Catholic Bishop, the Board
had only recently reversed itself and asserted jurisdiction over private
schools and Congress had not had a chance to pass upon the Board's
action.'0" Additionally, the court found that the Act's role of promoting labor peace clearly outweighed the minimal infringement on WEI's
freedom of operation in that WEI had failed to show that recognizing a
union would "significantly impede WEI's ability to propagate its
beliefs."1 3
Finally, using a method of computation similar to that in Southeast,1 °" WEI was found to engage in sufficient commercial activities to
qualify it within the Board's jurisdictional guidelines. 05
99. WEI acquired the El Cortez Center consisting of three motels, a swimming pool, a
convention center and a tower containing offices, hotel rooms and restaurants. In addition,
WEI adopted the previous owner's contracts with two interstate airlines to provide hotel
rooms on a priority basis for flight crews and leased out 25,000 square feet to eighteen commercial tenants. 656 F.2d at 1351.
100. Id. at 1351-52. Before acquiring the center, WEI decided to retain between five and
nine operating engineers whose contracts with the previous owner were still
in effect. WEI
refused to bargain with the engineers' union, paid the engineers lower than contract wages
and failed to contribute to fringe benefit trusts. Id at 1351-53.
101. 656 F.2d at 1353 (citing Christian Bd. of Publications, 13 N.L.R.B. 534, 537 (1939),
enforced, 113 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1940)).
102. 440 U.S. at 497-98, 505-06.
103. 656 F.2d at 1354. "Requiring WEI to recognize a union would not contravene its
religious tenets. Nor would WEI's religious tenets compel it to commit an unfair labor practice." Id See St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th Cir.
1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting). See also Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d
398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1974) (clause requiring union membership of Seventh Day Adventist
not unconstitutional); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(applying Act to employer with religious objections to collective bargaining not unconstitutional). But cf Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123-25 (7th Cir. 1977)
af'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (unconstitutional to apply Act where unionization would inhibit a religious group's ability to propagate its beliefs).
104. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The jurisdictional guideline for motel operations is $500,000 annual gross revenue. NLRB v. Cofer, 637 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir.
1981); Floridian Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 261, 264 (1959). WEI stipulated that its
motel receipts would exceed $500,000 annually. 656 F.2d at 1353.
105. 656 F.2d at 1353. Additionally, WEI concluded that while its long-range plan was to
use the center exclusively for religious purposes, at the present time, such use was not
feasible.
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B. Procedure Under the Act

1. Quorums
Section 3(b) of the Act authorizes the Board to delegate any and
all of its powers to any group of three or more members, and that "two
members shall constitute a quorum" for any group so designated. 6
In Photo-Sonics,Inc. v. NLRB, 10 7 the Ninth Circuit rejected the

contention that the three-member panel's decision was unenforceable
because one member's resignation became effective on the same day
the decision was issued. The court, by analogy to the practices of fed-

eral courts of appeals, 08 interpreted "quorum" to mean the "number
of members of the court as may legally transact judicial business."10 9

Thus, the panel's decision was enforceable because a quorum of two
panel members supported the decision. 10
2.

Due Process

a. complaints
Section 10(b) of the Act provides that an action must be brought
within six months of the events which are the subject of the complaint." ' However, an ALJ has the discretion to allow amendment of a

complaint during the proceedings." 2 Amendments closely related to
the original charges are deemed ified at the time the original complaint
106. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) provides, in pertinent part:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or
all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . three members of the Board shall,
at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.
107. 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982).
108. Id at 122. "No case directly defines. .. 'quorum' as used in section 3(b), but...
[flederal statutes provide that appeals are to be heard by a panel of three judges, [and] that
two judges. . . constitute a 'quorum.' Id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)).
109. 678 F.2d at 123; Tobin v. Ramey, 206 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. deniedsub
nom. Hughes Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 346 U.S. 925 (1954).
110. 678 F.2d at 123. In Photo-Sonics, all three panel members had concurred in the
result; thus the court did not determine whether the resignation precluded participation in
the Board's decision as the decision would nonetheless be valid because a quorum supported
the decision. Id at 122. The court recognized, however, that numerous cases have held that
two-judge decisions were valid when the third died or was ill. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v.
NLRB, 654 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1981); Minniefield v. Alabama, 542 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1976);
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1976), United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 535 U.S. 984 (1957).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
112. Id
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3

In AM Tanaka Construction, Inc. v. NLRB,"14 the Ninth Circuit

upheld an AL's decision to allow an amendment to the complaint
which, if denied, would have been time-barred by section 10(b).lI- The

amendment charged the employer with unlawfully coercing employees
to sign an agreement that the company was nonunion. The court found
that the amendment was sufficiently related to the unfair labor practices charges in the underlying complaint. Thus the ALJ had not
abused his discretion nor had the employer's procedural due process

rights been violated." 6
It is well settled in the Ninth Circuit that the Board may find an
unfair labor practice not specifically pleaded in the original complaint,

where the issue has been fully and fairly litigated at the administrative

hearing. 17 Actions before the Board are not subject to the technical
pleading requirements of private lawsuits and need not be technically
precise if they generally inform the party charged of the nature of the
alleged violations.' 8

Following this firmly established principle, the Ninth Circuit in
Industrial,Technical& ProfessionalEmployees Division v. NLRB,"I rejected an employer's claim that it was denied due process by the litigation of matters outside the scope of the complaint. The court found
that the complaint sufficiently informed Monfort of the charges against

it, despite Monfort's allegations of surprise. 120 Moreover, Monfort's
failure to object to the evidence presented and its "extensive cross-ex113. See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959); NLRB v. Jack La Lanne Management Corp., 539 F.2d 292, 295 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1976).
114. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982).
115. The alleged unfair labor practices occurred in October, 1978. The original complaint was filed February 5, 1979, and the proposed amendment was offered at the second
day of the hearing-beyond the six-month time limit allowable under section 10(b). 675
F.2d at 1036.
116. Id. The employer in the original complaint was charged with violation of section
8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), i.e., unilateral withdrawal of recognition from the
union and repudiation of an existing collective bargaining agreement, failure to make fringe
benefit payments to the union, and interrogation of employees regarding union activities
and sympathies. 675 F.2d 1032-33.
117. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied,
451 U.S. 984 (1981); Olympic Medical Corp., 608 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1979); e.g., NLRB
v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 433, 600 F.2d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1300, 1304
(9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); NLRB v. Klaue, 523 F.2d 410, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1975); Frito Co.
v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1964).
118. NLRB v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. 683 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1982).
120. Id at 307-08.
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amination" of witnesses concerning the alleged "'surprise'" facts negated its claim of prejudicial surprise and demonstrated that the issues
had been fully and fairly litigated at the hearing.' 2 '
b.

continuances

The grant or denial of a continuance is clearly within the discretion of the ALJ and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of
abuse. 22 Such abuse is found only where the exercise of discretion "is
23
demonstrated to clearly prejudice the appealing party."
In JM. Tanaka Construction Co. v. NLRB, 2 4 the Ninth Circuit
found no abuse of discretion upon the AL's refusal to grant a continuance to an alter-ego corporation after counsel for the corporation withdrew. 125 The court reasoned that since the corporations were alteregos, the relevant facts should be known to each and original counsel
should have foreseen that the parties' failure to settle before trial would
necessitate his withdrawal. 126 Thus, the appellant was not "clearly
prejudiced" and the refusal to continue the proceedings was proper. 127
c.

exclusion of evidence

Pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act, the Board shall conduct unfair labor practice hearings "so far as practicable . . . in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
States."' 128 Thus, the Board is not absolutely bound by the Federal
29
Rules of Evidence. 1

121. Id at 308.
122. NLRB v. Pan Scape Corp., 607 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1970); NLRB v.
Standard Forge & Axle Co., 420 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1969).
123. NLRB v. Pan Scape Corp., 607 F.2d at 201; Electromec Design and Development
Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); see, e.g., NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds
Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); NLRB v. Wichita
Television, 277 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo Arts, Inc., 232 F.2d 102,
106 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951).
124. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. Id at 1035. The two corporations, J.M. Tanaka and R.M. Tanaka, were originally
represented by the same attorney, Kinji Kanazawa. The case failed to settle prior to the
hearing to determine alter-ego status, and Kanazawa withdrew as counsel for R.M. Tanaka
which substituted new counsel and requested a continuance to prepare for trial.
126. Id at 1036.
127. Id
128. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
129. NLRB v. W.B. Jones Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388, 392 (9th Cir. 1957).
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During the survey period, in NLRB v. Maywood Do-Nut Co. ,"0

the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that it was within the
Board's discretion under section 10(b) to exclude from evidence a

secretly made tape recording of a bargaining session. The court agreed
that the Board had properly relied on the rule of CarpenterSprinkler
Corp. ,131 which excludes "surreptitiously prepared tape recordings of

negotiations" because of the chilling effect they have on the bargaining
process.

32

Moreover, the court distinguished Maywood Do-Nut from its previous decision in General Engineering,Inc. v. NLRB,133 in which the
Ninth Circuit held that section 10(b) does not "justify the exclusion of
evidence. . . which it would be error to exclude. . . in a federal district court .... ," 34 The court found that unlike GeneralEngineering,

in Maywood Do-Nut the Board had not attempted to suppress admissible evidence, 135 but had properly exercised its discretion and excluded
136
evidence that interfered with the collective bargaining process.
d

right to cross-examination

In Ra-Rich ManufacturingCorp. ,131 the NLRB adopted the rationale of Jencks v. United States 38 and held that the right of counsel in a
criminal trial to examine pretrial statements of witnesses called by the
government was applicable to Board proceedings. Thus, the Board

"affords parties... , upon proper demand, the right to production for
purposes of cross-examination of pretrial statements
made by witnesses
39
1
who have already testified in such proceedings."'

130. 659 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
131. 238 N.L.R.B. 974 (1978), enforced, 605 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979).
132. 659 F.2d at 110. In CarpenterSprinkler, the Board stated:
We are convinced that a rule permitting the introduction into evidence of surreptitiously prepared tape recordings of negotiations would inhibit severely the willingness of the parties to express themselves freely and would seriously impair the
smooth functioning of the collective bargaining process. Accordingly, we hold that
recordings of conversations which are part of negotiations and which are made
without notice to a party to the conversations should be excluded from evidence in
Board proceedings.
Id (quoting Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. at 975).
133. 341 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1965).
134. Id at 374 (citing NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1961)); see
also NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 1978).
135. In GeneralEngineering,the Board had attempted to use § 10(b) to shield Board employees from subpoenas for evidence possessed by Board employees. 341 F.2d at 370.
136. 659 F.2d at 110.
137. 121 N.L.R.B. 700 (1958).
138. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
139. Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. at 702.
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The Board elaborated on Ra-Rich in Tidelands Marine Service
Corp.140 by rejecting the argument that the purpose of Jencks is merely
to point out discrepancies between a witness' direct testimony and his
pretrial statement and that absent such discrepancies, the failure to
cross-examine a witness in light of his pretrial statement is not
prejudicial. 141
The Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. DoralBuilding Services, Inc.,142 reiterated its approval of the Tidelands holding by tersely rejecting the
argument that an Administrative Law Judge's refusal to permit crossexamination of witnesses as to prehearing statements did not constitute
prejudicial error absent a showing of inconsistency between the affida43
vits and live testimony. 1
In Doral,prehearing affidavits of General Counsel witnesses were
prepared in Spanish, the native tongue of the witnesses, and unofficially translated into English by a Board employee.'" The ALJ refused to permit cross-examination of the witnesses from the unofficial
English versions, and, since no one at the hearing understood Spanish,
all cross-examination of the witnesses on their prehearing affidavits was
precluded.' 4 5 The court, while recognizing that every procedural defect
is not "per se" prejudicial, 146 held that the denial of full, complete and
proper cross-examination amounted to prejudicial error. 4 7 The court
noted that the better procedure would have been to continue the hearing until official translations were prepared and then allow full cross48
examination of the witnesses as to their prehearing affidavits.1
The court distinguished Doral from its previous holdings where
limitations of cross-examinations were found not to be prejudicial. In
140. 126 N.L.R.B. 261 (1960).
141. Tidelands Marine Serv. Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. at 263. Tidelands relied specifically
upon Jencks for the proposition that
[tlat contradiction[s] [are] not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from
the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in the emphasis upon the same
facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining
process of testing [a witness'] credibility . . . . A requirement of a showing of
conflict would be clearly incompatible with our standards . . . and must be
rejected.
Id (quoting Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. at 667-68).
142. 666 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. Id at 434-35.
144. Id at 433.
145. Id at 433-34.
146. Id at 435; see also NLRB v. Health Tec Div./San Francisco, 566 F.2d 1367, 1371
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978).
147. 666 F.2d at 435.
148. Id
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NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union,1 49 a trial examiner imper-

missibly limited the scope of the cross-examination so that no prejudicial effect flowed from the Jencks violation. Similarly, in DwightEubank Rambler, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 ° the prejudicial effect flowing from a
Jencks violation was held waived by failure to request a rehearing

when "lost" prehearing statements were made available after the hearing. Unlike Seine and Dwight-Eubank, in Dora, no opportunity to
cross-examine was afforded and all objections to the AL's determina-

tion had been pursued. 5

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded

Doralto the NLRB to reopen the hearing and allow cross-examination

of the witnesses regarding their pretrial affidavits.' 52
C. NLRB Orders andRemedies

1. Reimbursement
Section 10(c) of the Act 53 gives the Board broad discretion to
fashion remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act.154 In cases in-

volving unauthorized collection of union initiation fees, dues, and fines,
the Board should order a refund to nonunion employees absent some
rational ground for refusing to do so.' 5 5
56
In the 1981 case of Joint Councilof Teamsters, No. 42 v. NLRB,'
the Ninth Circuit found that the Board had failed to offer a rational

ground for refusing to grant a make whole remedy requiring labor unions to reimburse nonunion dump truck owner-operators for initiation
fees and dues paid under an invalid provision of a bargaining agreement.'5 7 In Joint Council, the Board had denied the dump truck own-

er-operators' claim for reimbursement, reasoning that only a violation
59
of section 8(b)(4) 5 8 of the Act would warrant such a remedy.'

149. 374 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Blazevich v. NLRB, 389 U.S. 913
(1967).
150. 380 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967).
151. 666 F.2d at 433-35.
152. Id at 435.
153. Section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), provides that "the Board shall
.take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter."
154. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Acco Constr.
Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1975).
155. 511 F.2d at 852.
156. 671 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 103 S.Ct. 1172 (1983).
157. Id at 310. The Board declared a provision of the master labor agreement between
unions and contractor-employers in the Southern California construction industry to be an
unfair labor practice under § 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), because it prohibited
general contractors from hiring nonunion dumptruck owner-operators. 671 F.2d at 308.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
159. 671 F.2d at 310. The Board stated, "no evidence has been introduced with respect to
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While recognizing that reimbursement is an inappropriate remedy
in the absence of coercion, 60 the court rejected the Board's requirement of a strict section 8(b)(4) violation. Instead, the court held that
there was "no logical reason for denying reimbursement because of the
absence of a technical [section] 8(b)(4) violation'' 1 when an unlawful
provision of a collective bargaining agreement would have a coercive
effect. 162 Because the provision in the collective bargaining agreement
would have had the effect of coercing otherwise reluctant dump truck
owner-operators to join the union, the court found that reimbursement
of money paid by the truck owners to support a union they did not
freely choose to join would effectuate the policies of the Act 63 and
impose a remedy consistent with prior Board decisions in similar situations.'" In remanding the case to the Board to fashion a make whole
remedy or to show good cause why one would not effectuate the policies of the Act, 65 the court rejected the argument that an alternative
remedy under section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 66
67
barred the NLRB from ordering reimbursement.
In Industrial, Technical & Professional Employees Division v.
NLRB, 168 the Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Joint Council en-

forcing the Board's award of dues reimbursement to employees who
had been coerced into joining a union through the unfair labor practices of their employer and a union. 169 The court found that substantial
alleged losses directly attributable to actual coercion by [the] Unions ....
Furthermore,
we find a reimbursement order, typically used to 'make whole' employees for violations of
the Act, to be generally overly broad and inappropriate in the context of 8(e) violations."
Joint Council of Teamsters, No. 42, 248 N.L.R.B. 808, 817 n.34 (1980) (emphasis in
original).
160. 671 F.2d at 311 (citing Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651,
655-56 (1961)).
161. 671 F.2d at 311.
162. Id at 311-12.
163. Id at 312. See Local 814, Teamsters, 208 N.L.R.B. 184 (1974), enforced, 546 F.2d
989 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Sheraton-Kauai Corp., 177 N.L.R.B.
25 (1969), enforced, 429 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 541 (1943); Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local, No. 280 v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 1979).
164. 671 F.2d at 311 n.10 ("The Board cannot arbitrarily impose different remedies in
similar situations."). See Santini Brothers, 208 N.L.R.B. at 184; Sheraton-Kauai, 177
N.L.R.B. at 25.
165. 671 F.2d at 312-13.
166. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
167. 671 F.2d at 312. The court held that there was "no reason to burden a federal district court with § 303 litigation, when reimbursement can be ordered in an NLRB proceeding." Id
168. 683 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1982).
169. Id at 308. In this case the employer committed unfair labor practices by giving
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evidence supported the Board's finding of coercion, in that the employ-

ees involved were temporary construction workers hoping to secure
permanent employment with the employer. The union organizers had
guaranteed the employees permanent jobs if they signed the union au-

thorization cards, but had warned that no promise of future employment existed if the employees failed to select the union as their

collective bargaining agent. 170 The Board found that the employees'
awareness of the employer's support of the union justified the employ-

ees' fear that the union possessed the ability to carry out threats of job
loss. Thus, the Board found that coercion existed in that the employees
joined the union only after being informed that their chances for selec-

tion for17 1a permanent position depended upon whether they joined the
union.

Under these circumstances, the court found that reimbursement
was not only appropriate but necessary because it promoted the policies of the Act and played a "'vital role in remedying coercive union

organizing.'

"172

2.

Punitive remedies

While the NLRB's broad remedial power includes the discretion

remedies,
to order back pay or make whole
174

73

the Board has no power

to order punitive remedies.

Cautioning that it is not merely a "rubber stamp" for the Board's
remedial decisions, 175 the Ninth Circuit in Rayner v. NLRB, 176 reiter-

ated its position that remedies which are in fact punitive rather than
unlawful assistance and support to a union and by recognizing, and entering into a collective
bargaining agreement with, the union at a time when the union did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees. Id at 306.
170. Id at 308.
171. Id
172. Id at 308-09 (quoting NLRB v. Forest City/Dillon-Tecon Pacific, 522 F.2d 1107,
1109 (9th Cir. 1975)). In Forest City/Dillon-Tecon, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that:
Reimbursement of union initiation fees and dues plays a vital role in remedying
coercive union organizing. It promotes the policies of the. . .Act by assisting in
completely disestablishing the illegally constituted union, severing its connection
with the employer, restoring freedom of choice ...and encouraging the employee
to exercise his rights under the Act.
522 F.2d at 1109.
173. NLRB v. Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local 433, 600 F.2d 770,
777 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980).
174. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); NLRB v.
Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915
(1980).
175. NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1979).
176. 665 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1982).
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compensatory will not be judicially enforced. 177
In Rayner, an employer notified the representative union of its intention to terminate an existing contract and offered to negotiate a new
agreement.17 8 The Board condoned the union's refusal to respond by
concluding that, given the employer's long-standing noncompliance
with the terminated contract,179 any offer by the union to negotiate
would have been "'an exercise in futility.' "180
The court enforced the Board's remedial order requiring the employer to make whole employees for losses incurred during the term of
the collective bargaining agreement, but rejected the Board's order that
the make whole remedies continue beyond the termination of the
agreement until the employer complied with its terms.' 8' The court
indicated that the Board had ignored its own statement of the law
which provides that an "employer's continuing obligations expire once
the employer 'gives timely notice of its intention to modify a condition
of employment and the union fails to timely request bargaining.' "5182
The court held that since there was nothing in the record which
indicated that the employer would not negotiate the new contract in
good faith, the continuing make whole remedy served "only to punish
the [employer] for past conduct," and, as such, was beyond the Board's
remedial powers. 8 3 The court indicated, however, that the decision in
Rayner was in response to its factual setting, and had there been a refusal on the part of the employer to bargain for a new contract, contin184
uing liability would clearly be proper.
3.

Calculation of backpay

Subject only to limited judicial review, the NLRB is empowered
177. Id at 976.
178. Id at 973.
179. Id at 977.
180. Id. (quoting Rayner, 251 N.L.R.B. 89, 90 n.5 (1980).
181. 665 F.2d at 976.
182. Id. at 977 (quoting Rayner, 251 N.L.R.B. at 90). As a general rule, an "employer is
required by section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), to maintain the status
quo as to wages and working conditions even following the expiration date of the agreement," if the parties continue negotiations. 665 F.2d at 977 (citing Peerless Roofing Co. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1981); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d
721,729 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981)). However, such continuing liability continues "until and unless [the employer] affords the Union an opportunity to bargain."
665 F.2d at 977 (quoting Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 139 (8th Cir. 1970)).
183. 665 F.2d at 977.
184. Id at 978.
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with broad discretion in determining the amount of backpay awards."s
Once the General Counsel establishes the amount of backpay due a
discharged employee, the burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence to mitigate its liability.' 86
InAlfredM. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,"8 7 the Ninth Circuit enforced an

NLRB decision requiring an employer to reinstate all employees who
were discharged "solely as a result of" a production quota system.,,
The employer reinstated and made whole all employees, except McCown. 189 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
NLRB (Lewis 1I),19o enforced the Board's supplemental order to rein-

state McCown with backpay, subject to certain reductions.' 91
In Lewis I, the employer sought to reduce the amount of backpay
due McCown on the grounds that McCown had failed to make reasonable efforts to find equivalent employment, had refused offers of employment, and would have participated in a strike against the 1employer
92
during the period of unemployment following his discharge.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the employer's contention that McCown had not made a "diligent search" for employment since McCown's period of unemployment coincided with a period of substantial
unemployment and there was no evidence that McCown's efforts to secure other employment had been "insincere" or pursued with "disinterest."' 93 The court also found that McCown's rejection of a job offered
three months after his discharge which paid less than one-half the sal185. NLRB v. Dodson's Market, Inc., 553 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Golden
Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 1981).
186. NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., 589 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., 460 F.2d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1972).
187. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
188. Id at 412.
189. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1982) (Lewis 1). In
compliance proceedings, the ALJ determined that McCown had not been fired solely because of the quota system but also due to his "poor attitude" toward his supervisor. Id at
1155.
190. 681 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1982).
191. Id at 1156. In Lewis II, the Ninth Circuit revised its earlier judgment to include
reinstatement and backpay for employees, such as McCown, who reacted negatively to the
quota system and developed a poor attitude as a result. Id
192. Id The employer also argued that the backpay award should be reduced by the
amount of unemployment compensation McCown received. The court dismissed this argument as "specious." Id at 1156 n.1 (citing NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364-65
(1951); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 677 F.2d 767, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1982)).
193. 681 F.2d at 1156. The court rejected the employer's reliance on NLRB v. Mercy
Peninsula Ambulance Serv., 589 F.2d at 1018, because the employee in Mercy Peninsula,
unlike McCown, admitted that he could have easily found employment had he seriously
pursued it. 681 F.2d at 1156.
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ary he had previously received 194 was not "willful refusal of equivalent
196
employment."'' 95 Thus, no reduction of backpay was warranted.
The court did, however, agree with the employer that McCown's
award should be reduced by the amount of backpay accruing during
the period of the strike. 197 While recognizing the Board's rule that
"employees wrongfully discharged before an economic strike are entitled to backpay accruing during the strike,"' 98 the court held that because McCown had testified unequivocally that he would have
participated in the strike had he been employed at that time, there was
no uncertainty McCown would have taken part in the strike, and thus,
there was no reason to award backpay for the strike period. 199
4. Retroactive bargaining orders
While the National Labor Relations Board is vested with broad
remedial powers, the Board cannot prescribe the substantive terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, either directly or indirectly.200 To allow the Board to do so would "violate the fundamental premise on
which the Act is based- - 2 0 ' freedom to contract.20 2
In East Bay Chevrolet v. NLRB,

°3

the Ninth Circuit rejected a

194. McCown was offered employment at $2.35 per hour, whereas he had received $6.40
an hour before his discharge. 681 F.2d at 1156.
195. 681 F.2d at 1156.
196. Id (citing NLRB v. Alaska S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 357,360 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. J.G.
Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 1943)). The court indicated that if McCown had
accepted such a drastic cut in pay so soon after his discharge, he could have been held to
have willfully incurred the loss and thus be subject to a corresponding reduction in backpay.
681 F.2d at 1156.
197. 681 F.2d at 1157.
198. Id The reason for the rule is that it is often impossible to determine whether the
employer's discrimination caused the employee to participate in the strike and the employer
should not benefit from such uncertainty. See NLRB v. Rogers Mfg. Co., 406 F.2d 1106,
1109 (6th Cir. 1969); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 777 (1973), enforced, 502 F.2d
1151 (4th Cir. 1974).
199. 681 F.2d at 1157.
200. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970); NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978); United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295,
300 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
201. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. at 108.
202. Id at 107. The Court stated:
While the parties' freedom of contract is not absolute. . . allowing the Board to
compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate
the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under
governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract.
Id at 108.
203. 659 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Board order directing an employer to recognize and bargain with a
union and to embody any agreement in a contract retroactive to a specific date.2" The court found that the effective date of the collective
bargaining agreement was a substantive provision. 20 5 Thus the Board
had exceeded its authority and had ignored firmly established principles by attempting to establish a substantive contract term. 2°
The court distinguished East Bay Chevrolet from cases in which
Board orders according retroactive effect to collective bargaining agreements have been upheld.20 7 In those cases, collective bargaining agreements had already been negotiated and agreed upon; thus the
retroactive orders merely gave the employees "the full benefit of the
bargain" already agreed upon and did not prescribe substantive terms
of the agreement. 08
The court also rejected the General Counsel's urging to adopt the
decision of I U.E. v. NLRB (Tiidee Products),2o9 whereby the Board

would be allowed to fashion a remedy "based upon what the parties
would have agreed upon but for the unfair labor practices. '210 The
court declined to adopt or reject the Tiidee Products decision 21' as there
was no indication that the Board had based its order upon Tidee ProduCts 21 2 and General Counsel's "'post hoc rationalizations'" for the
Board's actions were "'incompatible with the orderly function of the
204. 659 F.2d at 1008. In East Bay Chevrolet, the employer refused to bargain with a
four-craft union (representing auto mechanics, painters, car jockeys, and new and used car
salespeople) and the union filed unfair labor practice charges. On July 26, 1977, three of the
four crafts entered into a collective bargaining agreement, while the fourth was engaged in a
dispute concerning its representative status. In the subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board ordered that the employer recognize and bargain with the four-craft
union and that any contract agreed upon by the parties be made retroactive to July 26, 1977.
The employer's sole objection concerned the retroactive order. Id at 1008-09.
205. Id at 1009.
206. Id (citing Trustees of Boston Univ., 228 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1977), enforced, 575 F.2d
(1st Cir. 1978), vacatedon othergrounds, 445 U.S. 912 (1980)). In Trustees the Board stated:
By its request for retroactivity of certain contract provisions, the Union in effect is
asking the Board to establish the effective date of the contract with respect to these
terms. Since the Board is without power to compel parties to agree to any such
substantive provision of a collective bargaining agreement, we shall deny this
request.
228 N.L.R.B. at 1010 (citing H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)).
207. 659 F.2d at 1010.
208. Id
209. 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
210. 659 F.2d at 1010.
211. Id See also Culinary Alliance & Bartenders Union, Local 703 v. NLRB, 488 F.2d
664, 666 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
212. 659 F.2d at 1010.
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process of judicial review.' "213
Finally, the court distinguished East Bay Chevrolet from circumstances in which the Board's order makes only the obligation to bargain
retroactive. 21 4 Unlike East Bay Chevrolet, the retroactive bargaining
order in TradingPort, Inc. 215 sought to remedy the employer's unilateral changes in working conditions made after a union had achieved
majority status. 216 Thus, the retroactive order in TradingPort was necessary to restore the union to a bargaining position equal to that which
had existed before the employer's unfair labor practices, 217 and did not
compel the parties to agree to substantive contract terms.2 18
5. Costs and attorneys' fees
The Board has adopted a policy of awarding costs and attorneys'
fees only in instances where the defenses asserted by the employer in
refusing to bargain are frivolous or totally devoid of merit. 21 9 Recently, the Ninth Circuit twice rejected arguments that costs and attorneys' fees were warranted. In EastBay Chevrolet v. NLRB,2 2 ° the court
deferred to the Board's discretionary determination that the employer
had not engaged in litigation "totally without merit, 221 1 and that a defense resting upon a credibility determination was not frivolous. 222
In NLRB v. East Wind Enterprises,223 an employer appealed a

Board determination that an employee had been discharged solely for
participating in union activities. In opposition, the Board requested
that attorneys' fees be awarded against the employer for bringing a
frivolous appeal to delay enforcement of the Board's order.2 24 The
Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, acknowledged that the employer's defense virtually lacked all merit,225 yet refused to award attorneys' fees.226 The court reasoned that it was not the practice of the
213. Id (quoting NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1965)).
214. 659 F.2d at 1010-11.
215. 219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975).
216. Id. at 301.
217. Id
218. 659 F.2d at 1011.
219. Hecks, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 765, 766 (1974).
220. 659 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1981).
221. Id at 1011.
222. Id
223. 664 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
224. Id Solid and substantial evidence existed supporting the Board's finding that the
employee had been discharged for union activities. On the other hand, the employer was
unable to assert any plausible argument to the contrary. Id.
225. Id
226. Id
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Nihth Circuit to award attorneys' fees, but cautioned that "henceforth
[the Ninth Circuit] will be more favorably disposed to such requests
[for attorneys' fees] . . . to preserve the rights of all parties under the
. . . Act and to protect our own docket."2 27
II.
A.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Interference with Employees' Section 7 Rights

Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act 228 defines an
unfair labor practice as one in which an employer attempts to restrain,
interfere, or coerce employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.229 The
Ninth Circuit test for a violation of section 8(a)(1) is whether the employers' actions reasonably tend to coerce or restrain employees. 2 30 Intent to coerce is not required in order to establish a violation of the
23
Act. '
1. Interrogation
An employer's interrogation of an employee violates section
8(a)(1) if, under all the circumstances, "the interrogation reasonably
tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of their
protected § 7 rights. ' 232 The Ninth Circuit has held that an employer's
interrogation of employees regarding union activity is not unlawful per
se, 23 3 but is coercive and inherently suspect as an unfair labor practice
unless the employer gives express assurances against reprisal.23 4
In JM. Tanaka Construction,Inc. v. NLRB, 235 the employer questioned several employees after receiving complaints that the union was
coercing employees to sign authorization cards. The employer gave no
explanation for his questioning and failed to make assurances that
there would be no forthcoming reprisals. The court held that consider227. Id
228. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ... "
230. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See also Clear Pines
Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 984
(1981).
231. 324 U.S. at 795-803.
232. 632 F.2d at 725.
233. NLRB v. Super Toys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1971); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, Local 364 v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1970).
234. 458 F.2d at 183.
235. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ing the company's hostile attitude toward the union, the employees
who were interrogated could reasonably conclude that the questioning
was intended to be coercive.236
An employer who interrogates an employee regarding union activity must give express assurances against reprisals or else an employee
can reasonably conclude that the interrogation was intended to be coercive. The Ninth Circuit will look to surrounding circumstances to determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed.
2. Employer no-solicitation rules
Employers establish no-solicitation rules to prevent union and
other activities from occurring at specified times and locations.2 37 The
rules may be considered valid or invalid depending on their wording
and the circumstances under which they are enforced.238 A rule that
prohibits only union activity will be considered discriminatory and presumptively invalid.2 39 In addition, an employer cannot ban solicitation
in non-working areas during non-working hours. 2' A rule barring solicitation during working hours may also be invalid if there is no substantial business justification,24 1 but such a rule is presumptively valid
if it simply prohibits solicitation during the employee's working hours
and not during breaks or lunch hours.24 2
InNLRB v. Rooney,243 an employee allegedly caused work disruptions by distributing union literature to co-workers. One of her employers ordered her not to solicit "on my time." 2' The court referred
to earlier Board decisions in which the Board distinguished rules barring solicitation during "working time," which are presumptively valid,
and those barring solicitation during "working hours," which are presumptively invalid.245 The phrase "working hours," subject to broad
236. Id at 1037.
237. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 84-86 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
238. Id
239. Id
240. Id at 84. There is, however, an exception to this rule for retail department stores
which may prohibit solicitation on the selling floor even during non-working time due to the
nature of the business. Id at 85.
241. See Daylin, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 281 (1972); see also Wayne Home Equip. Co., 229
N.L.R.B. 654, 657 (1977).
242. Id
243. 677 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. Id at 45. The next day the employee was seen distributing union literature to a coworker in the work area. She received a written reprimand which included a facially valid
statement concerning her rights under the no-solicitation rule.
245. See Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 750 (1974).
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interpretation, has been found by the Board to mean the period from
the time employees begin their work shift, or "clock in," to the time
their shift ends when they "clock out." This period of time includes
lunch and rest periods.2 46
The Ninth Circuit looks beyond purely semantic distinctions and
focuses on how the employee interpreted a phrase used by the employer.24 7 In Rooney, the court found that the employee understood
the employer's use of the phrase "my time" to refer to periods when
either she or the other employees were actually on duty.2 4 8 Since the
employee did not understand the admonition to refer to periods when
the employees were not on duty, the court found that the employer did
not commit an unfair labor practice by enforcing the no-solicitation
rule. 249
The coincidence of the promulgation of a no-solicitation rule and
a union campaign, although not invalid per se, is evidence of discriminatory intent. 2 - 0 This evidence may be rebutted if the employer can
prove that the union campaign caused substantial work disruption for
the first time.25 t In Rooney, the employer testified that the employee's
activities created a disturbance and that she was the first employee to
attempt solicitation. The court held that this evidence, in light of other
factors, showed that the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice. 252 The court's holding overturned the Board's ruling that the written reprimand to the employee was improperly motivated and issued
with discriminatory intent. Thus, the court found the no-solicitation
rule to be valid.2 53
3.

Yellow-dog contracts

An agreement whereby an employee is obliged to refrain from
union membership is rendered unenforceable by the National Labor
Relations Act.25 4 Specifically, section 8(a)(3) outlaws yellow-dog con246. Id at 750. The parties in Rooney disputed whether the employer's use of the phrase
"my time" was analogous to "work time" and was therefore presumptively valid, or to
"company time" and thus presumptively invalid. The court found that the parties were
overly concerned with semantics and that they failed to address whether the employer's
action interfered with the employees' organizational rights. 677 F.2d at 45-46.
247. 677 F.2d at 46.
248. Id
249. Id at 45.
250. NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1979).
251. Id
252. 677 F.2d at 46.
253. Id
254. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 23 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
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tracts by making it an unfair labor practice to "encourage or discourage
'
membership in any labor organization."255
In J.M Tanaka Construction, Inc. v. NLRB,2 56 the owners of a
construction company shut down operations of an old company and
transferred operations to an alter ego to avoid the burden of a union
contract. All of the engineers hired by the new company had been employees of the old company. When rehired, the engineers were required to sign an agreement acknowledging the new company as a nonunion employer.25 7 The court held that the agreement violated section
8(a)(1) because an employee might reasonably conclude that he or she
had executed a binding agreement to remain non-union.2 5 8 The company maintained that the agreement did nothing more than advise the
employees of non-union status. However, the court rejected this
claim259 as it had earlier in Kallman v. NLRB 6 °
In Kallman, the employer told his predecessor's former employee
that he would be rehired under the same conditions, but that the new
company would be non-union. The employer alleged, as did the employer in JM Tanaka, that he was merely expressing his view of the
company's status. The court held that the statement implied that the
company61 would remain non-union and therefore violated section

8(a)( 1).2

4. Employer interference
An employer's assistance to a union and a union's acceptance of
such assistance may serve to coerce employees in selection of a bargaining agent and violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act.262 In Industrial,Technical and ProfessionalEmployees Division, National Maritime Union of

America v. NLRB,263 the union began to solicit authorization cards
from employees at the employer's plant. The union was given unlimited access to the employer's facilities and was allowed to conduct organizing campaigns during working hours with the cooperation of the
255. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
256. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982).
257. Id at 1033. The agreement also provided that all fringe benefit payments on government contracts were to be paid directly to the employees, but in case of dispute the employee promised to reimburse the union for such payments. Id
258. Id at 1037.
259. Id
260. 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981).
261. Id at 1097-98.
262. Industrial, Tech. and Prof. Emp. Div. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1982); see
also ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 139 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
263. 683 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1982).
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employer's supervisors. The union presented the employer with authorization cards of a majority of the employees, and the employer immediately recognized the union as the sole bargaining agent without
verifying the cards. 64 The court held that the employer's activities
constituted illegal assistance sufficient to coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.265
The employees were temporary construction workers who desired
permanent positions with the employer. Union organizers made
promises that those employees who signed authorization cards would
be guaranteed permanent employment. The court upheld the Board
ruling that the references to job status were material because the employees were well aware of the employer's support for the union.266
This awareness could reasonably have led the employees to believe the
union could carry out threats of job loss. 2 67 Thus, the employees were
coerced into union membership, it being apparent that future employment depended on union membership.268
In NLRB v. Catalina Yachts, 2 69 the Ninth Circuit held that the
employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act by engaging in
certain activities during an employee organizational campaign.270 Catalina Yachts attempted to discourage union support by promising and
granting benefits to certain employees, by soliciting employee grievances, and by discharging one employee for involvement in union activities. The employer also interrogated employees about union
activities. The court held that the employer committed an unfair labor
practice based on the record as a whole, 27 1 and stated that the findings
of the administrative law judge would be overturned "'only if a clear
preponderance of the evidence'" convinced the court that they were
incorrect.2z 2 The employer did not meet the burden so as to overturn
the Board's ruling in this case.27 3
264. Id. at 307. The union and employer subsequently entered into a bargaining agreement. Id
265. 683 F.2d at 308.
266. Id. at 307-08.
267. Id at 308.
268. Id
269. 679 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1982).
270. Id at 181.
271. Id
272. Id (citations omitted).
273. 679 F.2d at 181.
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5.

Weingarten rights

The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. ,274 held that an
employer commits an unfair labor practice by denying an employee's
request for union representation at an investigatory interview conducted by the employer.27 5 The employee must have a reasonable belief that the interview may result in disciplinary action.27 6 The Court
stated that such a request fell within the literal language of section 7 of
the Act allowing "concerted activities for the purpose of. . .mutual
2' 77
aid or protection.
The Board in Pac#Fc Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,278 reaffirmed
an earlier extension of Weingarten rights that permits an employee to
confer with a union representative before any confrontation with the
employer.2 79 In Pacoc Telephone, two telephone company installers
were ordered to meet with a phone company manager. The employees
asked the reason for the summons but received no answer. The manager asked if they desired union representation and both employees
responded in the affirmative. When the union steward arrived, he was
denied a request to meet with the installers before the investigatory
interview, and was informed only that there was a "problem" in response to his query as to what was going on. The employees were discharged one week after the meeting for unauthorized installation of
phone equipment. 28 0 The Board held that employees have a section 7
right to confer with their union representative prior to an employer
confrontation. 281 The employee and representative also have a right to
"a general statement" as to the subject matter of the interview. 282

In Climax Molybdenum Co. ,283 the Board stated that prior consultation permits the representative to assist the employer by "'eliciting
favorable facts,'" thereby saving the employer time in investigation.2 84
The counseling also assists the fearful employee, or one who may have
274. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
275. Id at 267. The employee had been suspected of stealing food from the employer.
The employer conducted an interview concerning the matter, at which time the employee's
request to have a union representative accompany him to the meeting was denied.
276. Id
277. Id at 260 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 1973)).
278. 262 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1982), enforced in part, denied in part, 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1983).
279. Id at 1048. See infra note 299.
280. Id at 1050. The reason for discharge also included falsification of time sheets. Id
281. Id at 1048.
282. Id at 1049 (emphasis in original).
283. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
284. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1048 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263).
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difficulty articulating the facts of the incident being investigated.285
The Weingarten rule attempts to strike a balance between employer
prerogatives in investigating misconduct and employee rights to join
collectively for mutual aid and protection when employment is
threatened. 286 The Board in Padfic Telephone ruled that access to
union counseling before an investigatory proceeding restores a proper
balance since, "[t]he weight of an employer's investigatory machinery
against the isolated employee is an imbalance which Section 7 was
designed to eliminate. 28 7
The Ninth Circuit recently considered Weingarten rights in NLRB
v. Texaco, Inc.,288 and held that the employee's right to have a union
representative present when confronted by the employer also includes
the right to have the union representative speak during the interview.289
In Texaco, a foreman asked an employee to report to his office after
discovering that the employee had not activated his safety device. As
requested by the employee, a union representative was present at the
meeting, but the representative was advised by the foreman that he
would not be permitted to speak. The employee admitted to violating
company regulations during the interview and subsequently received a
written reprimand.
Texaco argued that although Weingarten permits the presence of a
union representative at an investigatory proceeding, the employer can
prohibit that representative from speaking. The employer cited a passage from Weingarten which states, "'[t]he employer. . . is free to insist that he is only interested . . . in hearing the employee's own
285. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1048.
286. Id at 1049.
287. Id The dissent argued that the Board's rulings in Climax and Pacific Telephone were
an unreasonable extension of Weingarten. Id at 1050 (Hunter, J., dissenting). The dissent
further stated that the Board's definition of "knowledgeable representative" differed from
the Supreme Court's definition in Weingarten. Id at 1051. The dissent argued that this
phrase referred to knowledge about grievance procedures and not knowledge about the particular facts of the incident at hand. The majority in Pacftc Telephone, pointed out that
although the Board in Climax declined to extend Weingarten to a pre-interview conference
in that case, the employees in Climax made no request for representation, although seventeen hours elapsed between summons and the meeting. Id.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit agreed with the majority and upheld the Board ruling,
permitting an employee the right to a pre-interview conference with a union representative.
711 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Climax by pointing out
that, "ample time had been provided after notice and before the interview to allow the employee to arrange a conference." 711 F.2d at 137 n.4.
288. 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
289. Id at 126-27.
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account of the matter under investigation.' ,290 The court agreed with
the Board that this language was directed at avoiding a bargaining session or adversarial hearing.2 9 1 The language also refers to the employer's right to hear the employee's account of the incident. z9 2
Furthermore, other language in Weingarten indicated that the union
representative should take an active role in such a situation to help the
employer get to the bottom of the incident more quickly. 293 Texaco
therefore violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying the union steward the opportunity to speak at the investigatory proceeding.2 94
The Board extended Weingarten rights to unrepresented employees in Materials Research Corp.295 Employees in the precious metals
department (PMD) were annoyed at an abrupt change in the work
schedule announced by management. One employee organized a
group meeting of employees to discuss the new schedule. This employee and two others confronted a PMD supervisor and requested a
group meeting to discuss the problem. The supervisor denied the request but said he would be available to discuss individual problems.
The supervisor then asked to see the employee who organized the
group meeting in his office. The employee informed the supervis9r that
he had a right to have another employee present at the meeting. The
supervisor replied that he had no such right in Materials' plant. The
employee was informed that the meeting was disciplinary in nature,
and he received a verbal warning for organizing a group meeting and
failing to follow a grievance procedure established by the company.
The Board pointed out that although Weingarten spoke in terms of
a right to a "union representative" at an investigatory interview, the
reference to "union" was a result of the specific fact pattern before the
Court.29 6 "[W]ith only very limited exceptions, ' 297 the considerations
of protection of section 7 rights, as discussed in Weingarten, are present
whether or not the employee is represented by a union."' As the
Board pointed out in Glomac Plastics,Inc. ,299 the unrepresented employee's need for support is probably greater than that of a represented
290. Id. at 126 (quoting 420 U.S. at 260).
291. 659 F.2d at 126.
292. Id
293. Id (quoting 420 U.S. at 262-63).
294. 659 F.2d at 126-27.
295. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
296. Id at 1012.
297. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975).
298. Id
299. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978).
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employee being investigated by an employer . 3° Moreover, correcting
the imbalance between the employer and the unrepresented employee
"is not achieved by forcing an employee to attend a disciplinary interview alone. ' 30 1 If a co-worker is present to witness the interview, the
employer is less likely to overpower the employee. The purpose is fulfilled whether or not the co-worker is a union representative.30 2 The
court also stated that Weingarten provided for limited assistance which
can be equally satisfied whether or not the other employee present is a
union representative. 3 3 Even if the employee is not a union representative, he may be able to assist another employee who is too "fearful or
3
inarticulate" to give an accurate description of the incident. 0
B. Employer Discrimination
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides that an employer who discriminates in hiring or establishes any term or condition of employment which is intended to discourage or encourage membership in any
labor organization commits an unfair labor practice. 5 Section 8(a)(3)
protection extends to job applicants as well as persons already employed.30 6 Temporary employees, paid professional union organizers
who obtain employment in order to organize the employer's work
force, and union members are all afforded protection by this section of
the Act.30 7 In contrast, supervisors are not protected under section
8(a)(3). °8 Courts have held that employment discrimination alone
does not violate section 8(a)(3), which requires that the purpose of the
discrimination be actually proscribed.3 0 9
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,Inc.,310 held
that the Board could find an unfair labor practice without proof of antiunion motivation if the employer's conduct was "'inherently destruc300. Id at 1311.
301. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014.
302. Id at 1015.
303. Id
304. Id An employer still has alternatives when an employee requests assistance at an
investigative proceeding. He or she may refuse such a request by carrying on the investigation without interviewing the employee. Id at 1015-16.
305. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
306. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 51 (Morris Supp. 1971-75) [hereinafter cited as
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].

307.
308.
309.
310.

Id
Id
Id at 52.
388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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tive' of important employee rights."' 1 This is true even if the
employer advances a legitimate business consideration as justification
for the conduct.3 12 The Ninth Circuit in Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 1 3
stated that when a discharge appears to be motivated by both legitimate business concerns and protected union activity, the test is whether
the union activity or the business reason actually motivated the
discharge.3 14
The Board developed a bifurcated approach to determine whether
an employee discharge violated the Act in Wright Line, a Division of
Wright Line, Inc. 3 15 The General Counsel has the burden of first establishing that the employee's protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.3 16 After the General Counsel has made a
prima facie case, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee would have been discharged regardless of antiunion
motivations.31 7
The Ninth Circuit recently adopted the Wright-Line test in Zurn
Industries, Inc. v. NLRB. 1 8 In Zurn, the employer, a contractor, was
constructing concrete cooling towers for a nuclear power plant. Several
employees complained to the employer about safety deficiencies on the
jobsite. The field superintendent expressed his annoyance with the
safety complaints.31 9 Subsequently, a number of employees who had
complained about serious flaws in a concrete structure which created
safety hazards received termination notices. The employees admitted
the poor quality of the work, but attributed this to machine deficiencies
and breakdowns. The Board concluded that the field superintendent's
remarks threatened the employees for expressing safety concerns and
that the employer's asserted reason for the discharge was a mere
pretext.320
The court, in adopting the Wright-Line test, stated that the con311. Id at 34.
312. Id
313. 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1981).
314. Id at 678 (citing Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir.
1977)).
315. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
316. Id at 1089.
317. Id
318. 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3110 (1983); see also NLRB v.
Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981).
319. 680 F.2d at 685. The superintendent told the employees in a meeting that he was
"tired of hearing all this commotion about safety" and that dissatisfied employees should
talk to the shop steward or "pick up their checks." Id
320. Id at 686.
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gressional intent did "not foreclose a legislative purpose to place on the
32 1
employer the burden of proving the presence of a legitimate cause."

The court accepted the Board's conclusion that the employer had not
met this burden. 22 The employer had sole responsibility for the inoperable equipment and failed to discharge the foreman who was responsible for the project when the other employees were terminated.
The work of the discharged crew was generally satisfactory. These factors supported the inference that the employer's asserted reason for the
discharge, poor quality work, was a mere pretext.323
In Liopincou Industries,Inc. v. NLRB,3 24 the Ninth Circuit held

that the test for a violation in discharge cases should focus on whether
"antiunion animus was the moving cause, or but for cause, behind the
decision to discharge an employee. ' 325 The Wright-Line decision was
rendered after the Board decision in Lipincot and was therefore not
applied by the appellate court. The opinion is, however, consistent
326
with the Wright-Line test.

In Lippincot, an employer discharged an employee three hours
before a union representation election because of her pro-union stance.
The Board characterized the case as a "pretext case," one in which the
employer's business reasons are rejected leaving only the unjustifiable,
improperly motivated reason.32 7 Lippincott claimed that the case was a
"mixed motive" case and that the relative force of the employer's business reason should have been compared to the impermissible reason to
determine which motivated the discharge. 328 The court considered this
distinction to be artificial and eroded byAdArt.329 Many recent Ninth
321. Id at 689. Other circuits have not been so quick to adopt the test. The First and
Third Circuits have questioned whether the test is entirely consistent with the Act. These
circuits agree with the adoption of a "but for" test, but claim that shifting the burden to the
employer is unwarranted and violates § 10 of the National Labor Relations Act. The First
and Third Circuits have concluded that § 10 is violated because the Board will prevail
should the employer fail to prove its affirmative defense. As a consequence, these circuits
have adopted a procedure whereby the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, after the defendant provides a legitimate reason for its conduct, to prove that the defendant's reason was not
the true reason for the discharge. Id at 688-89. See NLRB v. Wright Line, a Division of
Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Behring
Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982); but see NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669
F.2d 547, 550 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982) (disagreeing with the First Circuit's criticisms).
322. 680 F.2d at 694.
323. Id
324. 661 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1981).
325. Id at 115.
326. Id
327. Id at 114.
328. Id
329. Id at 115.
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Circuit decisions have been decided without considering the employer's
alleged business motivations for dismissal.33 °
The test promulgated by the court in Lippincott is in accord with
the maxim that "'[a]n employer may discharge an employee for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, without violating § 8(a)(3), as long
as his motivation is not antiunion discrimination .... , ,,331 The court
concluded that the Board applied the law in conformity with the test.332
The discharge of the employee for her union sentiments and the "chilling" effect it would have on other employees supported a violation of
section 8(a)(3) of the Act.333 The employer's
explanations were found
334
to be "implausible" and "contrived.
While many recent Ninth Circuit cases have considered violations
without respect to the employer's legitimate business concerns, some
have not. For example, in Fun Striders,Inc. v. NLRB, 335 the court held
that a violation of the Act is established by showing that the employees
engaged in activities protected by the Act, that the employer's conduct
interfered with, restrained or coerced the employees in the exercise of
those activities, and that the employer's conduct was notjustfed by a
legitimate business consideration. 336 In Fun Striders, the court reversed
a Board finding that an employer had committed an unfair labor practice by dismissing and refusing to reinstate four workers after they distributed literature during an unannounced work stoppage. The
employees picketed the employer in protest of new piece-rates and distributed literature which advocated violent revolution and the annibilation of all management personnel.
The plant manager refused to reinstate the employees because they
330. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1980), where an employee
was discharged for smoking near a container of flammable solvents after a warning by the
employer. The court stated that the proper test for determining whether the discharge of an
employee constitutes an unfair labor practice is whether "antiunion animus" is the motivating reason. Id at 1213. No mention of an employer's business motivations is made in the
test.
331. 661 F.2d at 115 (quoting L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
332. Id
333. Id
334. Id The employer claimed that the Board applied an "in part" test which states that a
"discharge motivated inpart by an employee's exercise of section 7 rights is a violation even
though another valid cause may also be present." Id (emphasis in original). The court
agreed that this formulation of the test was incorrect but pointed out that the Board stated
no test in its decision and that the Board's conclusion conformed to the Ninth Circuit test.

Id
335. 686 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1981).
336. Id at 661-62 (emphasis added).
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advocated the overthrow of plant supervision and because he believed
they were associated with the Communist Party. The court determined
that the distribution of leaflets was a protected activity. 337 Although
338
distribution of purely political literature is not a protected activity,
distribution of literature containing nonpolitical matter and political
matter related
to the employee's working conditions is a protected
339
activity.
Antiunion animus is an essential element of section 8(a)(3) violations. 3 1 Since the Board found no such animus on the part of the employer, the court made no finding regarding a possible section 8(a)(3)
violation.341 Instead, the case proceeded under alleged violations of
section 8(a)(1). 34 2 In a section 8(a)(1) discharge case, if the employer

has demonstrated justification for the dismissal with legitimate and
substantial business concerns, the Board has the burden of proving that
the employer's motivation for the discharge was to penalize the employee for engaging in a protected activity.343 The court in Fun Striders
concluded that the employer could reasonably believe that the employees threatened to initiate a violent confrontation in its plant.344 Refusal
to reinstate the employees was an effort to avoid such a confrontation
which represented a legitimate and substantial business concern. 345
Evidence that an employee was engaged in protected activity and
that the employer had knowledge of that activity at the time of discharge is necessary to establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge.34 6 In Anja Engineering Corp. v. NLRB, 347 an employee, active
in an unsuccessful union representation campaign, was terminated for
failing to notify the company of her intent to return to work after receiving permission for a leave of absence. This failure to notify violated the company's automatic termination policy. The Administrative
Law Judge found that Anja had no knowledge of the employee's activi337. Id at 662.
338. Id (citing Firestone Steel Products Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 826 (1979); Ford Motor Co.,
221 N.L.R.B. 663 (1975), enforced mem., 540 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976)).
339. 686 F.2d at 662 (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-70 (1978)).
340. 686 F.2d at 662.
341. Id
342. Id This case is distinguished from AdArf and Stephenson;see supra notes 312 and
317, where the courts found violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
343. 686 F.2d at 662 (citations omitted).
344. Id
345. Id at 663.
346. Anja Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 292,294-95 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964)); see also NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
347. 685 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ties in the union's organizational campaign.348 The Board held, however, that the employer had "continuing knowledge" of the employee's

union activity. 349 The Board found that Anja had knowledge of the

employee's union activities based on other testimony. In addition, the
Board noted that Anja had vigorously resisted organizational efforts
and harbored antiunion animus with respect to other discharges.35 0
The Board also considered the firing of the employee one day before
the union election to be highly "suspicious." 35 ' The court in Anja
found the Board's conclusion to be speculative and in direct conflict
with testimony credited by the AL.3 2 The company's resistance to
union organization and antiunion animus regarding the discharge of
other employees on prior occasions did not render support to the
Board's "continuing knowledge" theory. 3 Although the timing of an
employee's termination can lead to an inference of company
knowledge regarding union activity, the court found the timing in this
case to be of little significance. 4 The court based its refusal to enforce
the Board's order on the AL's finding that the discharge was the result
of a strict application of company policy which was not discriminatorily applied to the terminated employee. 5
C. Withdrawalof Recognition
Congress granted the NLRB primary responsibility to formulate
rules to govern multiemployer bargaining units in order to balance the
conflicting interests of unions and employer association members.356
Several Ninth Circuit decisions have concluded that the Board's rules
do not reasonably balance these conflicting interests. The courts and
the Board previously held that an employer could withdraw from the
unit once there was impasse in bargaining.357 Prior to negotiations,
either the union or an employer in a multiemployer bargaining unit
may unilaterally withdraw upon adequate written notice.358 The intent
348. Id at 294. The AL's finding was based on the testimony of a company vice president. Id
349. 685 F.2d at 295.
350. Id
351. Id
352. Id at 296.
353. The court went so far as to say that the Board's opinion was "conjecture bordering
on cynicism." Id
354. 685 F.2d at 296.
355. Id
356. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
357. See NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975).
358. Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393-95 (1958).
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to withdraw must be unequivocal and exercised in good faith. 35 9 During negotiations any party may withdraw upon mutual consent.3 60 The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. CharlesD. Bonanno Linen Service,36 1 over-

ruled earlier decisions by stating that an impasse in bargaining would
no longer qualify362as a justification for an employer's withdrawal from a
bargaining unit.
In Seattle Auto Glass v. NLRB,3 63 the Ninth Circuit applied the
Bonnano rule to employers who withdrew from a multiemployer bargaining unit. The court in Seattle Auto Glass ruled that neither an impasse in bargaining nor the signing of an interim agreement that will
not survive the final master agreement, constitutes an "unusual circumstance" to justify an employer's withdrawal. 364 The multiemployer
bargaining unit and union had already signed a master agreement
when a dispute over terms regarding a segment of the unit arose. The
union struck, but shortly thereafter agreed to stop picketing association
members who signed the master agreement and agreed to sign an interim agreement concerning segment terms. Seattle Auto Glass did not
sign the interim agreement and attempted to withdraw from the bargaining unit in objection to the other employers' signing of the interim
agreement. The union refused to recognize Seattle's withdrawal. The
court concluded that the employer's withdrawal constituted an unfair
labor practice based on the rule in Bonnano.365 Only interim agree-

ments were signed in Seattle, as opposed to separate agreements that
would survive unit negotiations and might justify withdrawal.366
In Western Pacjfc Roofing v. NLRB,3 67 the court held that an employer who is a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit may demand special treatment if it informs all parties of a problem, such as
financial difficulties, at the start of negotiations. 68 In Western Pacific a
union struck all members of a multiemployer bargaining unit when an
359. Id
360. Id
361. 454 U.S. 404 (1982). In Bonanno, the employer was a member of a multiemployer
bargaining unit and was struck by a union after an impasse in bargaining was reached. The
company hired permanent replacements for the striking union members and notified the
bargaining unit of an intent to withdraw. The union filed an unfair labor practice against
the company as a result of its withdrawal.
362. Id at 412.
363. 669 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1982).
364. Id at 1335.
365. Id
366. Id
367. Id
368. Id at 1336 (citing Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United Shoe Workers of
America, 341 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1965)).
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agreement was not reached. Negotiations continued in spite of the
strike. Western's president decided to withdraw from the unit when it
appeared imminent that a contract to which he did not wish to be
bound would be approved. Western argued that extreme financial distress justified the withdrawal.3 6 9
The Board has ruled that financial distress may qualify as an "unusual circumstance" and justify withdrawal. 370 The court concluded,
however, that since Western did not initially demand special treatment
and make other members of the multiemployer unit aware of its
financial problems, it could not later choose to use these problems as an
excuse to withdraw from the bargaining unit to avoid an unfavorable
contract.3 7 '
InNLRB v. Birkenwald,Inc.,372 the court ruled that when the largest member of a bargaining unit enters into a separate agreement with a
union that "'effectively fragment[s] and destroy[s] the integrity of the
bargaining unit,' ,)373 this constitutes an unusual circumstance that will
justify employer withdrawal.3 74 In Birkenwald, the union voted to go
on strike after rejecting a proposal from the employers. The largest
employer member of the unit signed a separate permanent agreement
with the union shortly thereafter. Birkenwald became aware of this
agreement and notified all unit members that it was withdrawing. The
union refused to consent to the withdrawal. Several days later, the
bargaining unit and the union ratified a new contract and Birkenwald
refused to be bound by the terms of the new agreement. The court,
relying on Bonanno, found that the separate agreement was an unusual
circumstance which justified Birkenwald's withdrawal and that the remaining members of the multiemployer unit would also be permitted
to withdraw.3 7 5
A party may withdraw from a bargaining unit if all members were
notified of its intent to withdraw before commencement of negotiations.3 76 In NLRB v. Teamsters Union, Local No. 378, the Teamsters
369. 669 F.2d at 1336.
370. Id (citing Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557 (1968); United States Lingerie Corp.,
170 N.L.R.B. 750 (1968)).
371. 669 F.2d at 1336.
372. Id
373. Id at 1337 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1096
(1979)).
374. Id at 1336-37.
375. Id at 1337.
376. Bonanno, 454 U.S. at 410-11. See Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393-95
(1958). In RetailAssociates, an association consisting of department stores and a union commenced labor negotiations. The union joined with other labor organizations with whom the
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threatened to strike a multiemployer bargaining unit because the negotiations were at a standstill. One employer, Capitol Chevrolet, objected
to the tactics and proposals of the other employers. For example, the
association refused to incorporate a cost-of-living proposal made by
Capitol. As a result, Capitol announced its withdrawal from the bargaining unit after its proposal was rejected. Further negotiations
proved unfruitful and the Teamsters struck all association members except Capitol because it had initiated separate negotiations and executed
a separate written agreement with the Teamsters.
The association filed unfair labor practice charges, and the Board
held that withdrawal by an employer after commencement of negotia'
The Teamsters contended that mutions requires "mutual consent."378
tual consent only required the "union's consent for unilateral
withdrawal by an employer. '379 The Board held, however, that the
multiemployer association must also consent to the withdrawal. Thus,
the union, by negotiating with an improperly withdrawn employer, had
committed an unfair labor practice.38 °
The Board's position, if accepted, would allow the multiemployer
bargaining unit to have absolute authority over its members regardless
of the authority actually granted to it by its members during formation.3 81 The Teamster's position, at the other extreme, would give the
multiemployer unit no control over its members because they could
unilaterally withdraw at any time.38 2 The court relied on Bonanno in
stating that there should be limitations on the ability to withdraw because employers who have delegated the authority to negotiate to a
multiemployer bargaining unit have the right to have the agreement
respected by other signatories.38 3 This decision was not inconsistent
with Seattle Auto Glass,384 because unit members should only be held
association already had a relationship, for further negotiations. When no agreement was
reached, the union called a strike against the association, but picketed only one member
store. The store which was struck sought and received approval to withdraw from the association. Subsequently, the store entered into separate negotiations with the union.
377. 672 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982).
378. Id at 743.
379. Id; see, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1968); Universal Insulation
Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 406, 408 (6th Cir. 1966); Joseph E. Collins & Co., 184 N.L.R.B.
940 (1970); Metke Ford Motors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 950 (1962).
380. 672 F.2d at 743.
381. Id. at 744.
382. Id
383. Id
384. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
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to the terms of an agreement so long as its terms are satisfied.385 An
employer bargains for a guarantee that other employer members will
jointly negotiate when it joins a multiemployer bargaining unit. If a
large member of the unit drops out, the bargain is changed and the
terms are no longer satisfied.386
The court in Teamsters Union, Local No. 378, also rejected the
Board's conclusion that when an association agrees to restrict employer
withdrawals, it creates liability for a union which may be unaware of
the agreement and which subsequently reaches an agreement with an
improperly withdrawn employer.387 In RetailAssociates,388 the Board
held that a party who desires to withdraw from a bargaining unit must
notify all other parties of its intent. 389 This notice should make all parties aware of the "interests at stake" in the negotiations. 390 Notice
would also eliminate the possibility that a union would be unaware
that it was negotiating with an improperly withdrawn employer.39 '
D. Union Discrimination
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it
an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their self-organization and collective bargaining
rights.392 Section 8(b)(l)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection393of representatives for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining.
In Northwest Publications,Inc. v. NLRB, 3 94 the court held that the
union's fining of a warehouse supervisor for performing "off the clock"
activities prior to the start of the shift violated section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act.395 The supervisor in Northwest usually
arrived at work thirty minutes prior to the start of the shift to perform
"prestart activities" to ensure that the shift started smoothly.3 9 6 The
union notified this supervisor to appear at a hearing regarding observa385. Teamsters, Local No. 378, 672 F.2d at 744.
386. Id at 744-45.
387. Id at 745.
388. See supra note 376.
389. 120 N.L.R.B. at 393-95.
390. 672 F.2d at 745.
391. Id
392. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
393. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
394. 656 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1981).
395. Id at 465-66.
396. Id at 462. These activities included such things as turning on the warehouse conveyor, starting a forklift to warm it up, and unlocking warehouse doors. Id
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tions that he had been working "off the clock" before the shift began.
The employer advised the supervisor not to appear at the union hearing. The union fined him $100.00 for failure to appear, which was paid
by the supervisor under protest. Northwest then filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the union.3 97

Situations in which supervisors are also union members create
unique problems with respect to union discipline.398 In FloridaPower
and Light Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electric Workers,3 99 the
Supreme Court established a standard for ascertaining whether union
discipline of supervisors has violated the Act.4" A violation of section
8(b)(1)(B) occurs only when disciplinary action taken by the union "adversely affect[s] the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of
and acting in his capacity as grievance adjustor or collective bargainer
on behalf of the employer."4 1
The types of union activity that adversely affect a supervisor's conduct in this capacity have expanded significantly since the 1947 passage
of the Act.40 2 The Board extended the auspices of section 8(b)(1) in
San Francisco-OaklandMailers Union No. 18.403 In Oakland Mailers,4 04 three foremen were assigned bargaining unit work in violation
of a collective bargaining agreement and were expelled from the union
as a result. Although there was no union pressure or coercion aimed at
replacing the foremen, the Board held that the union violated section
8(b)(1)(B) by attempting to influence interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement by the foremen. 405 Any foreman interpreting the
contract in the future would4 predictably
be reluctant to take a stance
6
adverse to that of the union. 0
The Supreme Court has discussed a possible "carryover" effect of
union discipline that might influence a supervisor's conduct and deprive an employer of the full services of his supervisor, "thereby re397. The employer alleged violations of § 8(b)(1)(B). 656 F.2d at 462.
398. 656 F.2d at 463.
399. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
400. Id at 805. The Court determined that a union did not commit an unfair labor practice when it disciplined supervisors who were also union members for crossing a picket line
during a strike and performing work normally done by the nonsupervisory employees on
strike. Id at 813.
401. Id at 805.
402. 656 F.2d at 463.
403. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
404. The case involved the same employer as in Northwest Publications,see supra note
394.
405. 172 N.L.R.B. at 2183.
406. 417 U.S. at 801.
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straining and coercing the employer in his selection of
representatives.""4 The Board elucidated circumstances in which
union discipline may have a carryover effect and interfere with a supervisor's functions in Teamsters Local No. 524 (Yakima).408 In Yakima,

the union filed charges against several supervisors for performing off
the clock bargaining unit work at the request of customers. The union
claimed that the supervisors breached a provision in the collective bargaining agreement by performing off the clock work without prior
union consent. 4°9 The union admitted that the disciplinary action of
fining the supervisors was directed at forcing the supervisors to adhere
to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.410 As a result, the
Board found violations of 8(b)(1)(B) in that the union action imposed
the union's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement on the
employer without initiating a grievance proceeding. 41' The underlying
purpose of the Act is undercut when a union uses disciplinary action
instead of the proper mechanisms set up by the Act to force its interpre412
tation of an agreement on an employer.
In Northwest, the company claimed that prestart activities had
been performed off the clock by previous supervisors without union
protest. The Board concluded that the prestart activities did not constitute a supervisory function, but this was inconsistent with the Board's
decision in Yakima which found similar activities to be supervisory. 41 3
The court determined that the proper classification of work should be
determined by an "overall analysis" of the supervisor's activity during
the period of time for which the supervisor is being reprimanded. 414
The court stated that the union had unilaterally interpreted what
should be considered supervisory under the collective bargaining
agreement instead of properly instituting a grievance proceeding. 415
The union's action would have a "carryover" effect on future supervisory decisions.41 6
407. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429 (1978).
408. 212 N.L.R.B. 908 (1974).
409. Id. at 909.
410. Id at 910.
411. Id
412. 656 F.2d at 465.
413. Id
414. Id
415. Id at 465-66.
416. Id at 466.
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Subcontracting Clauses

In Joint Council of Teamsters, No. 42 v. NLRB,4 1 7 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a subcontracting clause between a union and
an employer which mandated union membership for any person wishing to work for the employer constituted an unfair labor practice. Section 8(e) of the Act prohibits agreements, known as hot cargo
agreements, between unions and employers where the employer agrees
to "'cease doing business with any other person.' ""
In effect, the
subcontracting clause under consideration would require that any selfemployed person who wished to work at the jobsite would first have to
join the union.4 19 The construction industry proviso to section 8(e),
however, permits such agreements with respect to "'work to be done at
the site of the construction.' "420 In Joint Council, independent dump
truck owner-operators hauled material from the construction site to remote dump pits. The court upheld the Board's conclusion that the
owner operators did not come under the auspices of the special construction industry proviso because they spent "most of their time on
public roads away from the construction site. ' 421 The court found that
although the union did not directly use coercive tactics, the inclusion of
the agreement to require mandatory union membership would have the
indirect effect of coercing reluctant truck owners to join the union if
they wished to work for the employer.42 2
The Supreme Court in Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v.
NLRB,42 3 held that subcontracting clauses are protected by the construction industry proviso and are not restricted in application to jobsites where both nonunion and union employees are working. 2 4 The
Court considered two consolidated cases where both employers argued
that the subcontracting clauses which prohibited the employers from
subcontracting work at the jobsite to anyone who was not a member of
425
the union violated section 8(e).
417. 671 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1172 (1983).
418. Id at 309 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976)).
419. Id at 311.
420. Id at 309.
421. Id The only time the truck operator was on the site was when the truck was being
loaded or unloaded during which time he generally remained in the vehicle. Id
422. Id at 311.
423. 456 U.S. 645 (1982).
424. Id at 666.
425. Id at 647-48. Section 8(e) generally prohibits secondary agreements that "require
an employer to cease doing business with another party, in order to influence the labor
relations of that party." 456 U.S. at 649.
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The first case involved Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., a framing subcontractor in the construction industry. Woelke had been engaged in collective bargaining with the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America for a three year period. Negotiations for a successive agreement reached an impasse because the union
demanded a union signatory subcontracting clause. Two union locals
picketed Woelke's jobsite which resulted in work stoppages. Woelke
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging section
8(e) violations.4 26
Woekle alleged that the construction industry proviso protected
only subcontracting clauses that covered jobsites where union and nonunion personnel were employed.4 27 The Board rejected this argument
and ruled that such clauses are protected by the proviso so long as they
are negotiated under a collective bargaining arrangement.42 8 In upholding the clause's validity, the Board also found that the union committed no unfair labor practice by picketing to enforce the clause. 429
The second case involved the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. and Local 701 of the
International Union of Operating Engineers. Oregon AGC, an association comprised of approximately two hundred employers in the construction industry, entered into a contract containing a subcontracting
clause with Local 701 in 1960. In 1977, the association filed unfair labor practice charges against the union alleging section 8(e) violations. 430 The Board, adopting the rationale applied in CarpentersLocal
No. 944 (Woelke), found that the clause was protected by the proviso. 43 1 In an en banc hearing, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's
order in its entirety and added that, although economic pressure may
not be used to enforce a subcontracting clause, it may be used in an
effort to obtain such an agreement.4 32 In reviewing these decisions, the
Supreme Court looked to the plain language and legislative history of
section 8(e) and determined that Congress did not intend to limit the
426. Id at 649. Woelke also argued that union picketing in support of the allegedly invalid clause violated section 8(b)(4). That section prohibits coercing "any employer. . . to
join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited
by subsection (e) .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
427. 456 U.S. at 649.
428. Id at 649-50 (quoting Carpenters Local No. 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.),
239 N.L.R.B. 241, 250 (1978) (citations omitted)).
429. 456 U.S. at 650 (citing Carpenters, 239 N.L.R.B. at 251).
430. 456 U.S. at 650-51.
431. Id at 651 (citing International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 239 N.L.R.B. 274, 277
(1978)).
432. 654 F.2d 1301 (1981) (en bane) (emphasis added).
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where union and nonvalidity of subcontracting clauses to situations
433
union employees were working side-by-side.
The petitioners also alleged that subcontracting clauses cause
"top-down" pressure for unionization.4 3 4 Such clauses have the effect
of forcing subcontractors to require that all employees join the union to
obtain work, thereby "tak[ing] the representation decision out of the
hands of the employees and plac[ing] it in the hands of the employers." 435 The Court found that this pressure was inherent in the proviso
of such
to section 8(e) and that Congress decided that the ill effects
436
pressure were outweighed by the benefits of the proviso.
Furthermore, the pressure is limited by other provisions of the
Act.437 Section 8(f) permits collective bargaining in the construction
industry even if the employees have not selected the union as their bargaining representative. 438 This section also provides that employees
may file an election petition with the Board to challenge the union's
status as exclusive representative. 439 As an additional safeguard, the
subcontractor may repudiate the clause if the union does not demonEven if the subcontractor must obtain labor
strate majority status."
from union hiring halls, nonunion members are not "frozen out" because the union must refer union and nonunion members to available
jobs on a non-discriminatory basis.44 1 Based on the plain language and
legislative history of section 8(e) and the additional safeguards, the
Court affirmed the lower court rulings that the clauses were protected
by the proviso." 2
F

Union Coercion of Employers

In NLRB v. Driver Salesmen," 3 the court found that the Board
433. 456 U.S. at 653-54.
434. Id at 662-63.
435. Id at 663.
436. Id "Congress concluded that the community of interests on the construction jobsite
justified the top down organizational consequences that might attend the protection of legitimate collective bargaining objectives." Id It is interesting to note that 7 years earlier in
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), the Court stated that
one of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to limit top-down organizing. 456 U.S. at 632.
437. 456 U.S. at 663-64.
438. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976).
439. I.
440. See, NLRB v. Local 103, Ironworkers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
441. 456 U.S. at 664-65 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)).
442. 456 U.S. at 666. The Court also held that the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to decide whether a union violates § 8(b)(4)(A) when it pickets to obtain a lawful subcontracting clause. Id at 665-66.
443. 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
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failed to establish that the union controlled a trust when the trustees
voted to implement vision care benefits. 4 " Without a showing that the
trust was an agent of the union there could be no violation of section
8(b)(3) of the Act." 5 A trust was created in 1966 by Driver Salesmen, a
union, and three employers in a multiemployer bargaining unit. In
1976, the union suggested to the Board of Trustees that the trust establish a vision care package by using $100,000 from the trust reserve
fund. The Board of Trustees was composed of three union and three
employer members. The vision care proposal received unanimous support from the union trustees and majority support from the employer
trustees." 6 The court concluded that there was no evidence that the
employers were coerced when the decision was made to extend the benefits.' 7 The employers would not be obligated to pay for any benefits
beyond the termination date of the existing collective bargaining agreement. 448 Because the trust was not considered an agent of the union,
and the employers had not been coerced in the vote, there was no violation of section 8(b)(3) of the Act.449
InNLRB v. LocalNo. 12,450 the court held that the union committed an unfair labor practice by threatening to strike in order to force an
employer to pay contributions to a union fringe benefit fund. 45 ' The
union claimed that contributions were due on behalf of the president
and vice-president of the company.4 5 2 In an earlier decision,4 53 the
court ruled that the union strike was illegal, and required the union and
trust fund trustees to repay to the company all monies that had been
paid to the trust under protest. 454 Relying on this earlier ruling, the
court found that the record clearly established that the union committed an unfair labor practice in the instant case. 455 Thus, the decision
was based on the earlier ruling that the strike was illegal and that the
Board's remedy requiring repayment of the funds was appropriate.4 5 6
444. Id at 858.
445. Id at 859.
446. Id at 857.
447. Id at 858.
448. Id at 859.
449. Id at 859-60.
450. 673 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982).
451. Id at 1096.
452. Id
453. Maas & Feduska, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1979).
454. Id at 720-21. The court relied on the terms of the labor agreement which provided
the company president and vice-president with optional coverage. Id
455. Id at 1097. The court, in a rather cursory opinion, relied heavily on the Board's
findings.
456. Id

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

G. Duty of FairRepresentation
The duty of fair representation has a statutory basis in both the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act.45 7 The failure to exhaust internal union remedies will generally preclude a union
member from bringing an action against the union.4 58 A union memin bad faith or engaged in discriminaber may sue if the union 4acted
59
tory or arbitrary conduct.
The Ninth Circuit considered a union's duty of fair representation
in Weitzel v. Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, Local -5."46 0
The court in Weitzel held that where the union made a good faith effort
to have a former employee adequately represented, the union did not
breach its duty of fair representation. 46 1 The employee had been fired
by Shell Oil Company during a strike. The union referred him to a law
firm and the firm subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board. The employee became critical of the law firm's services, and appealed a $10,000 judgment against the advice of the firm.
On appeal, no counsel from the firm appeared and the employee was
represented by an NLRB attorney. The Board overruled its earlier decision and reversed the $10,000 judgment. The court of appeals found
that the employee produced no evidence to prove that the union acted
in "an arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith fashion, and therefore [the
employee] failed to state a claim for breach of duty of fair
462
representation.
The employee also claimed that the NLRB attorney was uninterested, inexperienced, and incompetent. The court stated that the standard in a malpractice suit should be whether the combined skill and
care of the NLRB attorney and private counsel would have rendered a
different decision, and not whether the NLRB attorney exercised ordinary skill and care." 3 The case was remanded to consider this issue.
The court in Tenorio v. NLRB 4 4 held that a union breaches its
duty of fair representation by processing a member's grievance in a
perfunctory or arbitrary manner.4 65 In Tenorio, two union members
became involved in a barroom altercation. They refused to appear for
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 728 (1971).
Id at 187 (Supp. 1978).
d at 191.
667 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id at 786-87.
Id See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
667 F.2d at 787.
680 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id at 601 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190-91).
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questioning before a union board because they considered the fight to
be a private matter. They met with an executive board member to in-

form him of their position. The board member reported to a foreman
that he felt "threatened" at the meeting, and the two union members
were discharged the next day. The union filed a grievance on their
behalf. The union had a policy of interviewing discharged workers to

get their version of any incidents regarding dismissals, but failed to do
so in this case, alleging that it did not have the addresses or phone

numbers of the discharged workers. Testimony of one union official
disputed this fact. The joint standing committee met to review the merits of the grievance. The union acquiesced in the dismissal and decided

not to pursue the grievance to arbitration.
The court noted that unions are afforded a reasonable range of

discretion in handling grievances, but that an "egregious disregard for
the rights of union members constitutes a breach of the duty of fair
representation.

'466

The court found that the union departed from its

policy of interviewing all employees after dismissal and that the union
had no legitimate basis for doing

SO.

4 67

The totality of the circum-

stances indicated an inadequate handling of the union members'
grievance. 468
III.
A.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Duty to Bargainin Good Faith

Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act

(NLRA) impose a mutual duty on an employer and a union to "bargain collectively".4 69 Section 8(d) requires the employer and the union
to meet at reasonable times and to confer in good faith.47 0 Together,
these sections make it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain in
466. 680 F.2d at 609 (citing Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); Robesky v. Quantas Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1978)).
467. 680 F.2d at 602.
468. Id.
469. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) states in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representaSimilarly, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976) states in pertinent
tives of his employees ......
part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent to refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees
470. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 8(d) states in pertinent part: "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and concur in good faith. . . but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
... See, e.g., NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978).
.
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good faith. However, there is no universal definition of good faith.4 7 '

Thus, the Board and the courts determine the meaning of good faith on
a case-by-case basis.47 2
1. Indicia of good/bad faith
Surface bargaining and dilatory tactics during negotiations have
been recognized as evidence of bad faith.47 3 Surface bargaining exists

474
when a party bargains without an intent to reach an agreement. Similarly, dilatory tactics exist when a party initiates unreasonable delays

or tactics to frustrate the process of negotiation. 475
The Ninth Circuit recently dealt with the issue of good faith bar471. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 83-97 (Supp. 1976). In its first Annual Report,
the Board discussed some guidelines of good faith:
Collective bargaining is something more than the mere meeting of an employer
with the representatives of his employees; the essential thing is rather the serious
intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground ....
The Board has repeatedly asserted that good faith on the part of the employer is an
essential ingredient of collective bargaining.
I NLRB ANN. REP. 85-86 (1936).
472. The courts have tried to define "good faith." For example, the Ninth Circuit in
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943), stated that the parties
must meet with a present intention to find a basis for agreement. See also NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) ("While Congress did not compel agreement. . . ,it did
require collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result."); NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 528 (10th Cir. 1963) (parties may not come to
the bargaining table with a "predetermined position not to bargain"); NLRB v. Herman
Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960) (tactics employed while bargaining made
collective bargaining futile; there must be an attempt to reach an agreement); NLRB v.
Highland Park Mfg., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (parties "negotiate in good faith with
the view of reaching an agreement if possible"). See generally ABA, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, 83-88 (Supp. 1976).
473. ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, at 84-85.
474. See, e.g., NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 469 F.2d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1972)
(cancellation of meetings, refusal to return phone calls, and failure to provide counterproposals on time constituted a section 8(a)(5) violation); NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway
Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1972) (employer's actions during ten bargaining
sessions-refusal to sign union acceptance of employer's proposal, insistence on the right to
withdraw his proposal at any time, objections to typographical errors, commencement of
decertification proceeding against union-constituted surface bargaining).
475. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850, 855 (1st Cir.
1973) (employer's limited schedule of meetings, insistence that union representatives travel
long distances to meetings and requirement that union withdraw unfair labor practice
charge before any further meetings constituted bad faith bargaining); NLRB v. Vander Wal,
316 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1963) (procrastination in execution of written agreement held to
be a dilatory tactic); NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 530 (10th
Cir. 1963) (request for contract review on matters agreed to in principle and failure to make
positive and constructive suggestions concerning the wording of the contract indicative of
deliberate staling).
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gaining in Pittsburgh-DesMoines Corp. v. NLRB, 4 76 where an employer withdrew its proposed contract after the union had rejected
specific portions of it.477 When the employer tried to revive the negotiations, the union refused, contending that the employer did not intend
to reach an agreement.478 The court, however, concluded that the company did wish to reach an agreement.47 9 An employer is not committed
to those portions of a proposal on which there has been tentative agreement. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a proposal should be viewed as
a package.480 Concessions may be made in some portions of the proposal to gain concessions in other portions.48 ' Thus, the fact that Pittsburgh-Des Moines retracted its entire proposal when it could not win
concessions from the union on specific proposals did not justify a conclusion that it had engaged in surface bargaining.482
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) do not require a party to make concessions or to give up a reasonable position.48 3 If a party, however, does
not "enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement," the party may be violating its
duty to bargain in good faith.4 84 To determine whether a party genuinely desires to reach an agreement, the Board and the courts must consider the "totality of the circumstances" which are indicative of mental
state. 485 The Ninth Circuit has held that the content of the bargaining
476. 663 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1981).
477. Id at 958. The union rejected new proposal sections dealing with strikes and employee retirement plans. Id at 957. Tentative agreement had been reached on other portions of the contract. Id
478. Id at 958-59.
479. Id at 959.
480. Id The court stated that "'[to bargain collectively does not impose an inexorable
ratchet, whereby a party is bound by all it has ever said."' Id at 960 (quoting NLRB v.
Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 1978)).
481. 663 F.2d at 960. "We must assume that the proposal, advanced in the course of the
strike, was the result of compromise and the concessions may well have been tendered in
some areas with the hope of securing agreement on those portions which the Union chose to
reject." Id
482. Id
483. NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972).
484. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960). See also NLRB v.
Insurance Agent's Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960); NLRB v. Mrs. Fay's Pies, 341 F.2d
489, 492 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., 226 F.2d 377, 380
(9th Cir. 1955).
485. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 1981). A court
cannot rely solely upon the terms of the contract proposals. Id For example, in NLRB v.
Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit stated:
This circuit has specifically held that the Board can look at the content of the bargaining proposals as part of its review of all the circumstances. NLRB v. Holmes
Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972). In addition, how-
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proposal is relevant in determining bad faith.486
For example, in NLRB v. Mar-Len Cabinets,Inc. ,487 the employer
proposed an extremely strong "management rights" package that
would have required the union effectively to abrogate its representation
of the employees.488 While the court urged caution when inferring motivation from a proposal's content, it concluded that Mar-Len intended
to frustrate any possibility of agreement and consequently failed to bargain in good faith. 489 The proposals were so "consistently and predictably unpalatable" to the union that Mar-Len should have known an
agreement was impossible. 490

Furthermore, though the employer

proferred economic justifications in support of its proposal, the court
stated that "patently improbable justifications for a bargaining position
will support
an inference that the position is not maintained in good
faith." 49'
2. Unilateral changes
An employer's unilateral changes in conditions of employment
which are a mandatory subject of bargaining have been regarded as a
per se violation of section 8(a)(5). 4 92 Accordingly, in N.T Enloe Memoever, the Board must show "substantial evidence that the company's attitude was
inconsistent with its duty to seek an agreement" before a finding of failure to bargain is warranted. NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 29 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
486. 638 F.2d at 1227.
487. 659 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981).
488. Id at 999. The employer proposed:
to establish a no-strike/no-picket policy; to abolish union security, the right of
union representatives to visit the plant, and super-seniority for shop stewards; to
deny the employees' rights to arbitration of grievances and to respect picket lines;
and to relieve [employer] of its duties to notify the union of new hiring, to hire first
through the union hiring hall, and to contribute to the union pension fund.
Id
489. Id The court recognized that caution is required because "'there are too many
reasons why an employer who is willing to contract with a union might wish to... maintain an open shop."' Id (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir.
1980)).
490. 659 F.2d at 999.
491. Id at 999-1000. Mar-Len, for example, argued that the union was applying union
security clauses in an unlawful manner and consequently subjecting the company to litigation costs. The Board concluded that such an argument was "grasping at straws." Id The
court agreed with the Board that the employer's economic justifications "'were so theoretical and marginal as to be pretextual."' Id (quoting Queen Mary Restaurant Corp. v.
NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 1977)).
492. NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 1965) (unilaterally
implemented wage program constituted a failure to bargain in good faith without reference
to employer's subjective motive). See also NLRB v. Sky Wolf Sales, 470 F.2d 827, 830 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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ria Hospital & CaliforniaNurses' Association,49 the Board found the
hospital's unilateral wage and benefit changes to be a per se violation
4 94
of section 8(a)(5).
Similarly, a successor employer who plans to carry on the same
business with a substantial number of the predecessor's employees
must consult with the union before altering terms and conditions of
employment.4 95 Thus, in NLRB v. World Evangelism, Inc.,496 the
Ninth Circuit held that a successor employer violated section 8(a)(5)
when it unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment. a97 In World Evangelism, the successor employer retained all of
the predecessor's employees while carrying on the same business at the
same location.4 98 The successor employer, however, lowered wages
and discontinued employee benefits which the employees had enjoyed
under the contract with the predecessor employer.49 9 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the successor employer's changes made without
consultation with the representative union, constituted a violation of
section 8(a)(5).500
A union's unilateral change of an agreement is a per se violation of
section 8(b)(3).10 1 In NLRB v. Driver Salesmen Local No. 582,502 an
independently-operated union trust fund implemented a change in the
employees' vision care benefits. °3 Because the trustee was not found to
be the union's agent, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the union had
not unilaterally changed the benefits, and therefore, was not in violation of section 8(b)(3). 5°
493. 250 N.L.R.B. 583 (1980), enforced, 682 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1982).
494. 250 N.L.R.B. at 588. The Ninth Circuit did not address the issue on appeal because
the hospital did not specifically challenge the Board's determination. 682 F.2d at 793 n.l.
495. See, e.g., Bums Int'l Security Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972)
(successor employer is free to establish initial terms and conditions upon which it will hire
the predecessor's employees, unless "it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to
retain all the employees in the unit"); Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir.

1981).

496. 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
497. Id at 1355.
498. Id at 1354. See Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981) (a successor employer is one who carries on essentially the same business as the predecessor with a
majority of the same employees).
499. 656 F.2d at 1355.
500. Id
501. See, e.g., NLRB v. Communications Workers Local 1170, 474 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir.
1972).
502. 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
503. Id at 857.
504. Id at 859. In order for the trustee to have been an agent of the union, the union
must have been in control of the trust at the time of the vision care change. Id at 858. For
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3. Recognition of employees' representatives
Section 8(a)(5) imposes a duty on an employer to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. 0 5 This duty exists
even when an employer conducts his own poll and finds that a majority
of his employees support a union. 0 6 In NLRB v. English Brothers Pattern & Foundry,50 7 the Ninth Circuit held that if an employer conducts
a poll and the poll shows that a majority of the employees support a
union, the employer is bound to bargain with the union.50 8 Here, the
court found that the employer's personal poll proved the employer's
knowledge of the union's majority support.50 9 Therefore, the employer's refusal to bargain with the union constituted a section 8(a)(5)
violation. 10
4. Employer withdrawal of recognition
Section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain with the representative selected by a majority of its employees. 51 ' After certification or
voluntary recognition of a union, majority support is irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable period of time, usually one year.512 After one
year, the presumption becomes rebuttable. 1 3 To rebut the presumption, an employer must show that it had a good faith reasonable doubt
of the union's majority support at the time of withdrawal of recognition, or that it had clear and convincing evidence of the union's minority status.51 4
the change to pass, however, the proposal required a majority of both the union and employer trustees. Id In fact, the proposal did pass with a majority approval by the employer
and union trustees. Id
505. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See supra note 469.
506. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 680, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
507. 679 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982).
508. Id at 788 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB,
498 F.2d at 682). See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
509. 679 F.2d at 789. When asked by the employer in a face to face meeting, seven of
nine employees raised their hands in support of the union. Id at 788.
510. Id at 788.
511. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See supra note 469.
512. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921
(1979). Absent unusual circumstances, the reasonable period of time is usually one year. Id
at 297. An example of an unusual circumstance is a radical change in the size of the employee unit. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
513. 584 F.2d at 297.
514. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980). If the presumption
is rebutted, then the union must produce evidence to show the union's majority status. National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974).
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In NLRB v. Mar-Len Cabinets,Inc. ,515 the Ninth Circuit held that
the employer did not meet its burden of proof to rebut the presumption
of the union's majority support at the time it withdrew union recognition. " 6 In Mar-Len, the employer withdrew recognition from the
union after negotiations for a new agreement had broken down.5 17 Although the employer showed that none of its employees joined in the
picket line and that four out of six employees resigned from the union
and returned to work, the court held that the Board had sufficient evidence to find that the employees resigned from the union out of economic necessity.5 18 In addition, the court agreed with the Board that
the employer's doubt of the union's majority status was not asserted in
good faith.5 19
Similarly, in N.T Enloe Memorial Hospitalv. NLRB,5 2 ° the Ninth
Circuit held that the hospital violated section 8(a)(5) when it failed to

rebut the presumption of the union's majority status. 2 ' In Enloe, the
court stated that "'the evidence presented to establish [a] reasonable

good faith doubt, individually or cumulatively, must unequivocally indicate that union support had declined to a minority.' "522 Enloe contended that it had presented the Board "overwhelming evidence" to
demonstrate its good faith doubt.

23

The court, however, found that

Enloe relied on its supervisors' testimony of comments made by employees in the past.52 4 Even assuming the reliability of the testimony,
the court held that Enloe's evidence did not unequivocally show that a
515. 659 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981).
516. Id at 998.
517. Id at 996.
518. Id at 999. See NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 224-25 (9th Cir. 1979). The
court also found that the Board was justified in finding that the employees' dissatisfaction
with the union focussed on its handling of the negotiations, not its representation in general.
659 F.2d at 999.
519. 659 F.2d at 999. "'Reasonable doubt as to majority status must only be asserted in
good faith and may not be raised in the context of an employer's activities aimed at causing
disaffection from the Union."' Id (quoting Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d
721, 730 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court affirmed the Board conclusion that the employees'
resignations were a direct result of the employer's failure to bargain in good faith. 659 F.2d
at 999.
520. 682 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1982).
521. Id at 795.
522. Id at 794 (quoting NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981)). Thus, evidence presenting only an ambiguous inference
of the union's minority status is not enough. 682 F.2d at 795.
523. 682 F.2d at 795.
524. Id Enloe relied on comments made by nurses from the time of a strike in 1976 until
an unfair practice hearing in 1978 and on comments made by prospective employees. Id
The court found that these remarks were remote in time and had little probative value. Id
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majority of the employee unit did not want the union's representation.525 Thus, the court affirmed the Board's finding that Enloe had
violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the union.5 26
The Ninth Circuit extended the basic rule restricting an employer's ability to withdraw recognition in Mammoth of California,Inc.
v. NLRB. 5 27 In Mammoth, the employer and the union entered into a
settlement agreement in which the employer agreed to post a notice of
its intent to bargain with the union upon request in the future.5 28
Thereafter, Mammoth informed the union of its withdrawal of recognition since it believed that the union had lost its majority support.52 9
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that an employer must engage in good
faith bargaining with a union following its certification for a reasonable
period of time, usually one year. 53 0 Although Mammoth withdrew recognition one month after the certification year had ended, the court
held that the settlement agreement extended the certification year and
the union's irrebuttable presumption of majority status.5 3' Therefore,
Mammoth had committed itself to bargain with the union for a reasonable period of time without regard to the certification year or to any
change in the union's majority status.532 The Ninth Circuit has thereby
limited the ability of an employer to withdraw its recognition of the
525. Id
526. Id at 792.
527. 673 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1982).
528. Id at 1092. The agreement to post notice of the employer's future intent to bargain
with the union was in consideration of the union's withdrawal of unfair labor practice
charges against Mammoth. Id The settlement agreement was approved by the Regional
Director. Id
529. Id
530. Id See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954); Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578
F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1978); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (Board shall not order an election in
any bargaining unit within which a valid election was conducted in the preceeding twelve
months).
531. 673 F.2d at 1092-93. The court relied on Poole Foundry & Machry. Co. v. NLRB,
192 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952), where it was stated that
"by entering into a settlement agreement [the employer] is bound to bargain in good faith
with the Union for a reasonable period of time after such agreement, without questioning
the Union's lack of a majority." In Poole, the employer was not permitted to withdraw its
recognition three and one-half months after following the settlement agreement. 192 F.2d at
743. Mammoth contended, however, that the settlement agreement did not extend the certification year, relying on NLRB v. Vantran Elec. Corp., 580 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1978). 673
F.2d at 1093. The court found Vantran distinguishable because the settlement in Vantran
was a "non-board settlement" which did not require the Board's approval. 673 F.2d at 1093
n.3.
532. The court agreed with the Board that four months was not a "reasonable period of
time." See supra notes 512, 531 and accompanying text.
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union when the employer voluntarily enters into a settlement agreement with the union.
Similarly, a successor employer 533 commits a section 8(a)(5) violation when it refuses to bargain with the previously recognized union
unless the successor employer shows that the union no longer represents a majority of the employees, or that there is a good faith doubt as
to the union's majority status. 34 In NLRB v. World Evangelism,
Inc. , the Ninth Circuit found that the new owner's refusal to bargain
with the union constituted a section 8(a)(5) violation because the new
owner intended to carry on the same business with the same union employees.5 36 As a successor employer, World Evangelism was obligated
to recognize and bargain with the employees' union.5 37
5. Withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit
With adequate advance notice, a party is free to withdraw from a
multiemployer unit prior to the commencement of negotiations. 38
Once negotiations have begun, however, a party may only withdraw if
"unusual circumstances" exist or if "mutual consent" is obtained.5 39
a.

unusual circumstances

The Board has ruled that a bargaining impasse 5 ° is not an unusual circumstance so as to justify a party's withdrawal from a multiem533. A successor employer is one who conducts essentially the same business as the former employer, and a majority of whose work force are former employees. Kallmann v.
NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981).
534. NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1980).
535. 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
536. Id at 1354-55. If a successor employer plans to retain substantially all the predecessor's employees, the successor employer must consult with the union before altering terms
and conditions of employment. Id at 1355 (citing Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc. v. NLRB,
406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972)).
537. 656 F.2d at 1354.
538. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1982) (citing
Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958)).
539. 454 U.S. at 411. Although this rule was dictum in Retail Associates, the Board's
approach has been accepted by the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Custom Wood Specialties,
Inc., 622 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1980); Carvel Co. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); NLRB v. Central Plumbing Co., 492 F.2d 1252 (6th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70,470 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Dover Tavern Owner's Ass'n, 412 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
540. A widely accepted definition of impasse is "a state of facts in which the parties,
despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472,482
(5th Cir. 1963).
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ployer unit.54 ' In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, along with two other
circuits, has held that an impasse in negotiations constitutes an unusual
circumstance which justifies an employer's unilateral withdrawal from
the multiemployer bargaining unit.54 2
To resolve these differences, the Supreme Court, in Charles D.
Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB,54 3 held that an impasse in bar5 44
gaining didnot justify a party's withdrawal from the bargaining unit.
In Bonanno, the union and the employer association reached an impasse over the method of compensation for truck drivers. 45 Unable to
break the impasse, the union initiated a selective strike against
Bonanno.5 46 Thereafter, Bonanno notified the union and the employer

association of its withdrawal from the association. After Bonanno's
withdrawal, negotiations between the union and remaining employers
resumed, resulting in a collective bargaining agreement.5 47 Bonanno,
however, denied that it was bound by the agreement. As a result, the
union filed a charge alleging that Bonanno's attempt to withdraw from
the unit constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5).5 48
The Board concluded that Bonanno's withdrawal violated this section,
541. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22 (1973), enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1974). InHi-Way Billboards, the Board reasoned that an impasse was a foreseeable
stage in the bargaining process, rather than the end of collective bargaining. Id at 23. The
Board added that a rule permitting unilateral withdrawal upon impasse would "herald the
demise of multiemployer bargaining," since a member could avoid its bargaining obligation
by purposefully creating an impasse whenever "it was dissatisfied with the impending agreement." Id at 23-24. The Board has adhered to this policy ever since. See, e.g., Seattle Auto
Glass, 246 N.L.R.B. 94, 96 (1979); Golden Bear Motor, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 300, 308 (1979);
Marine Mach. Works, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1099 (1979); Florida Fire Sprinklers, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1035 (1978); Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1096 (1976).
542. NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 898 (1975); NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135, 146 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 485
(3d Cir. 1975). In Associated Shower Door, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was "only
fair" that when an impasse was reached and the union engaged in selective picketing and
entered into an individual agreement with some members of the unit, the other members
should be permitted to withdraw. 512 F.2d at 232. If "the rule [were] otherwise, a union
could reach an agreement with one or more employers and then whipsaw the remaining
members.., of the weakened multiemployer unit." Id See Hi-Way Billboards,Inc., 500
F.2d at 183.
543. 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
544. Id at 412.
545. Id at 407. The impasse was reached around May 15, 1975, two and one-half months
after the commencement of the negotiations. Id
546. Id In response to the union's strike against Bonanno on June 23, most of the association's members locked out their drivers.
547. Id at 408. The collective bargaining agreement was reached on April 23, 1976.
548. Id The union stated that since it had not consented to the withdrawal, Bonanno was
bound by the settlement. Id
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and the First Circuit enforced the Board's order. 549
The Court reiterated the Board's position that an impasse in negotiations is not "sufficiently destructive" of multiemployer bargaining to

justify a party's unilateral withdrawal.5 50 The Court reasoned that an
impasse is only a "temporary deadlock" which is broken "'through
either a change of mind or the application of economic force.'

"551

Therefore, to permit withdrawal at an impasse would undermine the
utility of multiemployer bargaining.: 52 In affirming the Board's deci-

sion, the Court recognized that the function of striking a balance effectuating national labor policy should be left to the Board and not to the
courts.55 3

In addition, the Court affirmed the Board's position that individual employers could execute interim or temporary agreements with the

union without that being destructive to a multiemployer unit.55 4
agreements do not justify a party's unilateral
Therefore, interim
55
withdrawal.
On the other hand, in Seattle Auto Glass v. NLRB, 556 the Ninth
Circuit held that when a union enters into a "permanent separate
agreement" with a substantial member of the unit, the remaining members of the unit are free to withdraw. 7 In Seattle Auto Glass,
549. NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1980).
550. 454 U.S. at 412 (citing Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973)).
551. 454 U.S. at 412. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1093-94
(1979), afd, 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
552. 454 U.S. at 412. The Court stated that the Board "developed a rule which, although
it may deny an employer a particular economic weapon, does so in the interest of. . .maintaining the stability of the multiemployer unit." Id at 419. See supra note 541.
553. 454 U.S. at 413. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (Buffalo
Linen). In Buffalo Linen, the Court stated that "[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of
the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."
353 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted). Thus, in Bonanno, the Court concluded that since the
Board's decision was not arbitrary or contrary to law, the courts should defer to its judgment. 454 U.S. at 413.
554. 454 U.S. at 416-17.
555. Id Although interim agreements establish terms and conditions of employment
pending the negotiations, all employers, including those with interim agreements, have a
vested stake in the final agreement. Id at 415. See, e.g., Sangamo Constr. Co., 188
N.L.R.B. 159 (1971); Plumbers and Steamfitters Union No. 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592 (1971).
However, when one or more group members reach a "separate" agreement, entirely divorced from the multiemployer process, the Board has permitted the remaining members to
withdraw. 454 U.S. at 414-15. See, e.g., Typographic Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1573-74
(1978); Cornell Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974).
556. 669 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1982).
557. Id at 1337. See supra note 555.
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Birkenwald, a beer and wine distributor, was a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit. Upon learning that Premium, the largest member of the unit, had signed a separate agreement with the union after
the negotiations had reached an impasse, Birkenwald gave notice and
withdrew from the unit."' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Premium's
signing of a permanent separate agreement had "'effectively fragmented and destroyed the integrity of the bargaining unit.' "19 Therefore, the remaining members, including Birkenwald, were justified in
withdrawing from the unit.5 60
The Court's holding in Bonanno arguably sweeps too broadly. A
majority of the Court agreed with the Board that an impasse is only a
"temporary deadlock" which will eventually be broken "either through
a change in mind or the application of economic force." 56 ' However,
not all impasses are temporary. In fact, the deadlock in Bonanno lasted
for over six months, and there were no signs that the parties would
return to the bargaining table.5 62 Thus, the facts in Bonanno suggested
not just a temporary deadlock, but a complete breakdown in negotia5 63
tions. Since negotiations recommenced after Bonanno's withdrawal,
Bonanno's withdrawal actually helped rather than hindered the collective bargaining process.
Furthermore, the majority's holding in Bonanno that interim or
temporary agreements do not justify a party's withdrawal also may
sweep too broadly. An employer who enters into an interim agreement
is less likely to seek a final agreement, especially if his competitors are
hampered by a strike or a defensive lockout. 5" In such a situation, all
employers do not have an equal stake in promptly securing a final
agreement. 5 65 By giving blanket approval to interim and temporary
agreements, the Court actually promoted fragmentation of the bargaining unit.
A better rule would be to require the Board to analyze the specific
facts on a case-by-case basis. If a complete breakdown occurred in negotiations, or if an interim agreement resulted in unit fragmentation,
558. 669 F.2d at 1336.
559. Id at 1337 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1096
(1979), aftd, 454 U.S. 404 (1982)).
560. 669 F.2d at 1337.
561. 454 U.S. at 412.
562. Id at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
563. Id at 408.
564. An employer who reaches an interim agreement remains in the multiemployer unit
to negotiate for a final agreement, which would terminate the interim agreement.
565. CharlesD. Bonanno Linen Serv., 454 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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the Board could permit a party to withdraw. 66 The Court, however,
was reluctant to step into the Board's area of expertise.56 7
The Board has held that financial distress may be an unusual cir-

cumstance justifying a party's withdrawal.

68

In Seattle Auto Glass v.

569

a roofing contractor withdrew from the multiemployer unit
NLRB,
after an impasse in negotiations was reached.57 0 In addition to arguing

that an impasse justified withdrawal, Western, the contractor, contended that extreme financial distress warranted its withdrawal.5 7 1 The

Ninth Circuit held that this was not an unusual circumstance. 72 The
court stated that a member of a multiemployer unit may demand spe-

cial treatment if it clearly notifies the other parties at the beginning of
negotiations of its special problems.5

3

Since Western entered into the

negotiations without disclosing its financial problems, it was not permitted to withdraw from the unit at the last minute claiming financial
distress.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in H & D, Inc. v. NLRB, 57 4 held
that the mass resignation of H & D's employees from the union was not

an unusual circumstance to justify the employer's withdrawal from the
multiemployer unit.575 The court stated that the proper test was not

whether the majority of H & D's employees had resigned from the
union, but rather, whether the majority of all of the employees in the
multiemployer unit had resigned.5 7 6 H & D was not justified in its

566. Id at 431 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
567. The majority opinion stated in Bonanno that some or all of the Justices may prefer
that the Board reach a different balance in assessing the significance of impasse in collective
bargaining. 454 U.S. at 413. The Court reasoned that if it had substituted its judgment for
that of the Board, "the role of the judiciary in administering regulatory statutes will be
enormously expanded and its work will become more complex and time consuming." 1d at
418. The dissenting Justices, however, noted that although judicial review should be limited,
it should not be absent altogether. Id at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
568. Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1968) (a garment company's economic
straits deemed to be an unusual circumstance); U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 75152 (1968) (accord).
569. 669 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1982).
570. Id at 1336.
571. Id
572. Id
573. Id Even if an employer does not state its special problems at the beginning of negotiations, the employer would be able to withdraw if the union or the other members of the
association had notice of the special problems. See, e.g., U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B.
750, 752 (1968) (union waived its right to prohibit withdrawal where it had notice of the
employer's financial difficulties).
574. 670 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1982).
575. Id at 123.
576. Id (citing NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967)).
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withdrawal from the multiemployer unit because H & D's employees
amounted to substantially less than a majority of the entire unit.
b. mutual consent
In NLRB v. Teamsters Union Local No. 378, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Board's determination that the union had committed an
unfair labor practice by negotiating a separate contract with an employer who had withdrawn from a multiemployer unit without the
unit's consent.- 78 Capitol Chevrolet withdrew from the multiemployer
unit after it objected to the unit's bargaining tactics. 79 Capitol Chevrolet sent notice of its withdrawal to the employer association and the
Teamsters.5 80 The association, however, refused to accept Capitol
Chevrolet's withdrawal, and it sent notice of its refusal to Capitol
Chevrolet and the Teamsters.5 8 1 Nonetheless, Capitol Chevrolet and
the Teamsters initiated separate bargaining which led to the execution
of a permanent separate agreement.5 2 The Teamsters contended that
the mutual consent requirement should be interpreted as requiring only
the union's consent.5 83 The Board, however, concluded that mutual
consent requires both the union's consent and the employer unit's consent.5 84 Therefore, the Board determined that the Teamsters were
guilty of an unfair labor practice because the employer unit did not
consent to Capitol Chevrolet's withdrawal.
The Ninth Circuit rejected both the Board's and the Teamsters'
positions as too extreme.5 85 Instead, the court reasoned that the mutual
consent requirement depended on the employer's agreement with the
unit prior to negotiations.5 86 This agreement indicates the degree to
577. 672 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982).
578. Id at 745.
579. Id at 743. The unit decided to maintain a "hard money" position against the
union's proposed cost-of-living increase clause. Id
580. Id
581. Id
582. Id
583. Id See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Wire Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1968); Universal Insulation
Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 406, 408 (6th Cir. 1966); Joseph E. Collins & Co., 184 N.L.R.B.
940 (1970); Metke Ford Motors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 950 (1962).
584. 672 F.2d at 743.
585. Id at 744. The court stated that either extreme imposed unnecessary rigidity on the
bargaining process. Id
586. Id The court relied on dicta from the Supreme Court in Bonanno where the Court
stated:
mT1he Board has held that the execution of separate agreements that would permit
either the union or the employer to escape the binding effect of an agreement re-
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which an employer is bound to the unit and also indicates the other

employers' interests in maintaining the "stability, solidarity, and integrity of the unit."58' 7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that a union

should not be liable unless the union was given notice prior to negotiations of an agreement which bound each of the employers.5 8 Because
the facts here did not show whether there was such an agreement or
whether the Teamsters were given pre-negotiation notice of such an
agreement, the case was remanded to the Board for a factual
determination. 8 9

6. Construction industry proviso
a.

"hot cargo" agreements

Under section 8(e) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for the

employer or the union to enter into any agreement which requires the
employer to refrain from doing business with another party.5 90 How-

ever, section 8(e) contains a proviso which permits these "hot cargo"
agreements between the union and an employer in the construction industry, concerning the contracting or subcontracting of work to be performed at a construction jobsite 5 9 1
In Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 the Supreme

Court held that the construction industry proviso shelters union signatory subcontracting clauses sought or negotiated during collective bargaining, even when the clauses extend beyond a particular jobsite
where both union and nonunion workers are employed.5 93 In Woelke,
suiting from group bargaining is a refusal to bargain and an unfair labor practice
on the part of both the union and any employer executing such an agreement. The
remaining members of the unit thus can insist that parties remain subject to unit
negotiations in accordance with their original understanding.
672 F.2d at 744 (quoting Bonanno, 454 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added)).
587. 672 F.2d at 744. See, e.g., Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899,
906 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
588. 672 F.2d at 745.
589. Id
590. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Section 158(e) states in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract
or agreement ... [w]hereby such employer ceases ... or agrees to cease ... from...
doing business with any other person, and ... such an agreement shall be ... unenforceable and void." Section 158(e) was added to the NLRA in 1959 under the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments. Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(b), 73 Stat. 543-44.
591. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Section 158(e) states in pertinent part: "That nothing in
this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in
the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at
the site of the construction .
592. 456 U.S. 645 (1982).
593. Id at 666.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the petitioner and the union reached a bargaining impasse over the
union's demand for a clause which would prohibit Woelke from subcontracting work at any jobsite "except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement with the
appropriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this agree'
When Woelke's jobsites were picketed in support of the
ment."594
clause, Woelke filed an unfair labor practice
subcontracting
union's
charge with the Board. 95
Woelke asserted that the construction industry proviso shelters
subcontracting clauses only if they are limited in application to particular jobsites at which both union and nonunion workers are employed.5 96 The Board, however, rejected Woelke's argument and held
that "such clauses are lawful whenever they are sought or negotiated
'in the context of collective bargaining relationships.' " 91 In addition,
even though the issue was not raised before the Board, the Board indicated that since the subcontracting clause was lawful, the picketing in
support of the proposal was permitted under section 8(b)(4)(A).5 98
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit at first refused enforcement. The
court adopted Woelke's contention, reasoning that the proviso was
designed solely to minimize friction between union members and nonunion workers employed at the same jobsite.5 99 Therefore, the court
would shelter a subcontracting clause only when a collective bargaining relationship exists and the employer wishes to engage a nonunion
subcontractor at a jobsite where the employer or his subcontractor employs union employees. On rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's decision. 6 ° Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Board that "union signatory subcontracting clauses are
protected so long as they are sought or negotiated in the context of a
collective bargaining relationship." 60 ' In addition, the Ninth Circuit
held that section 8(b)(4)(A) was not violated when the union picketed
594. Id. at 648-49.
595. Id. at 649.

596. Id
597. Id at 650 (citing Carpenters Local No. 944, 239 N.L.R.B. 241, 250 (1978)).
598. 456 U.S. at 650 (citing Carpenters Local No. 944, 239 N.L.R.B. 241, 251 (1978)).
Section 158(b)(4)(A) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents [to] forc[el or requir[e] any employer. . . to enter into any
agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section."
599. 456 U.S. at 651 (citing Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1347 (1979)).
600. 456 U.S. at 652 (citing Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc)).
601. 456 U.S. at 652.
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to obtain a lawful subcontracting clause. °2
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the subcontracting clause was permitted under the construction industry proviso.6 °3 The Court reasoned that the legislative
history of section 8(e) and the construction industry proviso clearly indicated that Congress did not intend to limit the proviso's application
to situations where union and nonunion workers are employed at the
same jobsite.6° It was Congress' intent to ensure that subcontracting
agreements remained lawful because the agreements were a major part
of the pattern of collective bargaining in the construction industry.60 5
In contrast, Woelke argued that Congress adopted the construction industry proviso primarily to overrule the Court's decision in NLRB v.
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council.60 6 In Denver Building,
the Court held that picketing a general contractor's job in order to protest the presence of a nonunion subcontractor is an illegal secondary
boycott.6 0 7 The Court, however, discounted Woelke's reliance on Den-

ver Building by finding that Congress was concerned about more than
the possibility of jobsite friction. 8
Woelke also contended that if these types of clauses were ap602. Id at 651.
603. Id at 666.
604. Id at 655. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959). Senator John F.
Kennedy stated that the proviso was "necessary to avoid serious damage to the pattern of
collective bargaining in [the construction] industr[y]." 456 U.S. at 656 (quoting 105 CONG.
REC. 17,889 (1959)). Senator Kennedy clearly indicated that broad subcontracting agreements were legal:
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to
subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be legal
today. They will not be unlawful under section 8(e). The proviso is also applicable
to all other agreements involving undertakings not to do work on a construction
project site with other contractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relation between them.
456 U.S. at 657 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,900 (1959)).
605. 456 U.S. at 657. A study done in 1961 revealed that broad subcontracting agreements were quite common. See Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 579 (1961). The Lunden report did not "describe a single agreement
that limited the applicability of a subcontracting restriction to jobsites at which both union
and nonunion workers were employed." 456 U.S. at 659.
606. 456 U.S. at 660. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
607. 456 U.S. at 661.
608. Id See supra note 604. The Court noted that the problem of jobsite friction received relatively little emphasis. 456 U.S. at 662. Congress was more concerned that the
Denver Building case would deny construction workers the right to engage in economic picketing at their place of employment. Congress was also concerned that since the employers of
various contractors have a close community of interest, the wages and working conditions of
one set of employers may affect the others. Id at 661-62 (citations omitted).
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proved, the unions would have a powerful organizing tool.60 9 Essentially, the subcontracting clauses would create "top-down" pressure for
unionization because the employers would decide the employees' representation. Admitting the presence of top-down organization pressure, the Court reasoned that such pressure is implicit in the
construction industry proviso.610 In addition, the Court stated that
Congress decided to accept this degree of top-down pressure when it
endorsed subcontracting agreements obtained in the context of a collective bargaining relationship. 61I Top-down organizing pressure, however, is limited by other provisions of the NLRA.61 2
Woelke also argued that the union's picketing to obtain the subcontracting clause violated section 8(b)(4)(A) .613 The Court refused to
review the validity of the picketing because it concluded that the Ninth
Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the issue.6 14
The Court has affirmed a broad interpretation of the construction
industry proviso. As a result, a construction industry employer who
has union employees will be unable to employ a nonunion subcontractor at a jobsite if the employees' union successfully negotiates a subcontractor clause in the context of collective bargaining. This seems to be
consistent with the purpose of the proviso because if the proviso did not
shelter a subcontractor clause like the one in Woelke, the employer
would be free to carry on separate nonunion construction projects. Besides causing friction between the employer's union and nonunion employees with regard to pay and working conditions, the position of
union members would be endangered because an employer could pay
less and give fewer benefits to a nonunion employee who is in a weaker
bargaining position. Thus, an employer would be more inclined to
have nonunion construction projects and, therefore, freeze out union
employees. In contrast, nonunion employees are not frozen out with
the presence of a subcontractor clause because sections 8(a)(3) and
609. 456 U.S. at 662.
610. Id. at 663.
611. Id
612. Id at 663-64. A subcontractor cannot be subjected to unlimited picketing to force it
into a union agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). Also, an employer can enter
into a prehire agreement with the union even though the employees have not designated the
union as their representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
613. 456 U.S. at 665. See supra note 598.
614. 456 U.S. at 665. The picketing issue was not raised during the proceedings before
the Board. Thus, judicial review was barred by § 10(e) which states in pertinent part: "[n]o
objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court,
unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary
circumstances." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
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8(b)(2) of the Act require the union to refer both members and nonmembers to available jobs.
The Ninth Circuit applied the Court's holding in Woelke to Brogan v. Swanson PaintingCo.6 15 In Brogan, the defendant, a signatory
to an industrial collective bargaining agreement, subcontracted work to
a nonsignatory contractor in violation of a subcontractor clause.6 16
The nonsignatory contractor refused to contribute to the signatory
union trust fund. 6 17 The collective bargaining agreement specified that
the defendant was obligated to make the contribution upon refusal of a
nonsignatory subcontractor.61 8 When the trustees of the employee trust
fund filed suit to enforce payment, the defendant argued that the subcontractor clause was "outside the ambit" of the construction industry
proviso. 6 19 Relying on the holding in Woelke, the Ninth Circuit held
that since the subcontracting clause was sought and negotiated in the
context of a collective bargaining relationship, it was sheltered by the
620
construction industry proviso.
Although the construction industry proviso exempts the industry
from the prohibition against secondary boycott agreements, the proviso
does not exempt the industry from section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), which forbids
economic coercion to enforce such a boycott. 62 ' In Groith Co. v.
NLRB,6 2 2 the Ninth Circuit held that agreements entered into pursuant to section 8(e) are to be enforced judicially rather than by selfhelp.6 23 In Grfth, the collective bargaining agreement gave the union
the right to strike to enforce its boycott against subcontractors who
were delinquent in their trust fund payments. 624 The court, however,
held that this provision violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 625 Although the
enforcement provision was held to be invalid, the construction industry
615. 682 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1982).
616. Id at 808.
617. Id at 809.
618. Id
619. Id at 809-10.
620. Id at 811.
621. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). See Conference Committee Rep. No. 1147, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959). The Ninth Circuit has followed this view on numerous occasions.
See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1975);
Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 405 F.2d 159, 163-64 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921
(1969).
622. 660 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
623. Id at 410. See supra note 621 and accompanying text.
624. 660 F.2d at 408.
625. Id at 410.
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proviso still sheltered the rest of the boycott agreement.62 6
In addition, the construction industry proviso is limited to activity
on the jobsite. In Joint Council of Teamsters, No. 42 v. NLRB,6 27 the
Ninth Circuit held that the operation of owner-operated dump trucks
was not "on-site work" within the meaning of the construction industry
proviso.628 In Joint Council, the dump truck operators hauled materials
from construction sites to remote dump sites, from "borrow" pits to
construction sites, and from one construction site to another.6 29 Since
the truck owners spent most of their time away from the construction
site, the court held that the truck owner-operators were delivery persons; therefore, their work was not covered by the on-site construction
630
industry proviso.
b. prehire agreements

Generally, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer and a
union to sign a collective bargaining agreement recognizing a minority
union as the exclusive bargaining representative. 63' An employer in
the construction industry, however, will not be found to have committed an unfair labor practice if it enters into a prehire agreement with a
minority union. 632 A prehire agreement does not entitle a union to full
rights until it can show that it has attained majority status in the bargaining unit.633 An employer, therefore, is free to repudiate a prehire
626. Id Only the portion of the agreement which exceeds the limits of the construction
industry proviso is negated. Id See, e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 405
F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1968).
627. 671 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 100 (1983).
628. Id at 309.
629. Id
630. Id The court affirmed the Board's holding which was consistent with other holdings
involving the delivery of goods to a construction site. See, e.g., Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB,
361 F.2d 547, 552 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
631. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(2) (1976). See International Ladies Garment Workers Union
v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1961).
632. 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1976). Section 158() states in pertinent part: "It shall not be an
unfair labor practice. . . for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement . . . with a labor organization . . . because . . . the
majority status of such labor organization has not been established .... " Section 158(1)
was added to the NLRA in a 1959 amendment under the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 545. Section 158() recognizes the
frequent movement of employees in the construction industry which makes it impossible for
the NLRB to conduct union elections at each jobsite. In addition, the use of prehire agreements allow contractors to compute labor costs which are necessary to bid jobs. See NLRB
v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 348 (1978).
633. 434 U.S. at 345.
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agreement and call for an election at any time. 634 Once a union
achieves majority support, however, "the prehire agreement attains the
status of a collective-bargaining agreement executed by the employer
with a union representing a majority of the employees in the unit. 63 5
Accordingly, the employer must recognize the union as the bargaining
representative for the duration of the contract.63 6
In Construction Erectors, Inc. v. NLRB,6 37 the employer entered
into a prehire agreement with the union.6 3 8 Subsequently, the employer repudiated the agreement, asserting that it no longer employed
any union members. 639 The union filed suit, claiming that the employer's refusal to recognize the union was an unfair labor practice.64
The Board held that at the time of the agreement the company's employees were a stable unit and that the union had the majority support
of the unit.641 The agreement, therefore, was binding under section
9(a) of the NLRA and the union was entitled to be recognized as the
exclusive representative." 2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded the Board's decision because the court decided that there
was insufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that there was a
permanent and stable work force on the job at the time of the agreement." 3 In fact, only two of thirteen workers employed at the time of
the agreement were on the job one year later.6" The Ninth Circuit
distinguished this case from those relied on by the union which were
found to have permanent and stable work forces." 5 Consequently, the
634. Id
635. Id at 350.
636. See, e.g., Pioneer Inn Associates v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1978).
637. 661 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1981).
638. Id at 802.
639. Id
640. Id at 802-03.
641. Id One method used by the Board to determine whether the agreement is voidable
under § 8(1) or binding under § 9(a) is to determine whether the agreement covers a permanent and stable unit of employees. See, e.g., Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169
(1979), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981). If the union represents a majority
of employees in a stable unit when the contract is executed, the contract is binding under
§ 9(a). Similarly, if the union does not represent a majority at the time the contract was
executed, but later attains a majority in the stable unit, the Board deems the contract to be
initially a voidable § 8(f) agreement that is later converted to a binding § 9(a) agreement.
When an employer does not have a stable employee unit and hires on a job basis, the union
must demonstrate its majority status in order to invoke § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. See, e.g.,
Hageman Underground Constr., 253 N.L.R.B. 60 (1980).
642. 661 F.2d at 803.
643. Id at 804-05.
644. Id at 804.
645. Id See, e.g., Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169 (1979), enforcement denied,

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

case was remanded to the Board to determine whether the union had

support at any other time prior to the repudiation of
attained majority
646

the agreement.
Similarly, in Todd v. Jim McNeff, Inc.,"4 the Ninth Circuit held

that a section 8(f) prehire contract is voidable by the employer until the
union attains majority support." In Todd, McNeff signed a prehire
agreement with the union." 9 According to the terms of the agreement,
McNeff was to make contributions to the union trust fund for each

covered employee.

°

When McNeff refused to make these contribu-

tions, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.65 '

McNeff claimed that the agreement was unenforceable. 652 Disagreeing, the Ninth Circuit held that an agreement is enforceable unless the

employer repudiates the agreement before the union attains majority
status. 65 3 Here, McNeff never repudiated the contract. The court

found that McNefis failure to perform its contractual obligations fell
short of the behavior needed to put the union on notice of the em642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981) (same five persons employed from execution of contract to
repudiation); Hageman Underground Constr., 253 N.L.R.B. 60 (1980) (three of four backhoe operators were transferred by employer from job to job).
646. 661 F.2d at 805.
647. 667 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1982), a.ff'd, 103 S. Ct. 1753 (1983). See amicus brief submitted by Loyola Law Review, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 511 (1983).
648. Id at 802. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978) (Hliqdon Construction Co.); Ruttman Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971). In Higdon, the
Supreme Court held that a prehire agreement only matures when the union achieves majority status. 434 U.S. at 341. Since the Higdon decision, the lower federal courts have split
into three groups on the issue of the correct interpretation of the Supreme Court's statement
that prehire contracts are voidable. The most restrictive reading limits Higdon to only unfair labor practice cases and to suits brought by trustees of fringe benefit funds for back
payment. See, e.g., Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters, and Engineers Health & Welfare Plan
v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981); New Mexico Dist. Council of
Carpenters v. The Mayhew Co., 664 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981). At the other end of the
spectrum, some courts have held that no contract is created until the union affirmatively
demonstrates majority status. See, e.g., Washington Area Carpenters Welfare Fund v.
Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. E.C. Shafer Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1981). The middle ground, which
requires the employer to repudiate the prehire agreement, is the best interpretation of the
Higdon decision. The Supreme Court did use the word "voidable," not "void" in Higdon.
434 U.S. at 341. To hold that no contract has been created allows the employer to enjoy the
benefits of a prehire agreement, while retaining the ability to avoid its contractual obligations. Further, there is no reason to restrict Higdon to unfair labor cases since the construction industry proviso has continually been broadly interpreted. As shown in Todd, the
Ninth Circuit has adopted the middle ground.
649. 667 F.2d at 801.
650. Id
651. Id
652. Id at 803.
653. Id at 804.
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ployer's intent to repudiate.654
Prehire agreements are an invaluable tool in the construction industry. Employees are given some of the wage and benefit advantages
of union representation. Employers are assured a qualified pool of
workers to choose from when needed, protection against labor unrest
during the period of contract, and, most importantly, predictable labor
costs. To allow an employer to enjoy the benefits of a prehire agreement without any intention to perform its obligations would be an injustice. The Ninth Circuit's holding that a prehire agreement is
enforceable under section 301 of the Act until the employer expressly
repudiates the agreement prior to the union's achievement of majority
status strikes a good balance between the interests of the employer and
the employee.
B. GrievanceArbitration
1. Judicial review of arbitration awards
The legislative policy expressed in section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 655 encouraging the final settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, has resulted in a rule limiting judicial review of arbitration awards.656 A court may not rule on the merits of an
arbitrable grievance,657 since such a decision denies the parties the bargained-for judgment of the arbitrator.658 Judicial inquiry will therefore
normally be limited to whether the parties intended to arbitrate the
654. Id
655. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976) provides in part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement."
656. The rule was originally propounded and developed in the Steelworkers Trilogy,
three Supreme Court cases decided the same day. In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), the first case in the Trilogy, the Supreme Court reversed a court of
appeals decision which denied a union's demand to arbitrate on the ground that the grievance, though concededly arbitrable, was "frivolous." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court held that all
grievances were arbitrable under the agreement, not just those the court deemed "meritorious." 363 U.S. at 567.
In the second case, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960), the Court held that although the question of arbitrability is normally one for the
court, an order to compel arbitration should only be denied if it is clear that the arbitration
clause does not cover the parties' dispute. 363 U.S. at 582.
Finally, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960),
it was held that an arbitration award may not be overturned if it "draws its essence" from
the contract. 363 U.S. at 597-98.
657. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567.
658. Id
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dispute at issue, with doubts to be resolved in favor of arbitration.65 9

When he makes a decision and formulates a remedy, the arbitrator is
not strictly limited to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, but may also rely on "industrial common law," or industry and
shop practices. 660 An arbitrator's award, however, must "draw its essence" from the contract, and may be overturned if not premised on an
interpretation of the contract. 6 6 1 The award will also be overturned if
the arbitrator exceeds his jurisdiction, formulates a remedy which is not

within his contractually-derived authority, or if the dispute itself is not
one the parties intended to arbitrate. 62
The Ninth Circuit requires that an award be affirmed if on its face

it is a plausible interpretation of the contract. This standard is consistent with the rule of limited judicial review of arbitration awards. 63 In
Local 1020 v. FMC Corp.,664 the Carpenters Union appealed from the

dismissal of a section 301(a) suit against an employer. The union
sought to compel arbitration of the question whether certain work
should be assigned to Carpenters Union members rather than members
of two other unions working on the same job.665 The union argued that
an earlier arbitrator's decision that the Carpenters Union was not entitled to be assigned the work was not dispositive of the instant dispute
because the decision did not "draw its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement.6 66 The union asserted that because the work had
659. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
660. Id at 581-82. The arbitrator's job, then, is not to decide issues of law but to consider
a grievance in light of the written agreement and the parties' conduct and custom, keeping in
mind the effect of his decision on morale and productivity. See id at 582.
661. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597-98.
662. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 592.
663. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int'l Union Local 28, 412 F.2d 899, 902-03
(9th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit's version of the rule of judicial deference is arguably
more strict than the rule suggested by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel, since it requires not only that the award be based on the contract, but on some "plausible" or reasonable construction of the contract. See also San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v.
Tribune Publishing Co., 407 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (award upheld
because "it is possible for an honest intellect to interpret the words of the contract and reach
the result which the arbitrator reached").
664. 658 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
665. Id at 1286.
666. Id at 1292. The arbitration proceeding arose out of a jurisdictional dispute between
the three unions. Id at 1288. The employer was not a party to that proceeding, which was
conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the unions. Id at 1288
n.5. The court noted that the Carpenters union was not a signator to the agreement between
the unions and could perhaps have refused to arbitrate, but held that the Carpenters waived
that right by participating without objection in the arbitration proceedings. Id at 1295. The
court held that the Carpenters' action was barred by the Oregon statute of limitations for a
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initially been assigned to the Carpenters Union, reassignment to another union was precluded. 6 7 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
Carpenters Union was not arguing that the award failed to draw its
essence from the agreement, but rather that the award was erroneous.66 The court upheld the award, noting that it effectively avoided a

work stoppage over the dispute while not precluding additional negotiation between the unions. 66 9
A logical corollary to the rule that an arbitrator's decision must be

based on some rational construction of the contract is the premise that
the legal effect of an arbitrator's decision is limited to the parties to the

proceeding. The Ninth Circuit applied this corollary in Joint Councilof
Teamsters v. NLRB.67 ° In Joint Council, a union appealed an order

issued by the NLRB invalidating a clause of the collective bargaining
agreement on the ground that it violated section 8(e) of the NLRA.6 71

Section 8(e) prohibits employer-union agreements requiring self-employed persons to join the union in order to work on a job, but excepts
from this prohibition on-site work in the construction industry.67 2 The

NLRB found that transportation between sites is not "on-site work" for
purposes of section 8(e), and that the agreement requiring owner-oper-

ators transporting supplies between sites to join the union was therefore
suit to vacate an arbitration award. Therefore, it was probably unnecessary to review the
arbitration award. id at 1296 (Canby, J., concurring).
667. 658 F.2d at 1294.
668. Id The court applied the test that the decision must be derived in some "rational"
manner from the collective bargaining agreement. Id (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union Local 781, 629 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied,
451 U.S. 937 (1981)).
669. 658 F.2d at 1293. The court treated the action to compel arbitration as an action to
vacate the earlier arbitration award. However, even if the suit had not been treated as one
seeking to vacate the earlier award, but rather as a completely separate claim, the employer
probably would have been able to assert the earlier award as a bar. This is because the
collective bargaining agreement between the Carpenters union and the employer provided
that the unions would settle jurisdictional disputes by arbitration among themselves. Id at
1287. Therefore, the employer did not have to be a party to the earlier proceeding in order
to invoke its effect.
670. 671 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1981), as amended, 702 F.2d 168, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 100
(1983).
671. Id at 308.
672. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract. . . whereby such employer. . . agrees to...
cease doing business with any other person. . . Provided, That nothing in this
subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of
work to be done at the site of the construction. ...
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unenforceable.673 On appeal, the union relied on a prior Ninth Circuit
case affirming an arbitrator's award 674 which was based on a finding
that transportation between sites was "on-site work" for purposes of
section 8(e).675 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the union's reliance
on the earlier case was misplaced, stating that the affirmance merely
meant that the arbitrator's award was premised on a logical construction of the contract, and not that transportation between construction
sites is "oW-site work" as a matter of law. 676 The decision in Joint
Council accords with the theory that, because an arbitrator's authority
to settle disputes is contractually derived,6 77 the legal effect of his decisions will not extend beyond the parties to the contract.
In addition to vacating awards which exceed the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, courts will sometimes set aside awards procured
through corruption or fraud, or rendered by a biased arbitrator.678 The
Ninth Circuit has held, however, that failure to object to an arbitrator's
bias at the arbitration proceeding waives the objection on appeal. 679 In
United Steelworkers v. Smoke- Craft, Inc., 8° the Ninth Circuit applied
this waiver doctrine to procedural objections to a party's standing to
arbitrate and to an arbitrator's right to proceed. In Smoke-Craft, the
employer appealed from a district court's summary confirmation of an
arbitration award,68 ' arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the dispute was settled before arbitration and whether
673. 671 F.2d at 309. See Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 248 N.L.R.B. 808, 816-17
(1980).
674. 671 F.2d at 310. The union relied on La Mirada Trucking, Inc. v. Teamsters Local
Union 166, 538 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). The court in La
Mirada upheld the arbitrator's decision on two grounds: (1) he did not exceed the scope of
his submission; and (2) the case was factually distinguishable from Board cases holding that
transportation between sites was not on-site work. 538 F.2d at 289.
675. La Mirada, 538 F.2d at 288.
676. Joint Council, 671 F.2d at 310.
677. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
678. See, e.g., Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1968)
(award vacated when arbitration panel included union members and union represented both
groups of conflicting employees).
679. See Kodiak Oil Field Haulers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local 959, 611 F.2d 1286,
1290 (9th Cir. 1980) (claim that arbitrator bias waived where not raised at time arbitration
board convened). In order for a waiver to occur, there must be knowledge of possible bias
or of the grounds for objection. See Cook Indus. Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106, 108 (2d
Cir. 1971) (waiver occurs when a party with knowledge of facts showing bias fails to raise
objection), cer. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
680. 652 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
681. Id. at 1358.
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the union had standing to proceed with the arbitration. 6 81
The arbitration proceedings had originally been instituted by two
unions which jointly represented the employees.68 3 The parties requested a stay since settlement appeared imminent, and after three
weeks without further communication, the arbitrator, assuming a settlement had been reached, sent a bill for his services.6 84 One of the
unions then filed a brief. The employer was notified but failed to respond, and the arbitrator rendered a decision. 685 On the issue of
whether the dispute had been settled, the court noted that the arbitrator
acted reasonably in resuming the proceedings,6 8 6 and held that in any
event the employer waived its argument by failing to raise it before the
arbitrator.6 87 On the issue of standing, the court observed that the arbitration had been properly commenced by both unions in their joint capacity as employee representatives6 8 8 and held that the employer had
waived that objection as well by its failure to raise it at arbitration.6 89
The court reasoned that allowing the objection on appeal would discourage the national labor policy encouraging dispute settlement by arbitration. 690 Because the court characterized standing as a
"procedural" issue to be decided by the arbitrator,6 9 ' the employer
would probably have been unable to raise that issue on appeal even
had it not waived its objection.
2.

Arbitration and the NLRB

A breach of contract which is arbitrable pursuant to the contract
may also be an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. 6 92 In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,693 the Supreme
682. Id

at 1359.

683. Id at 1358. Neither union had succeeded in becoming the exclusive employee bargaining representative; both were eventually elected and certified jointly. Id
684. Id.
685. Id at 1359.
686. Id at 1360. Once the union resumed the proceedings by filing a brief, the arbitrator
received no indication from any party that the dispute was settled. Id
687. Id
688. Id at 1359.
689. Id at 1360.
690. Id
691. Id See also John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964) (arbitrator is
to decide procedural questions, i.e. questions whether proper grievance procedures have
been followed or excused, or whether failure to follow procedures avoids duty of
arbitration).
692. For example, although discharging an employee for union activity is an unfair labor
practice under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), the discharge may also
be forbidden under a collective bargaining agreement which allows discharge only for cause.
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Court held that when a dispute can be characterized either as a representational dispute, and thus within Board jurisdiction, or as an arbitrable contract interpretation dispute, the Board's jurisdiction is not
exclusive and a party may compel arbitration. 94 The Court further
held that should the Board choose to render a decision, its judgment
will prevail over a confficting arbitration decision.6 9
Although under Carey the Board retains jurisdiction to decide arbitrable breaches of contract that are also unfair labor practices or are
otherwise within its expertise, the Board will normally defer to an arbitrator's decision. 696 If, however, the award is in some way "repugnant"
to the letter or the policies of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the Board will assume jurisdiction and overturn the award.697
An award that contravenes the NLRA will also be overturned in federal court.6 98
In Pagel v. Teamsters Local Union 595,699 an employer brought a
section 301(a) action to vacate an arbitration award in favor of a union.
The employer argued that the NLRB's prior refusal to enter a complaint on the same issue precluded any arbitration." ° The Ninth Circuit held that, because the Board's issuance or refusal to issue a
complaint is a decision made in a non-adversarial context without a
hearing on the merits, refusal to issue a complaint does not bar arbitra693. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
694. Id at 272. The Court based its holding on the policy goal of encouraging conciliatory measures such as arbitration in furtherance of industrial peace. Id See also supra note
655.
695. 375 U.S. at 272. The holding that a Board decision will control over an inconsistent
arbitration award is consistent with the congressional grant of power to the Board as expressed in § 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976), which provides in part: "This power
[to prevent unfair labor practices] shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. .. ."
The Carney decision is also consistent with the different functions of an arbitrator and
the NLRB: the arbitrator's function is essentially to make factual findings in light of the
parties' conduct and their contract; the Board's purpose is to establish, through its decisions,
a national labor policy.
696. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), enforced sub nom.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
697. See Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1951) (arbitration award allowing
discharge of employee for nonpayment of union dues overturned because union not certified
and discharge would be an unfair labor practice), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953).
698. See Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., 375 F. Supp. 485, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y.)
(arbitration award enforcing an illegal "hot cargo" agreement overturned), vacatedon other
grounds sub nom. Robb v. New York Joint Bd., 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
699. 667 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).
700. Id at 1279. The employer also argued unsuccessfully that the arbitrator's decision
did not "draw its essence" from the contract. Id at 1278.
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tion of the dispute.7 0 ' The court suggested that if the failure to issue a
complaint turns solely on a legal issue, subsequent arbitration will be
precluded.702 The court noted that had the Board actually70 decided
the
3
precluded.
been
have
would
issue
the
of
case, arbitration
7
In General Teamsters Local 162 v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 0

the Ninth Circuit affirmed an arbitration award that the employer argued would require independent contractors to join the union in violation of section 8(e) of the NLRA.7 °5 The court reviewed the legal basis
for the arbitrator's decision, holding that although the arbitrator had
cited an outdated precedent in rendering the award, he had applied the
correct legal test for determining employee status of the owner-operators. 706 The court rejected the employer's contention that the owneroperators were independent contractors as a matter of law and thus
were not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. The Ninth
Circuit stated that accepting such an argument would require an impermissible review of the merits.70 7
3. Arbitrability of a dispute
Although judicial review of arbitration awards is necessarily limited due to the legislative policy favoring arbitration, the preliminary
question of whether a dispute is arbitrable is normally decided by a
court.708 When a court determines whether a dispute is arbitrable, it
will resolve doubts in favor of arbitrability. 709 The parties to a collective bargaining contract may even agree to submit the issue of arbitrability itself to arbitration.7 10

However, in order for the issue of

arbitrability to be decided by an arbitrator, courts will require a clear
701. Id at 1280.
702. Id. at n.10. The court's suggestion is consonant with the rule that an arbitrator may
not render an award which has the effect of sanctioning an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a case where both the arbitrator and the Board would be required to decide a pure legal issue, since the arbitrator's authority is normally limited to the
resolution of factual issues.
703. Id at 1279.
704. 682 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1982).
705. Id at 767, 769.
706. Id at 766.
707. Id at 766-67.
708. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) (whether a party is bound
to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is matter to be decided by court on the
basis of the contract); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ("Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.").
709. Warrior& GulNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
710. Id at 583 n.7.
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showing that the parties intended it to be arbitrated.
In California Trucking Association v. Teamsters Local 70,"'2 the

Ninth Circuit rejected a union's argument that the employer's section
301(a) suit for damages for an illegal strike was precluded because the
employer was required to arbitrate its claim under either the master
agreement or a supplemental agreement. 3 The master agreement provided that an employer could institute legal proceedings for a strike
which violated the contract.714 The union first argued that the meaning
of the terms "strike" and "contract violation" had to be determined by
an arbitrator,71 5 and second, that the mandatory arbitration provision
of the supplemental agreement included violations covered by the
master agreement.716 The Ninth Circuit reasoned: (1) that the real issue was whether the dispute was arbitrable; (2) that the district court
had jurisdiction to decide whether the dispute was arbitrable because
there was no clear indication that the parties intended to have the arbitrator decide the issue; and (3) that the district court's decision that the
dispute was not arbitrable was reasonable, because the union had repudiated its right to arbitrate. 7 The difficulty with the first two steps of
the court's reasoning is that, as the court admitted, the union was not
contending that the arbitrator must rule on his jurisdiction, but was
rather arguing that the actual dispute was arbitrable. Under the principles enunciated in Steelworkers Trilogy, any doubts as to the arbitrability of a suit must be decided in favor of arbitration.7 1 Therefore,
since the union's construction of the arbitration clause was not implausible, or at least left doubts as to the parties' intent, the dispute should
have been arbitrated except for the issue of the union's repudiation.71 9
With respect to the issue of whether the union had repudiated the
collective bargaining agreement in proceedings before the district court
and therefore waived its right to arbitration,72 ° the Calfornia Trucking
court held that, although the question of agreement repudiation is presumptively arbitrable where the agreement provides for arbitration, a
711. Id

712. 679 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 299 (1982).
713. Id at 1278.

714. Id at 1280.
715. Id

716. Id
717. Id at 1280-81.
718. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
719. If the dispute was not properly brought before the district court in the first place,
however, the subsequent repudiation would arguably be immaterial, meaning that the union
never lost its right to arbitrate.
720. 679 F.2d at 1282.
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court may rule on repudiation when the asserted rejection occurs
before the court, as opposed to repudiations allegedly occurring before
the arbitrator.72 ' The court reasoned that the inherent right of a court
to supervise its own proceedings gives it jurisdiction to decide equitable
defenses,
including repudiation claims, that arise out of conduct before
2
it.

72

The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the district court had correctly decided that repudiation had in fact occurred.72 3 It noted that
mere nonperformance will not amount to a repudiation, but held that
in this case the union had repudiated by actively participating in the
legal proceedings without invoking arbitration, by asserting that it was
not bound by the agreement, and by delaying its request for a stay of
arbitration for over four years. 2
In Francesco-s B., Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local

28,725 the Ninth Circuit dealt again with the question of when the duty
to arbitrate arises. In Francesco'sB., one clause of a collective bargaining agreement provided for resolution of employee discharge grievances by an adjustment board. The clause did not provide for
arbitration, but did require that the complaint be filed for adjustment
"as provided in" a second clause.7 26 The second clause included a "nostrike" provision7 27 and provided for arbitration of all grievances be-

tween the union and employers who were members of the multiemployer association. The employer, who was no longer an association
member, fired an employee.728 The union struck without seeking arbitration, claiming that the second clause, with its no-strike and arbitration provisions, protected only association members.729 The employer
filed suit in district court for injunctive relief and damages. 73 ° The district court ordered an arbitration on the issue of whether the second
clause applied in its entirety to the first clause.73 ' After the arbitrator
decided that the second clause was incorporated by reference in the
721. Id at 1283.

722. Id
723. Id

724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.

Id at 1284.
659 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id at 1384-85.
Id at 1385.
Id
Id

730. Id

731. Id at 1385-86. Because the arbitrability of the dispute turned on how the arbitrator
construed the two clauses, the order in effect required the arbitrator to decide his own
jurisdiction.
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first clause, the district court ordered an arbitration on the issue of

whether the union had breached the no-strike provision.732 The union
appealed from the district court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award
arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his conin favor of the employer,
733
tractual authority.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the district court, rather
than deciding the arbitrability of the dispute, had ordered that the arbitrator decide his own jurisdiction.7 34 The court noted that, had the district court decided that the dispute was arbitrable, it would necessarily
have decided the merits, since the arbitration clause included a nostrike clause.735 The court then confirmed the award, noting that since
the contract was ambiguous, 736 the incorporation by reference of the
entire second clause within the first clause was not an implausible reading of the agreement.
The court's reasoning is flawed because, although arbitrability of
disputes is favored,737 the right of an arbitrator to decide his own jurisdiction is not.738 Therefore, since it was not at all clear in this case that
the parties intended for the arbitrator to decide the arbitrability of the
employee discharge grievance, the court should have made that decision, even if its decision would determine the outcome of the dispute.
In Alpha Beta v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 428, 73 ' an
employer unsuccessfully appealed a district court's denial of its petition
to compel arbitration. The employer had fired several employees who
struck in sympathy with another union.740 The union fied a grievance
over the discharges, which was settled without resort to the arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement. 74 1 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, which was to be final, the employees were reinstated
without back pay. 74 2 The reinstated employees filed independent suits
for back pay with the NLRB.743 The employer sought to compel the
union arbitrate, arguing that a dispute existed because the union's alleged intent to support the employees' suits would have breached the
732. Id at 1386.
733. Id

734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.

Id at 1387.
Id at 1388.
Id at 1388-89.
Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 583.
Id at n.7.
671 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id at 1248.

741. Id
742. Id
743. Id
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settlement agreement. 744 The court held that because the union was
not a party to the employee actions and the settlement agreements did
not provide for arbitration, the employer could not compel arbitration.745 The court also held that no dispute had arisen under a new
7 46
collective bargaining agreement, which did provide for arbitration.
The holding in Alpha Beta is consistent with the rule that parties may
not be compelled to arbitrate disputes that they have not agreed to arbitrate. Because the most the employer had alleged was a breach of the
settlement agreement, which had no arbitration clause, the employer's
remedy lay in an action in federal court.74 7
C Enforcement of Agreements Under Section 301(a)
1. Subject matter jurisdiction under section 301(a)
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 748 the United States
Supreme Court rejected the view that section 301(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act 74 9 is merely a jurisdictional statute providing a

federal forum for labor disputes.750 The Court instead held that section
301(a) authorizes courts to fashion substantive federal remedies to enforce collective bargaining agreements.7 5 ' The Court reasoned that the
second construction was necessary in order to effect the congressional
policy that labor agreements be enforceable in federal courts.752 The
Court further held that the law to be applied in section 301(a) suits is
federal law, developed "from the policy of our national labor laws. 753
After the Lincoln Mills decision, the question became how to accommodate the role of federal courts acting under section 301(a) with
that of other federal tribunals such as the NLRB. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,5 the Supreme Court held that federal
744. Id at 1248-49.
745. Id at 1249.
746. Id.
747. Id at 1250.
748. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
749. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. . . or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
750. 353 U.S. at 450-51.
751. Id at 451.
752. Id at 455.
753. Id at 456. The Court noted that state law could be applied if it would best effect a
federal policy, but that state law could not be an independent source of rights. Id at 457.
754. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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and state courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB in

suits dealing with activity that is arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of
the NLRA.755 The Court reasoned that a contrary holding would frustrate the congressional intent of a uniform national labor policy
promulgated by a single tribunal." 6
The Garmon preemption doctrine was limited in Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co. ,7 where the Supreme Court held that a suit for
violation of a collective bargaining agreement could be brought in federal court under section 301(a), even if the conduct complained of was
also arguably an unfair labor practice.7 In Smith v. EveningNews Association, the Court held that even if the alleged conduct is clearly
an unfair labor practice, federal courts have jurisdiction under section
301(a) if the suit also alleges that the same conduct breaches the collective bargaining agreement. 760 The Smith Court also ruled that jurisdiction under section 301(a) extends to claims by parties who seek to
vindicate individual rights conferred under the collective bargaining
agreement.7 6 ' The Court reasoned that denying jurisdiction to hear individual claims would stultify the congressional policy of maintaining a
uniform body of labor law, since individual suits would be decided
under state law and union suits for the same breach would be decided
under federal law.762
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,7 6 3 the United States Supreme

Court held that the jurisdiction of a federal court in a section 301(a)
contract enforcement action extends to the merits of a defense alleging
contract illegality, even if the subject matter of the defense is arguably
755. Id at 245.
756. Id at 244-45 (citing Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 489-91 (1953)).
757. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
758. Id at 102.
759. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
760. Id at 197.
761. Id at 200. The Court did not decide whether an individual has standing to bring a
claim to enforce individual rights. Id However, later decisions read Smith as conferring
standing to individuals to sue under § 301(a) to enforce collective bargaining agreement
provisions which grant personal rights. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298-99 (1971). Individuals may not bring a § 301(a) suit without
having exhausted their collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures unless they
allege not only an employer's breach of contract, but also the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967). See also Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976) (union's breach of duty of fair representation
allows employee to seek vacation of arbitration award even though the labor agreement
provides that arbitrator's decision is final).
762. 371 U.S. at 200.
763. 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
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within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 6 In Kaiser, a union
sued under section 301(a) to enforce a clause in a collective bargaining
agreement which required contributions to employee health and retirement funds for coal purchased from producers who did not have contracts with the union.7 6 ' The employer admitted its noncompliance
with the clause, but argued that the clause was illegal under either sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 1 and 2, or section
8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. section 158(e). 766 Both the district court
and the court of appeals rejected the employer's defense without considering the merits. 767 The Supreme Court reasoned that federal contract law prohibits the enforcement of illegal contracts 768 and that a
court must therefore reach the merits of a defense of illegality before it
can decide whether to give effect to the clause in question. 769 The
Court reached this conclusion even though the act of contributing was
concededly proper. The Court noted that the obligation to contribute,
if enforced, would amount to an unlawful financial burden on coal
purchased from nonunion producers. 7
Kaiser effectively overruled Waggoner v. R. McGray, Ic. ,7 a
Ninth Circuit case which held that federal courts may not entertain an
unfair labor practice defense to a section 301(a) action.77 2 Waggoner
773
relied on-AmalgamatedAssociationof Street Employees v. Lockridge,

a Supreme Court case limiting jurisdiction under section 301(a) to disputes arising out of the contract itself and precluding the exercise of
jurisdiction where the dispute is based on an implied-in-law promise
rather than on a contract provision. 7

During the survey period, several Ninth Circuit decisions permit764. Id at 86. The Court noted that the defense of illegality may be heard only if it is
dispositive of the clause for which enforcement is sought, and not of some collateral matter.
Id.
765. Id at 76.
766. Id Kaiser argued that the clause violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because it
restrained trade by putting nonunion concerns at a disadvantage and penalizing Kaiser for
seeking the lowest prices. Id at 78.
The employer argued that enforcement of the clause would violate § 8(e) because it
would penalize the employer for dealing with nonunion producers and would thereby coerce
cooperation with the union's organizational objectives. Id
767. Id at 78-79.
768. Id at 77.
769. Id at 84-85.
770. Id at 79.
771. 607 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979).
772. Id at 1235.
773. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
774. Id at 300-01.
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ted federal courts to entertain section 301(a) suits interpreting collective
bargaining agreements even though the resolution of the suits required
decisions upon matters subject to NLRB jurisdiction. In Cappa v.
Wiseman ,775 the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court's decision that an
employer's oral agreement with a union modified a written collective
bargaining agreement to exclude an employee's job category." 6 The
decision necessarily involved a determination that the modified agreement, which changed the composition of the bargaining unit, did not
violate national labor policy.777 The court held that even though the
NLRB has primary jurisdiction to determine whether the composition
of a bargaining unit comports with national labor policy, 778 the main
issue-the admissibility of evidence showing an oral agreement-was
one of contract law within the expertise of the federal courts.779 The
court noted that the NLRB is bound by union-employer agreements
unit, unless such agreements
regarding the composition of a bargaining
780
violate statutes or federal labor policy.
Judge Fletcher dissented, arguing that the district court overstepped its bounds in making the determination that the bargaining
unit created under the modified agreement was appropriate.78 Fletcher would have allowed the district court to make the decision that the
contract was modified by the oral agreement, but would leave to the
Board the decision whether the agreement as modified created an appropriate bargaining unit.78 2 Fletcher's approach may be valid even in
light of Kaiser. In Kaiser, resolution of the contract issue turned on the
disposition of the unfair labor practice issue. Arguably, where the contract issue (e.g., the existence of a modified agreement) can be decided
without reaching the issue within Board jurisdiction, the court should
decide the contract issue and remand the case to the Board for a final
disposition. Although this approach hardly produces judicial economy,
the deference mandated in Garmon is effected.
775. 659 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981).
776. Id at 958.
777. Id
778. Id at 959. The Board's jurisdiction is established under 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976),
which provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether... the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof ......
779. 659 F.2d at 959-60.
780. Id at 960 (citing NLRB v. Mercy Hosp., 589 F.2d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979)).
781. 659 F.2d at 960 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
782. Id (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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In Todd v. Jim McNeff, Inc. ,783 the Ninth Circuit held that prehire
agreements under section 8(f are enforceable until repudiated by the
employer, absent a showing by the union that it enjoyed majority support before repudiation.7 8 4 The court held that it had jurisdiction
under section 301(a) to determine whether a union enjoyed majority
support sometime before a repudiation even though the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to determine a union's current majority status. 78 5
The court noted that a determination of a union's former majority status involves recreation of past relationships, which is a factual question
within the expertise of federal trial courts.7 86
Absent an explicit agreement to the contrary, the existence and
scope of an agreement to arbitrate is a question to be decided by the
courts.7 8 7 In California Trucking Association v. Brotherhoodof Teamsters Local 70,788 an employer sued a union local under section 301(a)
for damages resulting from an allegedly illegal strike. 789 The union
argued unsuccessfully that the employer's right to sue was conditioned
on preliminary resort to arbitration. 790 The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court had jurisdiction to determine whether the agreement permitted a damages action in lieu of arbitration.7 9 ' The court based its
holding on the absence of a clear indication that the parties intended
that the arbitrator decide his own jurisdiction.7 9 2
The court further upheld the district court's decision that the
union had repudiated its rights and obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement during trial, thereby waiving its right to compel
arbitration.7 9 3 In so holding, the court created an exception to the general rule that the issue of whether repudiation has occurred must itself
be arbitrated if the agreement calls for arbitration. 9 The court limited
783. 667 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1982), afid, 103 S. Ct. 1753 (1983).
784. Id at 804.
785. Id
786. Id By its reasoning the court in Todd determined that there was no issue subject to
NLRB jurisdiction. Todd is therefore distinguishable from Kaiser and Cappa, which permitted adjudication of issues admittedly within the Board's expertise.
787. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
The parties may, however, agree to submit the question of the arbitrability of a dispute to
arbitration. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
788. 679 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 299 (1982).
789. Id at 1278.
790. Id The union's arguments are discussed supra under Arbitrability of a dispute.
791. Id at 1281.
792. Id at 1280-81.
793. Id at 1284.
794. Id at 1284-85. The court adopted the holding in Reid, Burton Constr., Inc. v.
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this exception to instances where the repudiation occurs in proceedings
directly before the court, rather than before the arbitrator or during the
parties' contractual relationship.7 95 Whether repudiation has occurred
will depend not merely on a refusal to perform, but on whether the
repudiating party manifests any intent to preserve his contractual right
to arbitration.796
2.

Standing to sue and remedies available under section 301(a)
In Seattle Times Co. v. Seattle Mailer's Union No. 32, 7 9 7 an employer successfully sued a union under section 301(a) for damages resulting from a work slowdown in breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. 798 The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's award
of attorney fees. 7 9 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected the employer's argument that the legal fees were incurred in an effort to mitigate damages
by seeking injunctive relief, holding that legal fees are recoverable only
in exceptional
circumstances, or where authorized by contract or
statute. so
In United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334,01 the United
States Supreme Court held that a union constitution is a contract
within the meaning of section 301(a),80 2 and therefore, federal courts
have jurisdiction to hear suits between parent and local unions for
damages caused by violations of union constitutions.8 °3 The Court reaCarpenters Dist. Council, 535 F.2d 598, 602-04 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976),
appealfrom remand, 614 F.2d 698, 700-02 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
795. 679 F.2d at 1283. The court reasoned that a court's power over its own proceedings
allows it to hear equitable defenses arising out of those proceedings. Id (citing Reid, Burton, 535 F.2d at 603).
796. 679 F.2d at 1284. The Reid, Burton court listed the following factors to be considered: whether the repudiator participated in the lawsuit without timely communicating an
intent to arbitrate, whether the repudiator delayed in seeking a stay, whether the repudiator
asserted the right to arbitration as a defense or counterclaim without immediately insisting
on enforcement of the arbitration provision, and whether the delay prejudiced the other
party. 614 F.2d at 702.
797. 664 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1982).
798. Id. at 1368. The collective bargaining agreement did not expressly prohibit strikes
or slowdowns; rather the breach arose out of the no-strike provision which is implied in any
contract containing a compulsory arbitration clause. Id (citing Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962)).
799. 644 F.2d at 1370.
800. Id The court contrasted the instant action to one brought under § 303 for damages
resulting from an unfair labor practice. Section 303 expressly permits recovery of "cost of
the suit." 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976).
801. 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
802. Id at 624.
803. Id at 626-27. The Court expressly left undecided the question of whether individual
union members may bring suit on a union constitution against a labor organization. Id at
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soned that the congressional purpose of labor stability would be fur-

thered by construing the word "contract" in section 301(a) to include
union constitutions.8 " The Court bolstered its holding by noting that
Congress was certainly aware that union constitutions are the typical
form of contract between labor organizations and therefore must have
intended to include those types of contracts under section 301(a).1°5
The Ninth Circuit had formerly held that jurisdiction under sec-

tion 301(a) in intraunion disputes is limited to those suits which allege
that the dispute significantly affects external labor relations. °6 In Kinney v. BEW,8 °7 the court followed the Supreme Court's holding in
Local 334, concluding that a union member need not allege that a

breach of a constitution significantly affects external labor relations in
order to maintain a section 301(a) suit against a union for breach of a

union constitution, so long as the member can allege a connection between the action challenged and some legally protected interest.8 °8 The

court actually extended the rule of Local 334 by allowing suits on
union constitutions to be brought by individual members as well as
union locals.
An employee's action against a union for breach of its duty of fair
representation is generally within the subject matter jurisdiction of the

federal courts, 80 9 although such a breach also gives rise to an unfair
labor practice. 810 InAyres v. IBEW, 8 1' the Ninth Circuit dismissed an

employee's section 301(a) suit against both his union for breach of the
627 n.16. However, it appears that in light of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962), which was cited in Local 334, jurisdiction would exist to hear such a suit. See supra
note 761 and accompanying text.
804. 452 U.S. at 624.
805. Id
806. See Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.
1978) ("courts have been uniformly reluctant to permit judicial intervention in ongoing internal union affairs"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1970) (it is not the intent of Congress for courts
to use § 301(a) to police intra-union relations).
807. 669 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
808. Id at 1229. The union member in Kinney was complaining of wrongful discharge
from union office. He met the standing requirement because he alleged that his right to
office was protected under the union constitution and that he was discharged in violation of
that constitution. Id at 1230.
809. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971).
810. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179 (1967). The major rationales for this rule are that
decisions on a breach of the duty of fair representation are likely to be consistent whether
rendered by the Board or federal courts and will not give rise to confficts in national labor
policy, and that the duty itself was a judicially evolved principle applied by the Board in the
same manner as the courts. Id at 181.
811. 666 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1982).
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duty of fair representation and his employer, a public entity, for violation of a collective bargaining agreement." 2 The court held that it
lacked jurisdiction because section 2 of subchapter II of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. section 152, excludes political subdivisions of states from the
definition of employer.8 13 The court had earlier held in Dente v. International Organizationof Masters Local 90814 that the legislative policy

protecting employees warranted the extension of section 301(a) jurisdiction to claims brought by supervisory employees, even though supervisors were expressly excluded from the statutory definition of
employees. 815 The court refused to extend the holding in Dente to indude state employees because such an extension would contravene the
congressional intent to exclude the states from the reach of federal labor laws.816 The court's holding is reasonable because an expansion of
section 301(a) jurisdiction to state political subdivisions would have a
tremendous impact on state government and is therefore best left to
Congress.
Section 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. section
104(a), prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions restraining persons interested in or participating in a labor dispute from "ceasing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.' ' 81 7 The purpose of section 4(a) was to forbid blanket injunctions

against labor unions, thereby protecting the freedom of union members
to organize and to strike.818 In Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2750

v. Cole,81 9 the Ninth Circuit held that section 4(a) does not bar a federal court's order reinstating a wrongfully discharged employee as a
remedy in a section 301(a) suit.8 20 The court reasoned that affording an

employee an equitable make-whole remedy would not damage the labor movement or defeat efforts to organize, but would in fact vindicate
the collective bargaining process.8 2 '
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,22 the
812. Id at 442.
813. Id at 441-42.
814. 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
815. Id at 12.
816. 666 F.2d at 444.
817. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
818. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
819. 663 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1981).
820. Id at 986-87.
821. Id The court noted that this holding would also ensure a uniform national labor
policy, since state courts are not subject to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and would not be
precluded under that act from issuing reinstatement orders. Id
822. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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United States Supreme Court held that federal courts may enjoin a
strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement where the dis-

pute underlying the strike is clearly arbitrable.823 The Court reasoned

that, because a no-strike clause is normally the quid pro quo of an arbi-

tration clause, denial of specific enforcement of a no-strike clause

would discourage agreements to arbitrate. 24 The Court limited its

holding, stating that an injunction may not issue unless the court determines that the grievance is arbitrable and that ordinary requirements
for equitable relief are met. 82 5 In addition, the court must condition

issuance of an injunction on the employer's agreement to arbitrate.826
In Northern Stevedoring & Handling Corp. v. InternationalLongshoremen's Union LocalNo. 60,27 the Ninth Circuit held that a tempo-

rary restraining order issued to enforce an arbitration award was
invalid because the order was not issued in compliance with the procedures set out in section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.82 8 The collective bargaining agreement had an arbitration clause, a no-strike clause,

and a clause allowing the union to refuse to cross a bona fide picket
line of another union. 81 9 The union refused to cross a picket line; an
arbitrator determined that the line was not bona fide under the collective bargaining agreement, and the district court issued a temporary

restraining order to enforce the award.830 After disposing of an argument that the case was moot because the picket line itself had been

enjoined pursuant to NLRB proceedings, 83 1 the Ninth Circuit held that
the lower court had erred because, although it heard arguments, it
adopted the employer's proffered conclusions of fact and law without
823. Id at 253 & n.22.
824. Id at 248.
825. Id at 253-54 (quoting dissenting opinion in Sinclair v. Atkinson Refining Co., 370
U.S. 195, 228 (1957) (Brennan, J.,.dissenting)).
826. 398 U.S. at 254.
827. 685 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1982).
828. Id at 348. Section 7 of the Act provides that a temporary or permanent injunction
may not issue in a labor dispute except after testimony is heard with the opportunity for
cross-examination, and after the court makes findings of fact. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
829. 685 F.2d at 346.
830. Id The Ninth Circuit had earlier stayed the restraining order pending the district
court's compliance with the Act; the case at bar was based on a complaint that the district
court had not complied with the order.
831. Id at 346-47. The court decided that the case was not moot because if the Board
found that the picket line was not an unfair labor practice, the line could go up again and
the dispute could recur. Further, the employer had sought damages along with the restraining order, a claim which would depend on the validity of the order. The court's first
reason is not persuasive: a new picket line might have been "bona fide" under the
agreement.
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an evidentiary hearing or testimony. 832 The court rejected the employer's argument that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable because the underlying dispute was not a "labor dispute" under section
13(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. section 113(c). 8 33 The employer relied on
New OrleansSteamshio Association v. GeneralLongshore Workers Local No. 1418,834 a Fifth Circuit case that held that the enforcement of
an arbitration award is not a labor dispute under the Act.8 35 The Ninth
Circuit refused to follow New Orleans Steamship, noting that it was
decided before Boys Markets and was part of an ongoing erosion of an
earlier Supreme Court decision which was overruled in Boys Markets.836 The court went on to apply the test approved by the Supreme
Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association.837 In Jacksonville, the Court ruled that the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act turns on whether the "employeremployee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy. ' 83 The Ninth
Circuit held that the Jacksonville test was satisfied here because the
dispute was between the employer and a union over the interpretation
of a bargaining agreement.839
3. Time limitations in section 301(a) suits
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,84 ° the United States
Supreme Court held that the timeliness of a section 301(a) suit may be
determined by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations.84 ' In Mitchell, a discharged employee brought a section 301(a)
suit against the employer and a union seventeen months after an arbitrator upheld his dismissal.842 The suit alleged the union's breach of
duty of fair representation and the employer's wrongful discharge in
violation of the labor agreement. 43 The Court, noting that Congress
has not enacted a statute of limitations for section 301 (a) suits, held that
the suit was barred by the 90-day state statute of limitations for actions
832. Id at 350.
833. Id at 349.
834. 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
835. Id at 372.
836. 685 F.2d at 349. The earlier decision was Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1957), which held that federal courts may not enjoin a strike.
837. 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
838. Id at 712-13 (quoting Columbia River Co. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942)).
839. 685 F.2d at 350.
840. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
841. Id at 60.
842. Id at 58-59.
843. Id at 59.
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challenging arbitration decisions. 844
In UnitedBrotherhoodof CarpentersLocal 1020 v. FMC Corp.,84

the Ninth Circuit reviewed a claim that a union's section 301(a) suit to
have certain work reassigned to its members was barred by a state or
federal statute of limitations.8 46 The question as to whether the union
was entitled to have the work assigned to its members had been decided against the union in an arbitration proceeding between three unions several months earlier. 47 Relying on Mitchell, the court treated
the suit as one to vacate an arbitration award. 48 The court disposed of
the case on the merits, 849 but discussed at length the possible application of a statute of limitations. The court suggested that it would adopt
the twenty-day state statute of limitations for actions challenging commercial arbitration proceedings, even though that statute excluded
"terms or conditions of employment under collective contracts between
employers and employees.

'8 50

The court noted that the only other pe-

riod available under state law was a six-year statute of limitations for
actions on a contract or on a statutory liability, a period disapproved in
85
Mitchell because it discouraged speedy settlement of labor disputes. ,
Finally, the court suggested that it would not adopt the three-month
period of the Federal Arbitration Act852 because the Supreme Court
3
was reluctant to apply that Act to labor disputes. 85
In San Diego County District Council v. Cory,8 54 the Ninth Circuit
relied on Local 1020 to hold that a 100-day state statute of limitations
for the vacation, correction or confirmation of an arbitration award applied rather than the period under the Federal Arbitration Act. 85 5 The
court qualified its ruling, noting that a state limitations period would
apply only if it did not defeat the national labor policy favoring quick
844. Id at 60.
845. 658 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).

846. Id at 1288.
847. Id at 1286.
848. Id at 1290. Local 1020 is distinguishable from Mitchell because in Local 1020 the
suit was against the employer, who was not a party to the arbitration proceedings, while in
Mitchell the defendants had been parties to the arbitration. Nevertheless, the court was
correct in relying on Mitchell because the effect of the union's suit, if successful, would have
been to nullify the arbitration award.
849. See supra discussion under Judicial review of arbitration awards.
850. 658 F.2d at 1289-90 & n.7.
851. Id at 1290.
852. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
853. 658 F.2d at 1290.
854. 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1982).
855. Id at 1142.
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resolution of disputes.8 5 6 The court noted that a single federal standard

would be helpful to insure uniformity and confidence in the arbitration
system.

57

Nevertheless, the court reasoned that Congress' failure to

adopt a statute of limitations under section 301(a) was a tacit acceptance of the state statutes, and thus refused to create a limitations period
in the absence of legislative action.8 58
IV.

A.

CONCERTED ACTIONS

Secondary Activity

1. Product picketing and boycotts
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act85 9 states

that a union commits an unfair labor practice if it refuses to handle
goods or perform services, or coerces or threatens a person engaged in
commerce with the object of forcing that person to cease doing business

with another.86 0 Concerted activities excepted from this section include

primary strikes and picketing, that is, concerted activities directed
against the employer with whom the union has a dispute.8 6 1 Further

excluded from the section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibition is "publicity, other
than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public...
that a product . . . [is] produced by an employer with whom the

[union] has a primary dispute" which is distributed by a neutral employer, so long as the publicity does not induce neutral employees to
refuse to perform services at the neutral employer's premises. 62 " Courts
have had difficulty determining when a concerted activity such as pick-

eting or boycotting constitutes protected primary activity, 63 and when
the activity amounts to illegal secondary activity seeking to embroil a
neutral employer in a primary dispute. 864
856. Id.
857. Id at 1140-42.
858. Id at 1141.
859. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
860. Such a violation is actionable before the NLRB as an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, or in federal court as a damages suit under § 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
861. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
862. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
863. See, e.g., § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), which provides in part that
"[e]mployees shall have the right ... to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. .. ."
864. Congress, in forbidding secondary boycotts, sought to secure a union's right to pressure primary employers and shield neutral employers and employees from disputes that
were not of their own making. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951).
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In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable PackersLocal 760 (Tree Fruits),65

the United States Supreme Court held that it is not an unfair labor
practice under section 8(b)(4)(B) for a union to refuse to handle a prod-

uct that is one of many sold by the secondary employer, where the
union conducted peaceful picketing at the secondary establishment and

requested that customers boycott the primary employer's product. 6 6
The Court refused to construe section 8(b)(4)(B) to prohibit all secondary consumer picketing,"6 7 noting that the congressional intent in en-

acting the law was to avoid a broad ban on peaceful picketing because

it could conflict with the first amendment."' 8 The Court held that Con-

gress only intended to prohibit picketing which was designed to cause
the neutral party a general loss of patronage.

69

The Tree Fruits decision was distinguished and limited in NLRB v.
RetailStore Employees Union, Local 1001 (RetailEmployees).STO In RetailEmployees, the Supreme Court held that secondary product picket-

ing is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA
when the product involved constitutes virtually all of the neutral em-

ployer's trade.8 71 The Court reasoned that consumer picketing of a single-product secondary employer leaves responsive customers with no

practical option but to boycott the neutral employer altogether,

72

and

therefore amounts to coercion with the object of causing the neutral

employer to stop dealing with the primary employer.8 73 The Court
noted that its holding was necessary to further the related legislative
goals of protecting neutral parties 74 and discouraging labor discord. 75
The Court held that the appropriate test to determine whether product
865. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
866. Id. at 71. In Tree Fruits, union members picketed the consumer entrances of neutral
grocery stores. They carried placards and distributed handbills asking store customers to
refrain from buying apples packed by the struck primary employer. Id. at 60.
867. Id. at 63.
868. Id. Because picketing includes patrolling, conduct not directly protected by the first
amendment, as well as a speech element in the placard statements, it is "'something more
[than] and different' from simple communication" and as such is not beyond legislative control. Id. at 93 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464
(1950)).
869. 377 U.S. at 63.
870. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
871. Id. at 614-15. In RetailEmployees, the union picketed neutral title companies, carrying signs which asked customers to cancel their insurance policies with the primary employer. Id. at 609. Approximately ninety percent of the title companies' business was from
the sale or servicing of the employer's policies. Id.
872. Id. at 613.
873. Id. at 615.
874. Id. at 614.
875. Id. at 613-14. Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that a single-product neutral em-
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picketing is coercive secondary activity is whether the secondary appeal
is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss (economic impact test).87 6
In InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation v. Allied International,
Inc.,877 the Supreme Court applied the economic impact test to a

union's boycott, based on political grounds, of ships carrying cargo
from the U.S.S.R.178 The cargo was owned by an American importer
who had contracted with an American shipper to bring the goods from
the Soviet Union. 879 The importer, the shipper, and the stevedoring
company which agreed to unload the ships brought suit against the
Management Relations Act for
union under section 303(a) of the Labor
88 0
damages resulting from the boycott.
The Court first dealt with the question of whether the boycott affected "commerce" within the meaning of the NLRA 8 ' so as to be
subject to its secondary boycott provisions. The union relied on a line
of cases beginning with Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,882 where

the Supreme Court held that picketing by an American union in support of strikes conducted by foreign crews against foreign shipowners
was not "commerce" under the NLRA. 8 3 The rationale behind that
line of cases was that applying the Act to such situations would necessitate inquiry into the "'internal discipline and order'" of foreign vessels, which could cause disruption in maritime law and international
ployer assumes the risk of economic fallout from a primary dispute. Id. at 621 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
876. Id. at 614-15.
877. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
878. Id. at 223.
879. Id. at 215.
880. Id. at 216.
881. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976) defines "commerce" as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States. . . or between any foreign country and
any State ....
29 U.S.C § 152(7) (1976) defines "affecting commerce" as "in commerce, or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a
labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
882. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
883. Id. at 142. See also Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372
U.S. 24, 26-27 (1963) (operations of foreign owned ships employing foreign seamen not "in
commerce" under Act); Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104,
114-15 (1974) (picketing of foreign flagships by American unions protesting wages paid to
foreign crew not within Act, even though motivated by a desire to publicize competitive
advantage of foreign shippers over shippers employing American union members); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 222 (1974) (factually similar to Windward except plaintiffs in state court were unions seeking to unload foreign flag ships; state
court jurisdiction held not preempted).
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relations.88 4 The union maintained that its boycott was a primary boycott of Russian goods which incidentally affected American employers
dealing in those goods. The union pointed out that its motivation was
not to force the plaintiffs to stop dealing with each other, but to express
disapproval of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.8 85
The Supreme Court, affirming the First Circuit,8 8 6 held that Benz
and subsequent cases were irrelevant, since the instant boycott "did not
seek to extend the bill of rights developed for American workers. . . to
foreign seamen. '88 7 The Court noted that the employers subject to the
boycott were American companies "engaged in commerce," and that
the boycott allegedly affected "commerce up and down the east and
888
gulf coasts."
Having decided that the union's boycott was "in commerce," the
Court went on to hold that the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) because primary dispute was with the Soviet Union
rather than the plaintiffs, and because "the certain effect of [the
union's] action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers. 8 89
It is apparent from this case and Retail Employees that the question of
whether product picketing is protected primary activity or prohibited
secondary activity turns not on the admitted object of the picketing, but
on its possible effects. Such a test reflects a policy of protecting neutral
employers while limiting the right of unions to publicize labor disputes
through picketing or boycotting.
Finally, the union argued that to hold that the boycott fell within
the purview of section 8(b)(4) would violate the first amendment.8 9 °
The Court dismissed this argument by holding that the union's conduct
was not designed to communicate, but to coerce, and was therefore not
protected under the first amendment.89 '
In Allied International, the union conceded that its dispute was
with the U.S.S.R., and that it had no complaints against the plaintiffs. 892 The union might have sought to characterize the plaintiffs as
primary employers by arguing that its dispute was with American com884. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 198
(1970) (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)).
885. 456 U.S. at 224.
886. 640 F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir. 1981).
887. 456 U.S. at 221.
888. Id. at 219.
889. Id. at 223-24.
890. Id. at 226.
891. Id.
892. 640 F.2d at 1377.
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panies "disloyal" enough to trade with Russia. However, it is likely
that the Supreme Court would have reached the same result, either by
refusing to accept the union's characterization of the dispute and holding that the primary dispute was with the U.S.S.R., or by concluding
that the boycott was unprotected because it was not related to working
conditions.893 The First Circuit disapproved of the union's political
motivations, apparently because it considered non-labor related political action to be outside the ambit of proper union activity.8 94 The
Supreme Court approved and quoted at length from the First Circuit's
opinion, and would probably follow its reasoning in this area as well.
It does appear, however, that unions will be permitted to speak for their
members in political areas unrelated to labor as long as their actions
are in the form of communication,
which is protected by the first
895
amendment, rather than conduct.
2.

Common-situs picketing

A second type of concerted activity which has generated considerable litigation under section 8(b)(4) is common-situs picketing, or picketing at a site where two or more employers are engaged in separate
tasks. The Moore Dry Dock rule,8 96 a Board test for determining
whether common-situs picketing is protected primary activity or illegal
secondary activity, was approved by the United States Supreme Court
in Local 761, InternationalUnion of Electrical Workers v. NLRB (GeneralElectric).897 In GeneralElectric, a union picketed all the gates of a
common-situs, including a gate reserved for the exclusive use of employees of independent contractors who did work unrelated to the everyday operations of the struck employer's plant.898 The Court held that
picketing the reserve gate was an unfair labor practice because the
picketing would embroil neutral employees in a labor dispute and com893. Shelly & Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.
1974).
894. 640 F.2d at 1378. But see NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d
992, 997 (4th Cir. 1964) (union's refusal to handle cargo bound to or coming from Cuba not
illegal secondary activity).
895. 456 U.S. at 226.
896. In re Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The
test for determining the legality of common-situs picketing is as follows: (1) the picketing is
strictly limited to times when the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(2) the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the site at the time of picketing; (3) the picketing is limited to places near the location of the dispute; and (4) the picketing clearly discloses that the dispute is with the primary employer. Id. at 549.
897. 366 U.S. 667, 677 (1961). Satisfaction of the four Moore Dry Dock requirements
gives rise to a presumption of valid primary activity. Id. at 677.
898. Id. at 669-70.
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pel a neutral employer to stop dealing with the struck employer. 899 The
Court emphasized that its ruling should not be interpreted to proscribe
picketing at gates used by the struck employer's suppliers, customers, or
employees.9 ° The Court further held that appealing to neutral employees whose tasks are necessary to the employer's everyday operations is
protected primary activity. 90 '
In Huber & Antilla Construction v. Carpenters Union Local 470,902

the Ninth Circuit applied the reserve gate doctrine developed in GeneralElectric to uphold a union's argument that the struck employer's
effort to establish a reserve gate as a common site was legally insufficient. 91 3 The employer had put up signs restricting union deliverymen
and subcontractors to one gate and non-union employees, deliverymen
and subcontractors to another. 9 4 The court held that the employer's
attempt to limit picketing to the non-union gate infringed on the
union's right to "carry its message" to the struck employer's materialmen and suppliers, whether they were affiliated with a union or not. 90 5
The Ninth Circuit further held that the union did not violate section 8(b)(4)(A) by picketing at both gates because the picketing was
necessary to preserve the union's right to picket gates used by the primary employer's materialmen. 9°6 The court's holding on this point is
consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric that
mingled-use°7 gates may be picketed without violating section
8(b)(4) (A).9

B.

Strikes

The right to strike, though not constitutionally guaranteed, 90 8 enjoys statutory protection under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 90 9 An employer who interferes with employees who are
lawfully exercising their section 7 rights or who discriminates in terms
899. Id. at 680.
900. Id. There was some evidence that the gate had been used by employees of independent contractors doing work necessary to daily plant operations. Therefore, the case
was remanded for a Board determination on the issue of whether the mixed use was substantial enough to take the reserve gate out of the § 8(b)(4) limitation. Id. at 682.
901. Id. at 681.
902. 659 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982).
903. Id. at 1018.
904. Id. at 1015.
905. Id. at 1018.
906. Id.
907. 366 U.S. at 682.
908. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
909. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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or tenure of employment commits an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 9 10
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants,Inc. v. NLRB, 91 ' the Ninth Circuit

enforced a Board decision holding that an employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by firing three waitress employees who struck
91 2
to protest working conditions and the discharge of another waitress.
The waitresses were not represented by a union, but were discussing the
possibility of unionizing. The employer argued unsuccessfully that the
waitresses did not strike, but instead quit their jobs.913 Conflicting inferences could be drawn from the facts, but the court upheld the
NLRB's determination as "reasonable and supported by substantial evidence."9 t4 The employer relied on leaflets distributed by the picketing
waitresses which stated that they had quit their jobs.915 The court also
upheld that Board's decision that the waitresses' walkout was a valid
strike even though they had not made specific demands at the time of
their walkout. 9 16 Furthermore, the striking waitresses were reinstated

with back pay
because they were victims of their employer's unfair la917
bor practice.
It is clear from Bill Johnson'sRestaurants,Inc. that the NLRA pro-

tects legal concerted activity whether carried on by a union and its
members or by unrepresented employees who act together. This is an
appropriate interpretation of the Act, which was intended to benefit all
employees, whether unionized or not.
V.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

A.

ACT

Inspection

Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
910. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ....
911. 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S.Ct. 2161 (1983).
912. 660 F.2d at 1341.
913. Id.
914. Id.

915. Id.
916. Id. The court relied on NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15
(1962) (concerted activities by employees seeking to improve working conditions are protected whether they take place before, after, or at the same time a demand is made).
917. 660 F.2d at 1341.
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1970918 (OSHA) "to assure so far as possible" every worker a safe and

healthful work environment. 919 To ensure compliance with its provi-

sions, the Act grants the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) and his/her
representatives the authority, upon presenting proper credentials, to
enter, inspect, and investigate any workplace in a reasonable manner.920 An employee who believes that there is an imminent danger or
a violation of an OSHA standard on the worksite may request such an
inspection.92 If the Secretary determines that the employee's belief is
based on reasonable ground, the Secretary or his/her representatives
may conduct a "special inspection.
B.

. .

as soon as practicable." 922

Warrant

1. Probable cause
If an employer denies an OSHA officer admittance for the purpose
of conducting an inspection, the officer must secure a warrant. Warrants for OSHA inspections must be based on probable cause. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,92 3 the Supreme Court held that the requisite

probable cause for an OSHA warrant is not the same as that for a criminal proceeding warrant.924 The OSHA officer's right to inspect does
not depend on his or her demonstrating probable cause to believe that
conditions on the premises violate OSHA. Rather, the officer need
only show that " ' reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting . .

.

an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular

[establishment].' "925 Thus, probable cause for an administrative
search requires that the search be "reasonable" such that the public
interest in the inspection outweighs the invasion of privacy which the
918. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. 1982).

919. Id. § 651(b).
920. Id. § 657(a) (1976) provides:
(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any ... workplace or
environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer;, and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment ... and to question privately any such employer,
owner, operator, agent or employee.
921. Id. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
922. Id.
923. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
924. Id. at 320.
925. Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
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inspection entails. 926 Since the Barlow's decision, federal courts have
uniformly applied a less stringent standard of probable cause for an
OSHA inspection based on employee complaints than for a criminal
proceeding. 927
The Ninth Circuit applied this relaxed standard of probable cause
in the case of Hern Iron Works, Inc. v. Donovan,928 and concluded that

an inspection warrant issued fifteen months after receipt of an employee complaint was not based on stale probable cause.92 9 The Ninth
Circuit rested its decision on the circumstances surrounding the delay.
Upon service of a full scope inspection warrant, Hem refused entry to
an OSHA officer. The district court then denied the Department of
Labor's application for an enforcement order because the warrant had
been improperly drafted. Hem refused to honor a newly drafted warrant, but the district court declined to find contempt because the warrant was improperly served. Finally, Hem contested the third warrant
on the ground that it was based on stale probable cause. The Ninth
Circuit ruled that, unlike a criminal proceeding warrant, issuance of a
warrant for an OSHA search need not immediately follow an employee
complaint. 930 Perhaps more important, the court declined to conclude
that the warrant was based on stale probable cause because Hem was
chiefly responsible for the delay in its issuance through its "occlusive
tactics. 9 31
2. Scope
Section 8(a) of the Act 932 permits "wall to wall" inspection of the
workplace even if there is no reason to suspect violations of the Act.
Circuits differ, however, on the scope of a section 8(f) 933 "special in926. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
927. Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.6 (7th Cir.
1980). See also Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979);
Weyerhauser Co. v Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1979); Plum Creek Lumber Co. v.
Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. North American Car Co., 476 F.
Supp. 698, 703 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
928. 670 F.2d 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 69 (1982).
929. Id. at 840.
930. d.
931. Id. The court did not look favorably on Hem's tactics to delay the hearing set to
determine the validity of the second warrant. The opinion also remarked upon Hem's disdain for OSHA as indicated by the employer's repeated statements of "strong moral objections to the OSHA Act." The Ninth Circuit was probably reluctant to hold that the warrant
was based on stale probable cause because it would thereby encourage an employer to create
tactical delays for the inspection and, thus, thwart the enforcement of OSHA. Id. at 839-40.
932. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). See supra note 920 and accompanying text.
933. 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
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spection" prompted by an employee complaint. The Third Circuit con-

cluded that as a "special inspection" the scope of a section 8(f)
inspection was limited to that which bore some relationship to the violations alleged in the employee complaint. 934 In contrast, the Seventh

Circuit held that a special inspection need not be limited in scope to the

935
substance of the employee complaint.

The Ninth Circuit upheld a full-scale section 8(f) inspection in JR.
Simplot Co. v. OSHA ,936 but declined to formulate a general rule for
the proper scope of a special inspection. The court based its decision

on the information presented to the district court in the warrant application. The district court mistakenly inferred from the warrant appli-

cation that the Simplot plant was located in a single facility and, thus, it
authorized an inspection of the entire Simplot plant. The Ninth Circuit

ruled that since the district court's conclusion was neither unreasonable
nor made in bad faith, the warrant was not overbroad.937
The Ninth Circuit applied the Simplot analysis in Hem Iron

Works, Inc. v. Donovan,938 where it upheld an inspection of the entire
worksite after receipt of an employee complaint. 939 The complaint al-

leged that there existed safety hazards in the metal pouring area of the
plant and ventilation defects in the foundry. The Ninth Circuit held

that the magistrate who issued the warrant could have reasonably inferred from the complaint that a full-scale inspection of the entire plant
was necessary to detect the hazards.9 4°
The Hem court concluded that the warrant authorizing the full(l) Any employees or representative of employees who believe that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an
imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary or his authorized representative of such violation or danger. Any such notice
shall be reduced to writing [and] shall set forth with reasonable particularity the
grounds for the notice .... If upon receipt of such notification the Secretary
determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger
exists, he shall make a special inspection... as soon as practicable, to determine if
such violation or danger exists. If the Secretary determines there are no reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists he shall notify the employees or
representative of the employees in writing of such determination.
934. Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980).
935. Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1322-26 (7th Cir.
1980). The Seventh Circuit pointed out the anomaly which would result if a wall to wall
inspection were permitted where there was no specific reason to suspect an OSHA violation,
but were proscribed where there was specific probable cause to suspect that violations of
OSHA would be found on the work premises. 625 F.2d at 1325.
936. 640 F.2d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
937. Id.
938. 670 F.2d 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 69 (1982).
939. Id. at 841.
940. Id.
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scale inspection was reasonable in light of OSHA's purpose of promoting employee safety.94 ' The Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the Sev-

enth Circuit rule that "'[t]he better view is that which permits, absent
extraordinary circumstances, general inspections in response to employee complaints.' "942
C. The Multi-Employer Construction Site
1. Anning-Johnson/Grossman rule

Section 5(a)(2) of the Act943 requires an employer to comply with
the Act's health and safety standards. Typically, the employer cited for
violation of section 5(a)(2) created or controlled the hazard. There are
no OSHA regulations, however, which define the duties of a subcontractor toward its employees where it neither created nor controlled the
hazard. At a multiemployer construction site, the hazard created by
one employer can foreseeably injure employees of another employer.
In recognition of the circumstances peculiar to the construction industry, the Occupational and Safety Health Review Commission (Commission) has imposed a duty under section 5(a)(2) on a subcontractor
regarding safety violations which it neither created nor fully controlled.
The Commission left the scope of the duty for case-by-case
determination.
In Secretary of Labor v. Anning-Johnson Co.,

"

the Commission

ruled that the noncreating and noncontrolling subcontractor having actual knowledge of the OSHA violations may defend against liability by
showing it took "realistic" steps to protect its employees from hazardous conditions. 945 In Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp.,946 the Commission ruled that the subcontractor may defend against liability by
showing it acted as a reasonable person to assure that its own conduct
did not create a hazard to any employee at the site.947 These decisions
941. Id.
942. Id. (quoting Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1324
(7th Cir. 1980)).
943. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976).
944. BNA 4 OSHC 1193 (1976).
945. Id. at 1199.
946. BNA 4 OSHC 1185 (1976).
947. Id. at 1188. The Commission stated:
Simply because a subcontractor cannot himself abate a violative condition does not
mean it is powerless to protect its employees. It can for example, attempt to have
the general contractor correct the condition, attempt to persuade the employer responsible for the condition to correct it, instruct its employees to avoid the area
where the hazard exists if this alternative is practical, or in some instances provide
an alternative means of protection against the hazard.
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are referred to collectively as the Anning-Johnson/Grossman rule.
2.

Reasonable and realistic measures

The Ninth Circuit followed the Second and Eighth Circuits by applying the Anning-Johnson/Grossman rule in the survey case of Electric
Smith, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor.948 The Ninth Circuit treated the Anning-Johnson/Grossman standard as an affirmative defense, thereby
placing the burden of persuasion on the employer.9 49 The court ruled
that the subcontractor met this burden, and was relieved of liability for
OSHA violations, by proving that it took reasonable and realistic steps
to protect its employees from the hazards it neither created nor controlled.95 0 By agreement, the general contractor in Electric Smith had
assumed full responsibility for providing safeguards for the protection
of all employers at the worksite. When the general contractor failed to
provide the necessary safeguards, the subcontractor repeatedly complained to the general contractor's superintendent, directed its employees away from the hazardous area, and installed a makeshift railing
near the hazardous area.95 1
The Ninth Circuit predicated its decision on the good faith efforts
made by the subcontractor; it implied that it would be unfair to hold
the subcontractor liable for a hazard he diligently sought to remedy.9 2
Also playing a key role in the Ninth Circuit decision was the Commission's pragmatic emphasis in enforcing OSHA standards only when interest in enforcement outweighs interests of equity, economy, and
efficiency. 95 3 In this case, the scale tipped toward relieving the subcontractor of any liability.
Id. at 1189.
948. 666 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing DeTrae Enters. Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,
645 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (noncontrolling and noncreating subcontractor
liable for OSHA violations for failure to warn employees of hazards, to provide alternative
means of protection, and to prevent employees from using hazardous areas); Bratton Corp.
v. OSHRC, 590 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1979) (noncontrolling and noncreating subcontractor
lacking authority to abate hazards liable in absence of showing that it took realistic measures to protect its employees from known hazards)).
949. 666 F.2d at 1270. The court allocated the burden based on its finding that the employer's conduct with respect to protection of its employees is a matter particularly within its
knowledge. Id. (citing Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., BNA 4 OSHC at 1188).
950. 666 F.2d at 1274.
951. Id. at 1270-72.
952. Id. at 1273. The court cited Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.
1975), for the proposition that fairness requires that one held liable for a violation be shown
to have at least "knowingly acquiesced in" the violation.
953. Id.
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VII

Proofof DisparateTreatment

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964914 makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against any individual on account of
sex. 955 Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission9 56 to enforce the Act, and granted individuals the right to initiate
private causes of action against employers they believe violated Title
VII.95 7 A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation by showing that
the challenged employment practice resulted in either disparate impact

or disparate treatment. Under the disparate impact theory, employment practices are discriminatory where, though facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups, they in fact fall more harshly on
certain groups and cannot be justified by business necessity. 958 Dispa-

rate treatment, "the most easily understood type of discrimination," 95 9
results where the employer simply treats some people less favorably

than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The presence of discriminatory intent, though irrelevant under the disparate impact theory, is critical to establishing the disparate treatment
954. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976).
955. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive... any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
956. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The EEOC, however, has little power. The Commission may
investigate discrimination charges and bring civil actions against employers if it determines
after investigation that there is reasonable ground to believe that the charges are true. While
courts frequently defer to the Commission's views on the lawfulness of certain employment
practices, occasionally courts accord little weight to the agency's guidelines. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (EEOC guidelines constitute "'[t]he
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,'" and consequently are to
be accorded great deference) (citations omitted) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 141 (1976) ("courts properly may accord less weight to EEOC guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law").
957. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
958. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court ruled
that Title VII proscribes employment practices which are "fair in form but discriminatory in
operation." Id. at 431. The Court announced the procedural guidelines which govern litigation under the disparate impact theory. These standards apply to sex discrimination actions.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
959. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
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type of discrimination. 960 To sharpen the inquiry into "the elusive factual question" of discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has allocated the burdens of establishing discrimination. 61
1. Allocation of burdens
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 962 the Supreme Court an-

nounced the procedures to govern the litigation of disparate treatment
claims. The plaintiff carries the initial burden of producing evidence
which establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant
then carries the intermediate burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, thereby rebutting the
prima facie case. Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff is afforded a full opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for discriminatory intent. 963 Though the burden of coming forth with evidence shifts throughout the trial, the ultimate burden of persuading by
a preponderance of the evidence never leaves the plaintiff.964 The allocation of burdens serves to clarify the factual issues and, hence, to expeditiously and fairly focus the litigants and the court onto the question
of discrimination.965
2.

Order and nature of proof
a. primafacie case

The plaintiff has the initial burden of presenting evidence to create
a rebuttable presumption that the employment act or decision was pre-

mised on a criterion prohibited by Title VII.966 The plaintiff meets this

burden by showing that, in the absence of any explanation, the employer's act or decision "more likely than not" was based on unlawful
considerations. 967 The plaintiffs initial burden is not "onerous. 9 68
960. Id.
961. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
962. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
963. Id. at 805.
964. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
965. Id.
966. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
967. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978). In Furnco, the Supreme
Court explained how a prima facie case raises an inference of discriminatory animus:
"when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible
reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration
.... 438 U.S. at 577 (emphasis in original). Accord Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
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During this survey period, the Ninth Circuit uniformly held that plaintiffs in Title VII sex discrimination actions produced enough evidence
to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
The Ninth Circuit demonstrated the ease with which the plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in Meyer v. California & HawaiianSugar Co.9 69 At the time of her discharge, the plain-

tiff played a significant role in the administration of the defendant's
affirmative action program. She was dismissed after writing a memorandum which reflected personal sentiments unfavorable to minority
employees. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, to create the rebuttable
presumption of discrimination, the plaintiff need only eliminate the
most common reasons for her discharge.970 The court ruled that the
plaintiff created this inference of discrimination by presenting evidence
that she was discharged in spite of eighteen years of performance satisand that the employer did not seek to elimifactory to her employer,
97 1
nate her position.
The Ninth Circuit applied a remarkably. lenient standard for establishing a prima facie case in Ostroff v. Employment Exchange,Inc. 972
According to the district court findings, the plaintiff telephoned an employment agency to inquire about an advertised position. Without asking about her qualifications, an agency employee curtly informed the
plaintiff that the job was already filled. In fact, the plaintiff was not
qualified.9 73 Later that day the plaintiffs husband called and was invited to apply for the same position. The district court held that, despite this disparate treatment, the plaintiffs lack of qualifications
968. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). InMcDonnell Douglas, the Court suggested that the complainant in a Title VII action state a prima
facie case by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802. The Court considered this standard a flexible one which may vary with
different factual situations. Id. at 802 n.13. In Burdine, the Court refined the McDonnell
Douglas model: the plaintiff need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she
applied for a vacant position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which create an inference of unlawful discrimination. 450 U.S. at 253.
969. 662 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981).
970. 662 F.2d at 639 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54).
971. 662 F.2d at 639.
972. 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
973. 683 F.2d at 304. The advertisement specified that applicants were to possess a college degree. The plaintiff did not have a college degree and lacked significant managerial
experience.
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precluded her from establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.9 74

The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and ruled that a showing
of qualification is not essential to create the inference that "more likely

than not" the employment agency denied the plaintiff an opportunity
to apply for the position because of her sex. The court followed the

earlier Ninth Circuit decision in Nanty v. Barrows Co. ,97 observing
that, where the applicant is summarily rejected without knowledge of
her qualifications, the reason for her rejection cannot be lack of qualifi-

cation. Hence, those qualifications are irrelevant to whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.976 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
disparate treatment and that, since the defendants failed to rebut the
presumption, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.9 7 7
Though the Supreme Court has stated that the plaintiff's initial
burden, if carried successfully, creates a rebuttable presumption, the
Ninth Circuit has held that the evidence presented to establish a prima
facie case may be so conclusive as to compel the court to rule that the

employer discriminated against the plaintiff. For example, in Muntin v.
CaifforniaParks andRecreation Department,978 the Ninth Circuit held

that the defendant's testimony together with the plaintiff's evidence es-

tablished, as a matter of law, the defendant's discriminatory intent.97 9

The plaintiff, an experienced deckhand, placed third out of sixty appli974. Id. at 304.
975. 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981). In Nanty, the defendant placed an order with a state
employment agency for a truck driver. The agency determined that the plaintiff, a Native
American, was qualified and referred him to the defendant. Without inquiring of his qualifications, the defendant told the plaintiff the job had been filled; two days later the defendant
hired two Caucasian truck drivers. Though the Ninth Circuit believed that the plaintiff met
the McDonnellDouglas model for establishing a prima facie case, it ruled that the plaintiff
met the more flexible approach outlined in Burdine. 660 F.2d at 1331. See supra note 968
and accompanying text.
976. 660 F.2d at 304 (citing EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 188 n.3, 198-99 (4th
Cir. 1981) (employer cannot defend itself by stating men were more qualified for the positions where it never evaluated the qualifications of women)). The Ninth and Third Circuits
invoke the rule that qualifications are irrelevant where the defendant never initially considered them. Whereas the FordMotorCo. court ruled that the qualifications defense did not
rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case, the Ostroff court stated that the lack of qualifications
was not material in establishing the prima facie case itself.
977. 660 F.2d at 304. The plaintiffs lack of qualifications for the position is nonetheless a
crucial factor in the award of lost wages. If the defendant can show by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff would not have been hired in the absence of discrimination, she is
not entitled to lost wages. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for such a determination.
Id. at 305.
978. 671 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1982).
979. Id. at 362-63.
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cants on the qualifying exam for a position as a deckhand. The defendant refused to interview the plaintiff for the position, thus
departing from a longstanding practice of interviewing the top three
applicants on the exam. The testimony and deposition of the hiring
officer manifested a great reluctance to hire women as deckhands regardless of their ability to perform the job.9 80 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that no explanation offered by the defendant could rebut the
inference of sex discrimination.981
In most Title VII cases, however, it is difficult to present direct
evidence that an employer acted or made a decision on the basis of the
plaintiff's sex. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this difficulty by enthusiastically admitting the plaintiffs statistical data into evidence to
help establish a prima facie case. For example, in Lynn v. Regents of
the University of Caifornia,982 the court found some of the plaintiff's
statistical data "highly persuasive" in creating a rebuttable presump980. The trial and deposition testimony included the following:
Q. Do you think women should be standing night watch in San Francisco?
A. No.
R.T. 115
Q. Do you think the appointment of women deckhands at the park would c ause
problems?
A. Not particularly other than a - particularly the night watch business, that sort
of thing.
Q. But that's a problem that you see, a woman standingA. I see it as a very serious problem, yes.
Q. That women shouldn't be standing night watch in San Francisco?
A. Right.
Q. So, it would be practically impossible, then, for you to give consideration to a
woman for a deckhand position; is that correct?
A. Well, it would certainly be limiting.
R.T. 124.
Q. Have you ever worked with women deckhands?
A. At sea?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Would you want to?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. It's a lot of problems. I'm talking about merchant ships, now, with wome n in
the ship.
Q. What kind of problems?
A. Sexual problems.
Q. Such as?
A. Fights.
Q. What kinds of other problems do you foresee?
A. Other kinds of nroblems? Mostly those between the two sexes. As far as a bilities go, I'm sure they're every bit as capable as most of the guys going to sea
today. But off watch, trouble.
R.T. 194-95.
981. 671 F.2d at 363.
982. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982).
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tion of sex discrimination. 98 3 The plaintiff's data tended to show that
she was objectively qualified for the tenure the university denied her

and that the university exhibited a general pattern of discrimination
against women. The plaintiff augmented the statistics with testimony

which indicated that the evaluation of the plaintiff's scholarship reflected, in part, the university's disdain for women's studies as a topic
of scholarly work. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff successfully carried her initial burden, since the statistics and testimony each

implied that it was "more likely than not" that the university's decision

to deny tenure was based on a criterion proscribed by Title VII. 98 4
Statistical data also played an important role in the Ninth Circuit's

determination that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case in
O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc.98 5 To substantiate their claims that their

employer discriminated against women in its promotion practices, the
,plaintiffs submitted statistical evidence which demonstrated the disparity of representation between women in the lower paying positions and
the higher paying positions. The plaintiffs also produced evidence that
the employer failed to establish promotion criteria and relied entirely

upon subjective criteria for its high-level positions. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the view that the plaintiffs were required to show that they

were qualified for promotion since, given the fact that the criteria for
qualifications were unknown, such a showing would be an onerous
burden to carry. 986 Furthermore, the positions at issue involved super-

vision of airline meal preparations, which may have required skills that
many persons may easily learn. 987 Relying primarily on the plaintiffs'
statisical data, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs established a
983. 656 F.2d at 1342. The court emphasizes the utility of statistics, particularly in the
academic context, where the tenure decision is highly subjective. See also International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (statistical analyses serve an
important role in proving employment discrimination).
984. 656 F.2d at 1344. The Ninth Circuit thus ruled that the district court's finding that
Lynn failed to satisfy the initial burden was clearly erroneous and, accordingly, reversed the
decision. Id.
985. 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982).
986. 670 F.2d at 867 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981)).
987. On this basis the court distinguished Pack v. Energy Research & Dev. Admin., 566
F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), which required a showing that plaintiffs were qualified for the positions. In Pack, the positions at issue were those of highly specialized geologic engineers. The Ninth Circuit ruled in O'Brien that when a position involves skills
which many persons may easily acquire, statistical comparisons with the general labor pools
are more probative than when the job requires special training. 670 F.2d at 867 (citing Piva
v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1981) (where employment position involves
easily attainable skills statistical comparisons between composition of defendant's employees in the position and composition of general work force can be highly probative)).
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988
rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination in promotion policies.
The Ninth Circuit does not, however, categorically accept the validity of plaintiffs' statistics. In Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,989 the
court ruled that the probative value of statistics with respect to assessment of a prima facie case depended on the relevant labor market. The
plaintiffs urged that the market definition was either the city population
or its labor force while the defendant claimed it encompassed the labor
force of the entire county. The county had a lower percentage of female managers and professionals than the city. 990 The plaintiffs' statistical studies thus conflicted with those of the defendant. The plaintiffs'
figures showed that at the defendant's glass bottling plant, women were
systematically excluded from certain job categories, earned significantly less than men, and comprised a disproportionate number of cler-

ical and other nonmanagerial workers. 99 1 Relying upon the zip code

data submitted by the defendant showing that its employees resided
throughout the county, the trial court adopted the defendant's definition of the relevant labor market. It therefore held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in earnings and
nonsupervisory and management promotions. 992
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the zip code data relied upon by the
district court did not prove that the defendant's employment practices
were nondiscriminatory.993 Because the district court premised its conclusion that the defendant did not engage in sex discrimination on this
market definition, the Ninth Circuit remanded the claims for a redeterbased on the
mination of the relevant labor market and an assessment,
994
proper market definition, of the prima facie case.
A prima facie case was established in part through the use of statistical evidence in Laborde v. Regents of the University of California.

The university considered the plaintiff, an associate professor, for promotion to full professor several times and each time decided against it.
The plaintiff's statistical evidence tended to show that the university
hired fewer women, paid them less, and granted tenure to fewer women
988. 670 F.2d at 867.
989. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982).
990. 665 F.2d at 929-30.
991. Id.
992. Id. at 930.
993. Id. at 927, 930.
994. Id. at 930. The court did not automatically accept, however, the plaintiffs' market
definition which was the definition the defendant had adopted to qualify for a government
contract. The Ninth Circuit suggested that a more accurate indicator of the relevant market
would be actual applicant flow instead of hired worker flow. Id. at 927 (citations omitted).
995. 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983).
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than men.996 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was also required to show that she was objectively qualified for the promotion to
establish a prima facie case. The court held that the fact that the university considered the plaintiff for promotion was sufficient proof that
she met the minimum objective qualifications. 99 7
In GiVford v. Atchison, Topeka andSanta Fe Railway,9 9 8 the plaintiff alleged that her employer continually refused to promote her to the
position of wire chief, a position for which she was eligible until the
time of her termination. Although the plaintiff worked for the defendant for over twenty-three years, she had never applied for the wire chief
position. The Ninth Circuit ruled that to establish a prima facie case,
the plaintiff did not have to allege that she applied for the promotion if
the employer's promotional policies made application futile, or if the
employer normally initiated the promotion. 999 Accordingly, the court
held that the plaintiffs allegation that an application would have been
futile because of the defendant's prior refusal to hire women for the
wire chief position was sufficient to make out a prima facie case.' °°
Without reference to the allocation of burdens which characterize
Title VII cases, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for
the defendants in Padway v. Palches,l°° ' and held that the plaintiffs
depositions and affidavits raised an inference of sex discrimination. 100 2
Pursuant to the school superintendent's recommendation, the school
district's Board of Trustees voted to reassign the plaintiff from her position as elementary school principal to a teaching position. Three weeks
later the superintendent recommended that the plaintiff be discharged,
and the Board voted in agreement. The plaintiff charged that the superintendent's recommendations stemmed from his prejudice against
women.
The plaintiff's declarations and depositions reflected the superin996. 686 F.2d at 717-18 & n.4.
997. Id. at 718. The Ninth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima
facie case and ruled that the plaintiff met this burden of showing that: (1) she was a member
of a class protected by Title VII; (2) she met the minimum qualifications to be considered for
promotion to full professor, (3) she was denied promotion; and (4) men with similar qualifications had been promoted to full professor. Id. at 717.
998. 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982).
999. Id. at 1154 (citing Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir.
1980) (where employer sought out male employees for training or promotion and women
found it futile to apply for such training or promotion, it is immaterial that plaintiff never
was denied promotion or training)).
1000. Id. at 1154.
1001. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
1002. 665 F.2d at 966-68.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 17

tendent's alleged difficulties in dealing with female employees. The defendant trustees filed affidavits giving the reasons for their vote to
reassign the plaintiff.1 003 Relying heavily on these affidavits, the trial
court granted summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit ruled that summary judgment was improper because the affidavits raised conflicts of
material facts.'0 °4
In Sumner v. San Diego UrbanLeague, Inc. , oo0the Ninth Circuit

remanded the case for further findings because of the trial court's failure to frame its findings against the allocation of burdens. 1o06 The trial
court made a single conclusionary finding that the plaintiff "failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that she was terminated
from her position because of her sex. The Ninth Circuit stated that
while McDonnell Douglas did not mandate that the order of proof be
"rigidly 'compartmentalized,'" it is essential for appellate review that
the trial court findings be clear and explicit. 1 1 7 Since the district court
addressed only the ultimate issue of discrimination, the Ninth Circuit
could not review the district court decision in light of the applicable
legal principles. Nevertheless, the court observed ample evidence in
the record which would support a finding of a prima facie case. 1008
b.

rebuttalof the presumption

In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,"°

9

the Supreme Court

emphasized that once a prima facie showing is made, the court must
afford the employer an opportunity to introduce evidence to explain his
or her motive for the action or decision. The burden shifts to the em1003. 665 F.2d at 967. Each trustee stated that the plaintiff showed lack of discretion and
tact by sending each of them a mailgram protesting the assignment of a particular teacher to
her school. The Ninth Circuit ruled that sending the mailgram may have been an activity
protected by the first amendment and, if so, it could not have formed the basis of the plaintiff's reassignment. The court concluded that this issue could not be settled by summary
judgment. Id. at 967-68 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (absent
proof of false statement knowingly or recklessly made, teacher's exercise of his right to speak
on issues of public importance could not furnish the basis of his dismissal from public
employment)).
1004. 665 F.2d at 968.
1005. 681 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1982).
1006. 681 F.2d at 1142.
1007. Id. (citing Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698, 701 (3d Cir. 1980) (it is
necessary that the trial court make clear findings of fact as to each of the three states of proof
so that they may be examined in light of the evidence and applicable legal principles)).
1008. 681 F.2d at 1143. The record contained evidence of the plaintiff's qualifications for
the job and of discriminatory animus in the remarks of the plaintiff's superior that women
should be at home rather than at work. The record also included an EEOC determination
of reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was discriminated against.
1009. 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
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ployer to "articulate" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the ac-

tion or decision.

°10

Such an articulation rebuts the presumption of sex

discrimination.
If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence and the employer

offers no reason which would rebut the presumption, the court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff because there is no issue of fact in the
case.' 01' In Ostroff v. Employment Exchange, Inc.,1012 the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant employment agency refused to refer her to a
potential employer because of her sex. The plaintiff telephoned the
agency to inquire about an advertised position. An agency employee
told her the job was filled. Later that day the plaintiff's husband telephoned the agency about the same job and was invited to apply. The
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had to establish a prima facie case,
so that the burden shifted to the agency to rebut the presumption.0 3
The defendants offered no explanation for their refusal to refer the
plaintiff. Accordingly, 14the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was
0
entitled to judgment.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the burden of articulating a sufficient reason is significantly less than proving the absence of discrimi01 6
natory motive. 01 5 In Lynn v. Regents of the University of California,1
the plaintiff established prima facie that the university denied her merit
salary increases and tenure because of her sex. The Ninth Circuit ruled

that the university successfully articulated reasons justifying its denial
of tenure and salary increases by offering evidence of the plaintiffs deficient scholarship and research.10 1 7 The court reasoned that an em-

ployer successfully rebuts a presumption of discriminatory intent if it
presents evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
1010. Id. at 578 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
1011. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
1012. 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1013. Id. at 304. See supra notes 972-977 and accompanying text.
1014. 683 F.2d at 304 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1981)).
1015. 683 F.2d at 304. The employee's burden is satisfied when it explains or offers evidence showing some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action which would allow
the trier of fact to conclude that the action was not motivated by discriminatory animus.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981); Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (per curiam).
1016. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982).
1017. Id. at 1344. The university offered evidence to show that the plaintiff was warned
several times during her career that her scholarship was deficient. The plaintiff was encouraged to discuss her scholarship deficiency with members of her department and was
granted sabbatical for the purpose of improving her research and writing skills. Id.
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discriminated against the plaintiff. 0 18

Another survey case remarkably similar to Lynn demonstrates the
ease with which a defendant may rebut a presumption of discrimination. InLaborde v. Regents of the University of Calpfornia,1° 9 the plain-

tiff, an associate professor, charged that the university repeatedly
denied her promotion to full professor because of her sex. The Ninth
Circuit ruled that the university carried its intermediate burden simply
by offering evidence of the plaintiff's failure to meet the university standards for scholarship and research. 0 20
In Meyer v. California& HawaiianSugar Co. ,1021 the plaintiff was

discharged after writing a memorandum which reflected personal sentiments unfavorable to minority employees. At the time of her discharge, the plaintiff had significant responsibility for the administration
of the defendant's affirmative action program. The Ninth Circuit ruled
that the employer tendered a sufficient nondiscriminatory basis for its
discharge of the plaintiff. The employer reasoned that the plaintiff's
sentiments concerning affirmative action rendered her ineffective in administering its affirmative action program. Furthermore, the employer
feared that the plaintiff's conduct would expose it to liability to the
EEOC unless it indicated that such conduct did not reflect the employer's sentiments. 0 22

Not all the reasons proffered by employers during the survey period were deemed sufficient to rebut the inference of discrimination. In
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. ,1023 the plaintiff attempted to make out

a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that women were concentrated in nonmanagerial and nonprofessional positions, and earned
significantly less than men at the defendant's glass bottling plant. The
employer attempted to rebut the sex discrimination claim by attacking
the validity of the plaintiff's statistical studies and introducing other
studies to support its view. The employer also attempted to shift the
blame to the unions for any discriminatory practices by showing that
many of the policies concerning hiring, firing, promoting, and wages
1018. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1981)). See also Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 342 (4th Cir. 1980)
(scholarly deficiency and inability to relate specialized field of study to issues of general
importance were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not reappointing plaintiff to
faculty).
1019. 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983).
1020. Id. at 718.
1021. 662 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981).
1022. Id. at 639.
1023. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982).

1984]

94LABOR LAW SUR VEY

were governed by provisions of collective bargaining contracts that the

employer had entered into with various unions. The Ninth Circuit
held that the company's alternative studies did not negate the probative
value of the plaintiffs statistics.10 2 4 The court also ruled that union
pressure on the employer does not affect the employer's obligation to
honor an employee's Title VII rights.10 2 5 Consequently, the Ninth Cir-

cuit found that the employer's evidence did not rebut the plaintiffs sta026
tistical case.1
In O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc. ,"oz7 the plaintiffs, both for the individual and class claims, made a prima facie showing of the employer's

discrimination in promotions by offering statistical evidence of disparity between the representation of women in the lower paying positions
and the higher paying positions. The district court found that the em-

ployer's presentation of a "cohort group" study rebutted any inference
of discrimination from the plaintiffs' statistics and, consequently,
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.' 2 8 The "cohort
group" study covered advancements primarily in the years after the

individual plaintiffs left the defendant's employ. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, ruling that the "cohort group" study had

little probative value for sex discrimination before the plaintiffs' depar-

ture.0 2 9 The Ninth Circuit did not make it clear, however, whether the
defendant had successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination,

but remanded the case for resolution of the factual issues.
The employer also proffered legitimate reasons for not promoting
the named plaintiffs. Consequently, the district court held that the defendant had rebutted the prima facie showing and that, because the
plaintiffs did not controvert these reasons, no factual issues relevant to
1024. Id. at 926, 930.
1025. Id. (citing Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir. 1980) (union
pressure on employer does not relieve the employer of its duty to respect applicant's Title
VII rights), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Title VII rights cannot be bargained away by union, employer, or
both acting in concert), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
1026. 665 F.2d at 930. The court remanded the case for a redetermination of the relevant
labor market so that the district court could assign a probative value to the parties' statistical
data. See supra notes 989-994 and accompanying text.
1027. 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982).
1028. Id. at 867. The "cohort group" study demonstrated that the disparity between male
and female promotion was less than the standard deviation required to create an inference
of discrimination. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 n. 14
(1977) (as a general rule, if difference between expected value and observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations, then claim that teachers, were fired without
regard to race is suspect).
1029. 670 F.2d at 867.
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the McDonnell Douglas theory remained.10 30 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that a summary judgment was improper because there remained a factual issue of whether the defendant had a regular practice of keeping
women from advancing by not announcing job openings and by seeking men to fill the positions. 10 3' The court premised its holding on the
fact that the named plaintiffs based part of their prima facie showing
upon proof that there was a pattern or practice of discrimination. The
Ninth Circuit opined that a pattern or practice of discrimination can
take subtle forms so that it is less clear what the defendant must prove
to rebut the presumption. The Ninth Circuit thus ruled that the defendant's proffered reasons were insufficient for purposes of summary
judgment.0 32 Again, the court did not clearly indicate whether the defendant met its intermediate burden.
c. pretext

Once the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the
issue of discriminatory animus becomes crucial. The court must afford
the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to show by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for the employment decision were
a cover for a discriminatory reason. 0 33 The plaintiff may meet the
burden by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer. Alternatively, he or she may prove that
the employer's proffered reason is pretext. 0 34 The burden the plaintiff
carries at this point merges with the ultimate burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence
that he or she has been the victim of
0 35
intentional discrimination.
The Ninth Circuit reached the issue of whether the reason "articulated" by the employer was a pretext in only two cases during the survey period. In Labordev. Regents ofthe University of Calforria,10 36 the
1030. Id. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
1031. Id. at 868.
1032. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated: "We do not say that summary judgment is never
proper against individual plaintiffs in a pattern or practice case, but in this case we think that
the defendant has not made a sufficient showing." .d. It is difficult to conceive, however,
when summary judgment would be proper because the court must afford the plaintiff a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason for the decision is
pretext. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973). See also Haydon v.
Rand Corp., 605 F.2d 453, 455 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (summary judgment generally not proper when intent of the party is placed in issue).
1033. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
1034. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S 248, 256 (1981).
1035. Id. at 256.
1036. 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 820 (1983).
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plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the university refused to pro-

mote her from associate professor to full professor because of her sex.
The university rebutted the presumption by offering evidence that it
repeatedly denied her promotion because she failed to meet the requisite standards for scholarship and research. The burden then shifted to
the plaintiff to prove that the university's articulated reason was "'a
pretext or discriminatory in its application.' 1037 The plaintiff submitted evidence of her academic achievements. By 1979 she had published

four books which critiqued eighteenth century French literature, two
poetry books, and numerous articles and book reviews. She had also

read several papers at academic conventions. 1038 In addition, the plaintiff presented evidence indicating that the majority of evaluations submitted by outside scholars to the university supported the plaintiffs
promotion. 1039
The district court found, nevertheless, that the evaluations "'provide[d] a mixed picture of plaintiffs scholarship.' "l0 Accordingly,
the district court held that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponder-

ance of the evidence that she was the victim of invidious discrimination.

Although it characterized the plaintiff's academic file as

containing numerous favorable comments, 041 the Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court findings as not clearly erroneous.' z
1037. Id. at 718 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973)).
1038. 686 F.2d at 718. The plaintiff was considered for promotion to full professor during
the academic years 1973-74, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78, and 1979. Id. Each time the university decided against promotion; instead, it granted her merit salary increases to her present
rank of Tenured Associate Professor Step V, which was just one step short of full professor.
Id. at 718-19.
1039. Id. at 719. The decision to promote a teacher to full professor was based on several
factors, including letters of recommendation solicited from outside scholars. As permitted
by university procedures, the plaintiff herself solicited several of these letters. Id. at 719 &
n.6.
1040. Id. at 719. The university characterized these letters as "damnably faint in their
praise." Id.
1041. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated: "We do not discredit Laborde's academic qualifications by adopting the University's description of her work as 'inadequate' or 'deficient'...
we recognize that her scholarship has already been considered worthy of several promotions. . . ." Id.
1042. Id. The clearly erroneous standard is set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The full court voted against a suggestion for rehearing en banc. 686 F.2d at 719. Judge
Ferguson, dissenting from the en banc vote, succinctly outlined the effect of the majority's
analysis:
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In Meyer v. California& HawaiianSugar Co. ,1"'3 the plaintiff es-

tablished a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she was
discharged from her position because of her sex. At the time of her
discharge, the plaintiff played a significant role in administering the
defendant's affirmative action program. The employer rebutted the
presumption by explaining that she was discharged for preparing a
memorandum which disclosed personal sentiments unfavorable to minorities. To prove that the memorandum and the employees' reactions
to it1 ° 44 were not the true reason for discharging the plaintiff, the plain-

tiff cited numerous incidents in which male employees made racist
re°45
marks which evoked little or no reprimand from management.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that these allegations did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reason for the discharge
was pretext. 1 46 The Ninth Circuit based its reason on the fact that the
plaintiff was not discharged for making derogatory comments about
minorities. Rather, she was discharged because her derogatory comments provoked reactions which impaired her effectiveness in administering the employer's affirmative action program.1047 None of the
comments of the male employees provoked such a reaction. Furthermore, coming from her, the comments appeared to reflect the employer's policies toward its minority employees. Thus, the court found
The panel opinion presents the strongest case possible that Alice Laborde is
the victim of invidious sex discrimination.
The opinion states in clear language that men with qualifications similar to
hers have been promoted to full professor positions.
Yet the opinion concludes that she is not entitled to promotion because she
failed to meet the University's standards for scholarship and research.
The logical conclusion of that analysis is that men who do not meet the standards of scholarship and research will be promoted but women will not unless they
meet the standards. Title VII prohibits that type of discrimination.
Id. at 720 (Ferguson, J., dissenting from en banc vote).
1043. 662 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981).
1044. The plaintiff placed the memorandum on her superior's desk. A minority employee
found two draft memoranda and discussed the contents thereof with other minority employees. The employees expressed their displeasure with C & H's president. Several top C & H
meetings followed. The plaintiff confirmed that she had written the memorandum and was
asked for her resignatiqn. Id. at 638-39.
1045. Id. at 639-40. One employee purportedly shouted at his secretary that she "thinks
like a God damn Japanese." Another allegedly refused to hire a Chinese woman, stating
that "Chinese can't learn anything." A third employee refused to accept a black employee
in his department, commenting that "when there was more than one black they indulged in
a great deal of black humor." Finally, the past president of C & H purportedly refused to
hire a minority chauffeur because he thought his wife would be afraid of him. According to
the plaintiff, none of these employees received more than a mild reprimand. Id.
1046. Id. at 640.
1047. Id.
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that the incidents cited by the plaintiff were distinguishable."' 8 Since
no triable issues of fact remained, the Ninth Circuit held that summary
judgment was proper.1° 9
3. Retaliation

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee because the employee has filed a discrimination

complaint against the employer.10 50 The allocation of burdens and order of proof set forth
in McDonnell Douglas' 5 I apply to litigating a
52
0

retaliation claim.1
In Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp.,1053 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's findings that the plaintiff was discharged unlawfully in re-

taliation for having filed a sex discrimination complaint. 0 54 During
her first year of employment, the plaintiff received favorable performance reviews and periodic pay increases. Shortly after the plaintiff

complained to management of discriminatory treatment by her direct
supervisor, the supervisor noted in her file that her attitude needed im-

provement. After the employer learned that the plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC, several unfavorable notations
10 55
were entered in her file. She was subsequently discharged.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff clearly established a
prima facie case, and that the employer successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination. 0 56 The heart of the case was determining
1048. Id.
1049. Id.
1050. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment.. . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
1051. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
1052. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that the challenged employment decision followed the plaintiffs protected activities of which the employer was aware. The employer then carries the burden of articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. Finally, the plaintiff must be granted a full and
fair opportunity to show that the proffered reason is pretext. See Aguirre v. Chula Vista
Sanitary Serv., 542 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
1053. 695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1054. Id at 346.
1055. Id. at 344. Several notations reflected dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs actions in
connection with a medical leave of absence. She was dismissed for failure to contact management during her five-week absence.
1056. Id. at 345. The Ninth Circuit did not specify the evidence which constituted the
prima facie case or rebuttal. For guidelines to establish a prima facie case and its rebuttal,
see supra note 1052.
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whether the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the proffered reasons were pretext and that she was discharged because
she engaged in protected activities. The Ninth Circuit applied the "but
for" test10 57 and concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that but for the employer's retaliatory conduct,
the plaintiff would not have lost her job. 10 58 The supervisor testified,
both in his deposition and at trial, that the plaintiff's filing of a discrimination complaint was one of the reasons for her discharge. Another
officer of the company testified, as the abrupt shift in the tenor of the
notations indicated, that the company's attitude toward the plaintiff
changed after she filed the discrimination charge.10 5 9 The Ninth Circuit accordingly ruled that the finding of retaliation was not clearly
0 60
erroneous.
In Giford v. Atchison, Topeka andSanta Fe Railway, 10 6 1 the plain-

tiff contended that she was wrongfully fired and not rehired because
she threatened to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The
Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff clearly established a prima facie
case of retaliation when she offered into evidence a letter she wrote to
Santa Fe and the union prior to her firing, in which she threatened to
file a charge with the EEOC.I °s2 The court also found that the defendants rebutted the presumption of retaliation by articulating that the
plaintiff was discharged for failure to pay her union dues. 10 63
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants
and held that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise an issue of
fact as to whether the proffered reason was pretext. 10 64 To show that
1057. Under this test, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that her
involvement in the protected activity was one of the motivating factors for the firing and that
but for such activity she would not have been fired. Id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (plaintiff need only show that race was a "but
for" cause for the employer's decision); De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 857 n.12
(to show pretext plaintiffneed not prove that her activity was sole basis for employer's action
but must prove that "but for" the activity she would not have been fired)).
1058. 695 F.2d at 345.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 346.
1061. 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982).
1062. Id. at 1155-56. The court declined to draw a distinction between the filing of a
charge which is clearly protected and threatening to file a charge. Id. at 1156 n.3 (citing Sias
v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1978)).
1063. 685 F.2d at 1156.
1064. Id. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a question of pretext involves a determination of
the employer's intent in discharging an employee and, therefore, summary judgment was
not proper. Id. (citing Haydon v. Rand Corp., 605 F.2d 453, 455 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (summary judgment generally disfavored where motivation of a party is in issue)),
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she was the victim of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff offered
into evidence an EEOC report which concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was treated differently than simi10 65
larly situated male employees.
The Ninth Circuit also found that the plaintiff came forward with
enough evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether she was not
rehired because of retaliation. Although the plaintiff did not apply for
rehire, she presented evidence showing that it would have been futile to
do so. The court ruled that the evidence of futility was sufficient to
1 66
render summary judgment improper. 0
The plaintiff also claimed that she was discharged for her opposition to the collective bargaining agreement entered into by Santa Fe
and the union. Title VII makes it unlawful for employers and unions
to retaliate against employees who oppose unlawful employment practices.1 6 7 The agreement required extra board printer clerks to accept
assignments at all locations in their district. Prior to this agreement,
the clerks could opt to reject assignments away from their home points
without loss of seniority. The plaintiff argued that the agreement had a
harsher impact on some of the female employees than it had on the
male employees. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable
cause to believe that the agreement was discriminatory. The Ninth Circuit thus ruled that the plaintiffs allegations, coupled with the EEOC
finding, were sufficient to survive summary judgment and to make the
68
plaintifis opposition an activity protected by Title VII.10
B. Employee InsurancePlans
As a group, women live longer than men. Consequently, many
insurance companies offer life insurance plans which make distinctions,
either in contributions or in benefits, on the basis of sex. In LosAngeles
1065. 685 F.2d at 1156. The EEOC "reasonable cause" determination was made following
an impartial investigation.
1066. Id. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she stated that a fellow employee
told her that she would never have the chance to work for Santa Fe again. She also submitted a copy of her employment form which bore the notation "DO NOT REHIRE." Finally,
the parties stipulated that on prior occasions when the plaintiff resigned and had been rehired, Santa Fe initiated the rehire.
1067. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). See supra note 1045.
1068. 685 F.2d at 1157 (citing Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th
Cir. 1978) (opposition clause shields an employee from retaliation when employee reasonably believes discrimination exists); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 100407 (5th Cir. 1969) (filing a valid charge with EEOC is protected activity regardless of the
merits)).
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the Supreme Court ruled

that an employee-funded insurance group plan which requires greater
contributions from one sex
is discriminatory on the basis of sex and,
0 7°
hence, violates Title VII.

The Supreme Court emphasized that Title VII focuses on fairness
to the individual rather than fairness to the class. 0

71

The Court there-

fore found it significant that many women do not live as long as the
average man. Under insurance plans which made distinctions in contributions or benefits on the basis of sex, these "short-lived" women

were required to contribute more money to the fund and
would have
0 72
received no compensating advantage upon retirement.

The Supreme Court also illustrated the flaw in classifying insurance risks on the basis of sex: the preoccupation with traditional assumptions about men and women is preserved at the expense of other,'
perhaps more important, individual characteristics which account for
differences in health and longevity. For example, while sex-segregated

mortality tables seem to reflect innate differences between the sexes, a
better explanation for longevity may be that women are lighter smokers
than men.

0 73

The Court concluded that requiring women employees to pay
more into a pension fund directly contravened the language and policy
of Title VII. 0 74 The Court limited its holding to the employment practice of requiring unequal contributions from the sexes.10 7 It thus created the open market exception, which permits an employer to set aside
1069. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
1070. 435 U.S. at 711. In Manhart, the employer determined that the average female employee would live longer than the average male employee and that, as a class, the retired
female employees would receive more monthly payments than their male counterparts.
Consequently, the employer required its female employees to make higher monthly contributions to its pension fund. Since the contributions were withheld from the paychecks, a
female employee took home less money than a male employee earning the same salary. Id.
at 705.
1071. Id. at 708. Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1976), makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex
... ...
(emphasis added).
1072. 435 U.S. at 708.
1073. Id. at 709-10. The Manhart Court illuminated the absurdity of the practice of combining different classes of risks for purposes of group insurance: the flabby and the fit, the
healthy and the unhealthy, and the smokers and the nonsmokers are all treated as
equivalent risks. The Court suggested that "nothing more than habit" makes one classification seem less fair than another. Id. at 710.
1074. Id. at 711.
1075. Id. at 717. The Court cautioned: "[W]e do not suggest that [Title VII was intended
to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." Id. at 717.
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equal retirement contributions for each employee and let the retiree
0 76
purchase the benefits on the open market.
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit extended Manhart to
employee group insurance plans which require the same contributions
from individuals but allocate benefits on the basis of sex. In Norris v.
Arizona Governing Committee For Tax Deferred Annuity, 1077 retiring
employees were offered one of three options in the life insurance plan:
to receive the benefit in one lump sum, to receive a fixed sum for a
fixed period of time, or to receive a certain amount of money each
month for life. A female employee instituted a class action challenging
the third option. All the insurance companies which were selected by
the employer to carry out the third option used sex-segregated mortality tables to compute the monthly payments due the employee. Because women, as a class, live longer, their monthly payments were
smaller than those of their male counterparts.1 7 8
The Ninth Circuit found that the third option was a fringe benefit
and, thus, fell within the scope of Title VII. Since the option treated
female employees differently from male employees, the court held that
10 79
the plan violated Title VII.
The court applied Manhart even though the employer in Norris
did not operate the pension funds. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Title VII extends to agents of covered employers and that the challenged program could not operate without the affirmative adoption of
1 0 80
the employer.
The defendant contended that the third option fell within Manhart's open market exception because the defendant offered other nondiscriminatory plans. The Ninth Circuit summarily dispensed with this
argument and held that offering nondiscriminatory options does not
1076. Id. at 717-18.
1077. 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), af'd inpart,rev'd inpartpercuriam, 103 S. Ct. 3492
(1983) (plurality). A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
the insurance plan violated Title VII, id. at 3499, but reversed the circuit court award of
retroactive relief, id. at 3503-04. The Ninth Circuit had enjoined the employer to assure that
future annuity payments to similarly situated male and female employees would be equal.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a redetermination of the relief to be awarded.
Id.
1078. 671 F.2d at 332 & n.l.
1079. Id. at 332. The Supreme Court affirmed this portion of the opinion in 103 S. Ct. at
3499. See supra note 1075.
1080. Id. at 333-34 (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at
718 n.33; EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978)). The Ninth Circuit
rejected the employer's defense that it did not intend to discriminate against women, noting
that Manhart required no affirmative showing of intent. 671 F.2d at 333.
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validate a discriminatory option. 10 8' The defendant also argued that

the open market exception applied because the plan merely reflected
limits in the marketplace and was not a restriction of its own making.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that discriminatory practices under Title VII

do not become lawful by the mere fact that the challenged practices

flourish outside the employment context. 1082
In Retired Public Employees' Association of California v. California, °8 3 the Ninth Circuit again held that an employee group insurance
plan which resulted in different benefits for similarly situated male and

female employees violated Title VII. 10 84 The men and women employees made equal contributions to the pension plan but, as the result of

the use of sex-segregated tables, benefits differed according to both sex
and age.10 85 A woman retiring before age sixty would receive more

benefits than a similarly situated male retiring before sixty. Retirement
sixty would result in more favorable benefits to the male
after reaching
86
0

employee. 1
The State argued that the retirement plan was not discriminatory
because the different benefit levels did not favor any particular

class. ° 87 The Ninth Circuit refused to interpret Manhart as allowing
the employer to discriminate against one sex so long as it discriminated
in another manner against the other sex.' 0 88 The Ninth Circuit also
refuted the employer's argument that the plan did not violate Title VII

since it presented no barrier to employment, holding that the language
1081. 671 F.2d at 335. The defendant specifically argued that the employees were given an
option of taking their deferred compensation in a lump sum and buying the largest annuity
they could find on the open market. The Ninth Circuit stated that not only did the defendant offer a benefit which would purchase different amounts of goods from a third party, it
offered a benefit which favored men. Id.
1082. Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the defendant "affirmatively offered a plan,
better than that available for purchase by an individual, which discriminated against women." Id.
1083. 677 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). The Supreme Court
remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492.
Presumably, the Court remanded the case only for a redetermination of the relief to be
awarded. See supra note 1077.
1084. 677 F.2d at 735.
1085. Id. at 735 & n.2. Similarly situated men and women who retired at the retirement
target age of sixty received equal pension benefits. If an employee retired either before or
after sixty years of age, the monthly payment he or she received were computed from sexsegregated mortality tables. Since these tables incorporate assumptions that women live
longer than men, female retirees received smaller pension checks than their male
counterparts.
1086. Id.
1087. Id. at 735.
1088. Id.
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of Title VII does not require a showing that the challenged practice

created such an obstacle.1089 Finally, the State contended its plan was
valid under the holding in GeneralElectricCo. v. Gilbert. 9' The court
distinguished GeneralElectric, finding that the plan there discriminated

on the1basis of a physical disability, pregnancy, and not on the basis of
9
sex. 10

C. Affirmative Action

Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act' 0 92 makes it unlawful for an
employer to limit, segregate, or classify its employees in a way which
would harm an individual's employment status because of the individ-

ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Section 703(d)10 93
prohibits an employer from discriminating on such bases in the selection of employees for training programs.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,10 94 the Supreme
Court considered whether sections 703(a) and (d) proscribed a volun-

tary affirmative action program designed to propel black employees
into an exclusively white craftwork force. There, a union and an em-

ployer bargained for an affirmative action plan that reserved for black
employees fifty percent of the openings in a craft training program until the percentage of the black workforce was commensurate with the
percentage of blacks in the labor force. 9 5 The plaintiffs argued that
1089. Id.
1090. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
1091. 677 F.2d at 736. In GeneralElectric,the Supreme Court found that the exclusion of
pregnancy benefits from a disability insurance plan did not discriminate against women as a
class. Rather the plan classified two groups-pregnant persons and non-pregnant personsand, therefore, did not violate Title VII. 435 U.S. at 715.
1092. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
(a). . . It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employeri2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
1093. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
1094. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
1095. Id. at 198. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that blacks had long been
excluded from crafts on racial grounds. Id. at 198 n.1 (citations omitted).
Prior to 1974, the employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., hired as craftworkers
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since the plan discriminated against white employees solely because
they were white, the plan violated Title VII. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Title VII, holding that sections 703(a) and
(d) do not proscribe all race-conscious affirmative action. 1096
The Court premised its holding on the intent of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act "'to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
The Court also inferred that Congress envisioned private,
them.' "
voluntary resolution of discrimination which would supplement the
curative mandates of the Act. 10 9 8 While the Court did not establish a

test to determine the legality of an affirmative action plan, it held that
the challenged plan fell "on the permissible side of the line."' 1099
Against the background of Weber, the Ninth Circuit examined the
legality of an affirmative action program which discriminated on the
basis of sex rather than race and which was implemented by a state
agency rather than an employer in the private sector. In La Riviere v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 110 the California Highway Patrol (CHP) conducted a two-year pilot study to determine the
feasibility of employing women as CHP traffic officers." 0 ' To select
the female participants of the study, the CHP conducted an examinaat its plant in Grammercy, Louisiana, only those with prior craft experience. Since blacks
were long excluded from craft unions, few blacks could obtain the requisite experience.
Hence, Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which included the challenged affirmative action program. Id. at 197-98.
1096. Id. at 208. The Court characterized the plaintiff's reliance on a literal construction
of §§ 703(a) and (d) as "misplaced," since the prohibition of all race-conscious affirmative
action would defeat the statute's purpose of integrating blacks into the mainstream of the
American labor force. Id. at 201-02.
1097. Id. at 203 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
1098. 443 U.S. at 203-04 (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)
("[N]ational leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the
most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.")).
1099. 443 U.S. at 208.
1100. 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).
1101. Id. at 1276. Until 1974, women were barred from holding positions as CHP traffic
officers. In 1973, a Title VII class action was filed challenging this exclusion and the CHP's
policy of admitting only males to the traffic officer eligibility examination. Pursuant to negotiations with the class, the CHP agreed to undertake the feasibility study that was the
subject of this action. Id.
The California legislature enacted CAL. VEH. CODE § 2266, ordering the CHP to conduct the feasibility study and to report its conclusion to the legislature. Less than two years
following the study, the CHP conveyed to the district court its conclusion that women could
safely and efficiently perform the functions of CHP traffic officers. Accordingly, the district
court entered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered that all subsequent examinations be
open to both men and women. d. at 1276-77.
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tion limited to female applicants. The male plaintiff was denied admission to this examination. The CHP hired forty women who scored
highest on the examination and forty men chosen from a pre-existing
list of eligible males. The plaintiff was not on this list.
The plaintiff argued that the CHP violated Title VII when it failed
to allow him to take the women-only examination and to participate in
the feasibility study. The Ninth Circuit held that Title VII does not
proscribe all gender conscious affirmative action, and that the challenged feasibility study fell "'on the permissible side of the line.' "1102
The Ninth Circuit identified the purposes of Title VII's gender
component as identical to those underlying Title VII's race component:
to protect the group in the marketplace and to open employment opportunities in occupations previously closed to the group. 10 3 Applying
Weber, the Ninth Circuit found that, in light of these purposes, Congress contemplated the existence of lawful voluntary affirmative action
programs designed to eradicate sex discrimination.' 10 4
The court discerned no basis for differentiating affirmative action
programs implemented by state agencies from those implemented by
employers in the private sector. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that states
and their official agencies are not immune from Title VII. 110
To determine whether the challenged feasibility study fell "on the
permissible side of the line," the Ninth Circuit examined the factors the
Supreme Court considered in Weber. As in Weber, the challenged program (1) was designed to break down traditional patterns of segregation; (2) did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the majority
group; (3) did not create an absolute bar to the majority group; and
(4) was a temporary measure. Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
10 6
challenged feasibility study was permissible.'
D.

Relief

One of the chief objectives of Title VII is to achieve equality of
1102. 682 F.2d at 1279-80 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Kaiser, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979)).
1103. 682 F.2d at 1278-79. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere sex stereotypes);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (1971) (premise of Title VII is that
women are on an equal footing with men).
1104. 682 F.2d at 1279.
1105. Id.
1106. Id. at 1279-80. The Weber Court did not enumerate the criteria for the legality of a
particular affirmative action plan.. Nonetheless, it underscored these four factors in support
of its decision. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
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employment opportunities by proscribing practices which have operated to favor certain employees on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
national origin.1 7 Another primary objective is to make persons
whole for injuries resulting from unlawful employment discrimination. 1108 To accomplish the "make whole" objective, Congress in section 706(g)" 0 9 granted the federal courts broad powers to award full
equitable relief to victims of unlawful discrimination. Legislative history supports the view that Congress intended to give the courts wide
discretion to fashion "the most complete relief possible" for the purpose of restoring the injured parties to the position where they would
have been had the unlawful discrimination not occurred. 1110
In exercising their section 706(g) powers, courts have awarded successful plaintiffs back pay,"" retroactive seniority,' 1 2 attorneys'
fees,' 113 and injunctive relief.'" 4 They also have ordered reinstatement
or hiring of employees.' 115 Courts cannot, however, 16
award compensatory or punitive damages for a Title VII violation."
1107. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
1108. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
1109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate ...
I 110. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 420-21 (citing Section by Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference Report, 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972)).
1111. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
1112. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir
1980); Harper v. General Grocers Co., 590 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1979); Alaniz v. California
Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afid,572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 837 (1978).
1113. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Cary, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enters., Inc. 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
1114. Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147, 1168 (D.D.C. 1980), modified, 678 F.2d 257
(1982); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Ark. 1979), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 969 (1981); Neely v. City of Grenada, 438 F. Supp. 390, 409-10 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
1115. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See also Sethy v. Alameda
County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d
263 (10th Cir. 1975); Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Mo.
1981); Members of the Bridgeport Housing Auth. Police Force v. City of Bridgeport, 499 F.
Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
1116. Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982) (detailed provisions of§ 2000e5 almost compel conclusion that Congress intentionally omitted provisions for general or
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The district court does not wield unfettered discretion but must

exercise its judgment in view of" 'sound legal principles.' "1117 Nevertheless, the appellate court is to apply a narrow standard of review by
which it determines whether the district court's factual findings were
clearly erroneous and whether it abused its discretion to fashion a
' 1 18
"'just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case."
1. Backpay
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII as creating a presumption in favor of backpay. 111 9 Indeed, district courts which exercise
their power to award full backpay relief further the twin purposes of
Title VII. First, the prospect of a backpay award provides incentive for
employers to scrutinize their practices and eliminate discrimination.
Second, backpay awards make persons whole for injuries resulting
12 0
from past discrimination."
Backpay is to be paid only by the employer responsible for the
unlawful discrimination. 1122 Hence, agents and employees cannot be
2
held liable for backpay.1
a. tolling accrual
In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,1123 the Supreme Court considered
whether an employer charged with discrimination in hiring may toll
the continuing accrual of backpay liability simply by offering the complainant the position it previously denied her. The EEOC claimed that
punitive damages); Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th
Cir. 1981) (punitive damages and damages for emotional distress not authorized under Title
VII); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194-97 (6th Cir. 1978) (punitive damages not recoverable under Title VII), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979). But see
Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Neb. 1972) (claim for compensatory relief struck
down but claims for punitive damage allowed).
1117. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 416 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30, 35 (CC Va. 1807 (No. 14,692d)).
1118. 422 U.S. at 424-25 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931)).
1119. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 786 (1976).
In,41bemarlePaperCo., 422 U.S. at 421, the Supreme Court ruled that backpay must be
awarded unless its denial would not frustrate the purposes of eradicating discrimination in
the general employment sector and making persons whole for injuries resulting from past
discrimination. The Court thus required that a district court which denies a backpay award
must "carefully articulate its reason." Id. at 421 n. 14.
1120. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-18 (citing United States v. N.L.
Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
1121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See supra note 1109.
1122. Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982) (individual school board members cannot be held liable for backpay).
1123. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
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backpay liability may be tolled only when, in addition to offering unconditionally the job previously denied, the employer awards the complainant seniority retroactive to the date of the alleged discrimination.
In July 1971, Judy Gaddis and Rebecca Starr applied for jobs as
"picker-packers"1 124 at a Ford automotive parts warehouse. Each had
experience as picker-packers and, thus, were qualified to work at Ford.
At the time the women applied, Ford had never hired women to work
at the warehouse. Ford refused to interview Gaddis and Starr, then
hired male applicants to fill job openings.' 125 Gaddis filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC in September 1971. In January
1973, Gaddis and Starr were rehired by a nearby General Motors warehouse. 11 26 The following July, Ford offered a job to Gaddis without
seniority retroactive to her 1971 application. Gaddis, who was still
working for General Motors, declined the offer because she neither
wished to lose her accrued seniority at General Motors nor wanted to
be the only women employed in the Ford warehouse. Ford then extended its offer to Starr, who turned it down for the same reasons.
The district court held that Ford discriminated against the women
on the basis of their sex and awarded the women backpay in an amount
equal to what they would have earned had they been hired by Ford in
August 1971 minus the amount actually earned or reasonably earnable
by them. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Ford did not toll
the accrual of backpay liability when it offered to hire the women because its offer, without the promise of retroactive seniority, was "'incomplete and unacceptable.' "1127 The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit judgment, holding that Ford's unconditional job offer to
Gaddis and Starr terminated the further accrual of backpay
liability. 1128

The Supreme Court concluded that its standard for tolling
backpay liability better serves the objectives of Title VII. The Court
stated that voluntary compliance rather than litigation is the preferred
1124. "Picker-packers" pick ordered parts from storage and pack them for shipment. Id.
at 221.
1125. Id. at 221-22. Ford's hiring policy was to fill job vacancies from the earliest filed
applications first. The unit supervisor testified, however, that at least two of the male applicants were hired after Gaddis and Starr applied. Id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1126. Both women had been laid off by General Motors prior to July 1971. Id. at 222.
1127. Id. at 224. According to the dissent, however, the circuit court held simply that there
was no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to cut off backpay awards in
July 1973. The dissent asserted vigorously that the Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion on
whether Ford would have tolled its backpay liability if it promised retroactive seniority. Id.
at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1128. Id. at 241.
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means of achieving Title VII's primary purpose of ending discrimination." 9 Accordingly, the Court found that the rule tolling backpay
liability if the defendant offers the claimant the job originally sought
provides the employer strong incentive to hire the Title VII claimant.1130 In contrast, the rule requiring retroactive seniority to accompany the offer fails to provide the same motivatition, because it makes
hiring the Title VII claimant more
expensive than hiring new appli131
position.
same
the
for
cants
The Court similarly concluded that its standard better coincides
with Title VII's "secondary, fallback" goal of compensating injured
victims of discrimination. Applying the statutory duty to minimize
damages,' 132 the Court ruled that the unemployed or underemployed
Title VII claimant must accept the unconditional offer of the job
sought, even without retroactive seniority.' 133 The Court emphasized
that acceptance of this offer preserves the claimant's right to be made
whole because a court may grant the claimant's retroactive seniority. 1134 In the case where a victim of discrimination lands a job substantially equal to or more attractive than the defendant's, the Court
concluded that the victim no longer suffers the injury arising from the
unlawful practice. The Court thus reasoned that a rule which requires
for tolling that retroactive seniority be attached to the job offer would
propel the victims into a better position than they would have enjoyed
in the absence of discrimination. 1135 Accordingly, the Court inferred
that Gaddis and Starr opted to remain at their GM jobs rather than
accept Ford's offer because they thought that their GM jobs and the
1129. Id. at 228 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (cooperation and voluntary compliance are preferred means of assuring equality of employment
opportunities)).
1130. 458 U.S. at 228-29. According to the Court, such a job offer would ensure that the
employer would not be liable for further backpay damages. The employer's concern for
minimizing potential liability would motivate the employer to extend its offer to the Title
VII claimant before approaching other potential employees. Id.
1131. Id. The employer must offer the fringe benefits that accompany seniority. The
Court also suggested that granting retroactive seniority to the Title VII claimant over other
employees who "earned their places through their work on the job" may operate to deteriorate morale, reduce productivity, and create labor unrest. The Court concluded that requiring retroactive seniority would make the employer less willing to hire the claimant. Id.
1132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) provides: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce
the back pay otherwise allowable."
1133. 458 U.S. at 234.
1134. Id. at 234-36.
1135. Id. The Court considered continuing accrual of backpay liability following the job
offer to be tantamount to insurance against the risk of unemployment in a new job. Id. at
234.
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amount of backpay accrued prior to the offer were more valuable than

the Ford3 6 jobs and the right to seek full compensation from the
courts. 11

Finally, the Court considered the rights of innocent employees
who work for the employer charged with discrimination. It found that

requiring a promise of retroactive seniority to toll backpay liability
would trample upon these employees' seniority rights. Consequently,
the Court ruled that the objectives of Title VII should not impose "such
1137
a heavy burden" on innocent employees.
The dissent sharply attacked the manner in which the Court

framed the questions presented. It asserted vigorously that the question was simply whether the district court abused its discretion to
award backpay relief in this particular case. 1138 The dissent objected to

the Court decision as inconsistent with Albemarle's mandate that
backpay should be denied in cases of unlawful discrimination only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not undermine the twin statutory objectives of Title VII.' '3

The dissent interpreted the Court rul-

ing as a spur for employers to make "cheap offers" to victims of their
past discrimination, thus frustrating Title VII's primary objective to
eradicate discrimination.'
According to the dissent, Gaddis and
Starr would not have been made whole by accepting Ford's offer"

4

and, thus, the Court decision did not comport with the objective of
1136. Id. at 236-39. The Court appeared to contradict itself, nevertheless, when it stated:
"We cannot infer [that Gaddis and Starr thought their jobs at GM superior to the Ford
positions] solely from their rejection of Ford's offer." Id. at 235 n.24.
1137. Id. at 239-40. The Court acknowledged the central role seniority plays in many
employment situations and, on this basis, criticized a rule which encourages job offers that
would compel innocent workers to forfeit their seniority to a claimant with a yet unproven
claim of discrimination. Furthermore, the displaced workers cannot seek relief from claimants who sued unsuccessfully upon their claims. Id. at 240.
1138. Id. at 242 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent further asserted that the Supreme
Court rule unjustifiably limits the district court's discretion to exercise full equitable powers
in making victims of discrimination whole. Id. at 251-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1139. Id. at 244 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (backpay
should be denied only where it would not frustrate objectives of eliminating discrimination
and compensating unlawful discrimination victims)).
1140. 458 U.S. at 249-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that employers
may now cut off all future backpay liability by making offers which their discrimination
victims cannot reasonably accept. The applicant who declines such an offer to preserve
current job security is thereby penalized. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1141. Id. at 250-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Gaddis and Starr would have been deprived of two years of seniority that they would have otherwise acquired if there were no
discrimination. They would have enjoyed lower insurance benefits, lower wages, less vacation pay, and greater vulnerability to layoffs than persons hired after they were denied employment. Id.
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making discrimination victims whole. 1142
The dissent was perplexed by the Court's preoccupation with
rights of innocent employees and with classes of claimants not before
the Court."1 4 3 Finally, the dissent characterized as "studied indifference" the Court's attitude towards the concerns of the parties whose
interests were directly affected, in contrast to the Court's concern for
parties not before the Court. 1144
b.

offset of unemployment benefits

In Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp.,"" the district court granted the
plaintiff backpay for retaliatory discharge. The district court refused to
offset unemployment benefits from the plaintiff's award, and the defendant appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that, in granting relief, the court need not consider collateral benefits which the
1 46
employee may have received."
The court concluded that unemployment compensation is collateral because payments to the employee are not made to discharge the
employer's liability for unlawful discrimination." 4" In addition, the
Ninth Circuit found the trial judge's reasoning persuasive. First, if
Congress did not intend that an employee receive unemployment benefits plus backpay, the state employment agency logically should seek
reimbursement. Second, because section 706(g)"1 48 requires a deduction of amounts reasonably earnable, refusal to offset 11does
not discour49
age discharged employees from seeking another job.
2.

Attorneys' fees

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act""

°

grants the court discre-

1142. Id.
1143. Id. at 253-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent was referring to the Court's
discussion of the duty of unemployed and underemployed claimants to minimize damages,
and of claimants who subsequently find a job more attractive than the defendant's. See
supra notes 1132-1135 and accompanying text. The dissent asserted that Gaddis and Starr
fit none of these categories of claimants.
1144. 458 U.S. at 255 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1145. 695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
1146. 695 F.2d at 346-47.
1147. Id. (citing NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951) (benefits paid from
state unemployment compensation fund are collateral)).
1148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See supra note 1109.
1149. 695 F.2d at 347.
1150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides: "In any action or proceeding under this
subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs .... "
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tion to award a prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees. Allowance
of such fees is an important feature of Title VII because it encourages
victims of discrimination to seek the court's enforcement of Title VII
provisions and, at the same time, makes them whole for injuries resulting from the discrimination." 5
Courts have adopted either the lodestar" 52 or Johnson"I 3 approach in determining the reasonable value of an attorney's service in a
Title VII action. A court reaches the lodestar figure by multiplying the
time spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate." 54 The court may
adjust the lodestar figure after considering the contingent nature of success and the quality of the attorneys' work." 55 The resultant figure is
the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded.
The Johnson approach involves the consideration of twelve factors
in arriving at reasonable attorneys' fees. 1 56 Many of these factors are
incorporated in the lodestar approach.
Although a successfulplainti#fin a Title VII action is ordinarily
entitled to attorneys' fees, courts are generally reluctant to award a suc1151. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968), the Supreme Court
illustrated the importance of awarding the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees in a
Title II action:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking
the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees. . . to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination
to seek judicial relief under Title II.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975), the Supreme Court applied the
Piggie Park rationale to a Title VII action.
1152. Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973) (award of attorneys' fees following settlement of an antitrust class action).
1153. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (award of
attorneys' fees in a Title VII class action).
1154. Lindy Bros., 487 F.2d at 167. The district court ascertains how many hours were
spent and in what manner. The court then takes into account the attorney's legal reputation,
experience, and status (associate or partner) in setting a reasonable hourly rate. ld.
1155. Id. at 168. Where the fee is contingent, the court may wish to increase the attorney's
compensation to reflect the low chance of success. In evaluating the quality of an attorney's
work, the court may increase or decrease the award of fees only if the attorney exhibits an
unusual degree of skill, be it unusually poor or unusually good.
1156. To wit, the trial court must weigh the following:
(1) The time and labor required;
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case;
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cessful defendant attorneys' fees.

EEOC,"58

15 7

In ChristiansburgGarment Co. v.

the Supreme Court explained that a successful plaintiff is

more likely to be awarded attorneys' fees because Congress appointed
the plaintiff as private attorney general of the Civil Rights Act and,

moreover, awarding the plaintiff attorneys' fees is an award against a
violator of federal law." 59 In contrast, the Court inferred that Con-

gress intended attorneys' fees to be awarded to successful defendants
only in face of frivolous or burdensome litigation having no legal or
60

factual foundation."

In National Organizationfor Women v. Bank of Caifornia, National Association,1161 the district court awarded attorneys' fees to the

defendant. The parties to this class action agreed to a partial audit of
the defendant's Spanish-surnamed employees. Prior to this agreement,

the parties entered into a consent decree which provided that if the
auditor or court found that the defendant supplied inaccurate or inade-

quate information, the defendant would bear the cost of the audit;
62
otherwise the parties were to split the cost equally."

After investigating a random sample of the defendant's list of
Spanish-surnamed employees, the auditor concluded that the list was
inaccurate because it included individuals having origins in peninsular

Spain. The auditor reasoned that these individuals were not discrimi63
nated against and, hence, were not the object of the consent decree."

(5) The customary fee;
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) The "undesirability" of the case;
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(12) Awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
1157. Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), does not indicate when either a plaintiff or a defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees. See supra note 1150.
1158. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
1159. Id. at 418.
1160. Id. at 420-21.
1161. 680 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1162. Id. at 1292-93. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for its alleged discrimination
against blacks, women, and Spanish-surnamed employees. The parties entered into a consent decree which defined the Spanish-surnamed class it protected as "'persons with Spanish-surnames and others, those with Spanish-American background, including Mexican
Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans and those from Central and South America. This category does not include those of Portuguese ancestry."' Id. at 1292. This appeal arose out of
the district court's administration of the consent decree. Id.
1163. Id. at 1293.
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On the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs moved for a complete
audit of Spanish-surnamed employees. The district court denied the
motion without an opinion, but noted that the motion turned on the
question of whether the auditor's report constituted a determination
that the defendant's information was erroneous. The district court also
denied the plaintiffs' subsequent motion seeking to have the defendant
pay for the partial audit. In addition, the district court awarded the
defendant full attorneys' fees attributed to the second motion, holding
that since the second motion turned on precisely the same question as
the first motion, the second motion met the Christiansburgstandard of
frivolous or unreasonable action.116
In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in finding the second motion frivolous and upheld the award of attorneys' fees to the defendant. 16 s The Ninth
Circuit implied that the two motions turned on the same issue.
The dissent asserted that the motions addressed different legal issues and, hence, that the second motion was not frivolous. According
to the dissent, the motion seeking a full audit required the court to
determine whether the auditor's finding warranted a full audit. The
second motion seeking full payment for the partial audit concerned
whether the auditor's conclusion that the defendant's list was inaccurate required that the defendant pay for the partial audit.1 66 In spite
of the dissent's distinction between the two motions, the Ninth Circuit
found that the defendant deserved protection, in the form of attorneys'
fees, from the plaintiffs' frivolous action.
E. Exemptions
1. Bona fide occupational qualification
An employer may discriminate against employees on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin where religion, sex or national origin is
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) "reasonably necessary"
to carry on the particular business.' 167 In Gfford v. Atchison, Topeka
1164. Id. at 1293-94.
1165. Id.
1166. Id. at 1294-95 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
1167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) provides that:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees . . . on the basis of [their] religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operations of that particular business . ...

]LABOR LAW SURVEY

1984]

andSanta Fe Railway,11 68 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant consistently failed to promote her to the wire chief position because of her
sex. The defendant responded that this position required the lifting of
at least twenty-five pounds and, at that time, state protective legislation
did not permit the hiring of women in jobs requiring lifting."1 69 Consequently, the defendant pled good faith reliance on the statute.
The district court held that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence
to support her claim that heavy lifting was not a BFOQ for the position
and, therefore, it granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled that BFOQ is an affirmative defense. 17
' As such, the defendant carried the burden of producing facts
in support of the BFOQ claim." 7 The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to examine whether heavy lifting was "reasonably necessary" to the position of wire chief. The court stated that if it was not
the defendant could not plead good faith reliance
reasonably necessary,
1172
statute.
the
on
2.

Religious institutions

Religious institutions may discriminate in favor of employees who
are members of their faith.' 1 1 In EEOC v. Pacjfc PressPublishingAssociation, 1174 the plaintiff charged her employer, a non-profit religious
publishing house, with discrimination on the basis of sex. Until 1973,
the defendant paid its employees according to marital status and
sex. 1 175 The defendant claimed that Title VII exempts religious employment practices from Title VII's coverage. The Ninth Circuit ruled
exemption is of limited scope and did not apply to
that the religious
76
this case.11
1168. 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982).
1169. Id. at 1154. The plaintiff conceded that this legislation had not yet been declared
invalid.
1170. Id. at 1155.
1171. Id. (citing Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980)
(to justify exclusion of women employer has burden of proving that it had a factual basis for
believing that substantially all women could not meet the BFOQ)).
1172. 685 F.2d at 1155. The Ninth Circuit further stated that the district court should
consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim and if it found that heavy lifting was not a BFOQ,
it could grant, in addition to damages, injunctive relief.
1173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1976) provides that Title VII does not apply to a religious institution "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with 'the operation of the religious institution's activities.'"
1174. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
1175. Id. at 1275. Married men received a higher rental allowance than single men, who
in turn received more than female employees.
1176. Id. at 1276-77.
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The Ninth Circuit relied upon legislative history for its decision.

It found that Congress rejected proposals that granted religious employees complete exemption from Title VII's regulation."177 The Ninth

Circuit concluded, in accordance with all other courts that have considered this issue, 178 that religious employers are not immune from liabil17 9
ity for discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin.'

the district court holding that the deAccordingly, the court affirmed
180
VII.
Title
violated
fendant
VII.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME AND SECURITY ACT

Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974 (ERISA)" 81 to protect participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries.

11

2

Thus, the Act was designed "to prevent

plan assets; and to provide
transactions which dissipate or endanger1183
effective remedies for breaches of trust."
A.

Standardof Review of FiduciaryDecisions and
FiduciaryPersonalLiability

Section 11041184 of ERISA sets forth the fiduciary duties of employee benefit plan trustees. Fiduciaries must administer pension plans
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 85 Although
1177. Id. at 1276.
1178. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 28485 (5th Cir. 1981) (seminary must comply with EEOC filing requirements for employees
who were not working in capacity of minister); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477,
485 (5th Cir. 1980) (employment relationship between a religious educational institution and
its faculty not exempt from Title VII).
1179. 676 F.2d at 1276-77.
1180. Id. at 1283.
1181. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
1182. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976) states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by rejuiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
1183. 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974).
1184. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1185. Id. Section 1104 provides in pertinent part that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
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trustees of pension plans have broad discretion in plan administration, 18 6 the actions of trustees are subject to review. However, a federal court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trustees. In
Rehmar v. Smith" 87 the Ninth Circuit adopted a standard of review for
trustee decisions which provides that the court will only reverse fiduci-

ary decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith, not
supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a question of
88 In three recently decided cases,
law." I"
the Ninth Circuit applied this
standard to determine whether the trustee was liable for breach of
fiduciary duties.
In Brug v. Pension Plan of Carpenters Pension Trust Fund,11 89 a
union clerical employee bought suit against a trust fund claiming pension benefits for disability retirement. Effective June 1, 1975, trustees
of the plan adopted an amendment and implemented regulations
which designated clerical workers as beneficiaries of the plan. Shortly
thereafter, a newly eligible employee became disabled and applied for
disability retirement. In March 1976, however, the trustees of the plan
rescinded the amendment and delayed action on the employee's application until after the amendment's rescission. As a result, the trustees
denied the employee her benefits on the ground that she was no longer
covered by the plan." 90 The district court agreed with the trustees and
rendered a verdict against the employee." 9 On appeal, however, the
Ninth Circuit reversed because it found that the trustees' action was
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like characters with like aims;
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments, governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
this subchapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1186. Sailer v. Retirement Fund Trust, 599 F.2d 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1979); Giler v. Board of
Trustees, 509 F.2d 848, 849 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1187. 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1977).
1188. Id. at 1371. The Ninth Circuit relied on a series of decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit involving claims under pension plans administered by the United Mine
Workers Union. Id. See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (1962) (trustees' denial of plaintif's application for benefits reversed because the decision was arbitrary and capricious); see
also Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (trustees' refusal of
pension benefits upheld because based upon a reasonable interpretation of eligibility requirements), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (trustees' changes in eligibility requirements without notification to participants held
arbitrary), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964).
1189. 669 F.2d 570 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 135 (1982).
1190. Id.at 571.
1191. Id.
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arbitrary and capricious.1 192
The Brug court explained that the trustees could not retroactively
deny the application due to the rescission of an amendment after the
application was filed, and that the trustees were obliged to approve the
pension since the employee met all the plan's eligibility requirements at
the time of application." 93 The court concluded that the trustees
should have reviewed the application94under the eligibility standards in
effect at the time it was submitted.1
In Elser v. InternationalAssociationof MachinistsNationalPension

Fund,'1 95 the Ninth Circuit relied on the rational nexus test set forth in
Central Tool Company v. InternationalAssociation of Machinists National Pension Fund 1 96 to reach its decision. In Central Tool, the dis-

trict court held that forfeiture provisions which provided, with some
exceptions, for cancellation of past credits for employees whose employer withdrew from the plan, were arbitrary and capricious because
less drastic means were available to achieve the goal of fund preservation." 97 The CentralTool court stated that "the effects of the forfeiture
provisions are unduly drastic given the poor fit between the provisions
and goal they are designed to achieve, for far less punitive means than
available to satisfy the legitiforfeiture of all past service credits are
' 98
preservation."
fund
of
mate objectives
In Elser, two employees brought suit challenging the cancellation
provisions of a multiemployer pension plan. The plan provided that
employees must have a minimum of ten years of credited service,
which included both past" 199 and future 1200 service, in order to qualify
for pension benefits. Waste King, the former employer of plaintiffs,
contributed to the pension plan until its collective bargaining agreement with the union expired in 1975. Shortly thereafter, the union lost
a decertification election. Both plaintiffs had been employees of Waste
King for more than ten years. At the time of Waste King's withdrawal
1192. Id.
1193. Id. at 576.
1194. Id.at 575.
1195. 684 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 67 (1983).
1196. 523 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1981).
1197. Id.at 818.
1198. Id. at 817-18.
1199. 684 F.2d at 650. Past service credit is "credit for periods of eligible employment
prior to an employer's initial contribution." Id. The crediting of past service allows employees near retirement age when their employer begins contributing to the plan to be eligible for benefits based on all their years of employment. Id.at 650 n.l.
1200. Id. at 650. Future service credit is "credit for periods of covered employment for
which contributions were actually made." Id.
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from the plan, however, the employees had only six years of future
service credit. 1201
The plan had a cancellation provision which provided for cancellation of all past service credit if an employer stopped contributing to
the fund and remained in business.' 2 Exempt from this provision
were employees already receiving pensions and employees who had left
their employment more than twenty-four months before or within
thirty days after their employer's termination of participation. 2 0 3 Employees who earned at least five more years of future service credit
within eight years of their employer's termination of participation were
entitled to reinstatement of their past service credit.' 2 °4
After Waste King withdrew from the collective bargaining agreement, Waste King was notified that all past service credit had been
cancelled. The plan participants, however, were not directly notified.
Later, when the plaintiffs applied for pension benefits, their applications were denied because they did not have ten years credited
service
20 5
as a result of the cancellation of their past service credits.
The plaintiffs contended that cancellation of the past service credit
violated ERISA because the action was arbitrary and capricious insofar
as it discriminated among the participants and was not actuarially justified. 20 6 In contrast, the trustees argued that the cancellation was necessary to encourage participation in the fund and to preserve the
financial stability of the fund because the fund could not support a
continuing liability for pension benefits when the employer's contributions terminated. 20 7 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the cancellation
provisions failed the CentralTool rational nexus test because the trustees submitted no actuarial evidence to support their contention that the
provisions were necessary to protect the financial stability of the
fund. 20 8 The court accordingly held that the cancellation of the past
20 9
service credit was arbitrary and capricious.
ERISA does not impose a per se rule of fiduciary liability on trustees who violate its provisions. In Fentron Industries v. National
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.
1209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.

651.
657.
656.

658.
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Shopmen Pension Fund,1 2 11 the employer and its employees brought
suit against the pension fund and its trustees, alleging that the trustees'
cancellation of past service credits violated ERISA's minimum vesting
standards.' 121 Plaintiffs further argued that the trustees' violation of
the vesting standards was a per se violation
of the fiduciary require2 12
ments set forth in section 1104(a)(1)(D).1
Although the Fentron court found that the trustees' cancellation of
the past service credits violated ERISA's minimum vesting standards, 2 13 it did not summarily impose liability on the trustees. Instead,
the court stated that a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty
"only when his or her action was 'made in bad faith, or upon lack of a
factual foundations, or when unsupported by substantial

evidence.'

"1214

The court rejected the imposition of per se liability because Congress never intended it and because the court feared that "the potential
burden of per se personal liability for any violation of this very complex statute might deter capable persons from serving as trustees for
these plans."' 215 The court's conclusion therefore is consistent with the
established standard of imposing liability only for arbitrary and capricious acts.
B.

Attorneys' Fees

Section 11321216 of ERISA creates a statutory cause of action
against an employer for failure to make contributions in accordance
with the terms and conditions of a plan. Prior to 1980, an award of
attorney fees in such suits was discretionary. 121 7 However, section 1132
1210. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
1211. Id. at 1305. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053(c)(1)(B), (C)(1)(A), 1054 (g) & 1082(c)(8) (1976).
1212. 674 F.2d at 1307. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976) provides that a fiduciary shall
discharge his duty "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter."
1213. 674 F.2d at 1306.
1214. Id. at 1307 (quoting Tomlin v. Board of Trustees, 586 F.2d 148, 150 (9th Cir. 1978)).
1215. 674 F.2d at 1307.
1216. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action may be brought (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. ...
1217. San Pedro Fishermen's Welfare Trust Fund Local 33 v. Di Bernardo, 664 F.2d 1344,
1346 (9th Cir. 1982).
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was amended in 1980 and currently provides that attorney's fees shall
be awarded when a judgment is rendered in favor of a plan in suits
brought by a participant, beneficiary of fiduciary to enforce contribu1218
tions to a multiemployer plan.
In CentralStates, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Alco Express Co .,1219 a Michigan district court confronted the issue of
retroactive application of the amendment. In CentralStates, a pension
fund sought attorney's fees pursuant to section 1132 even though the
amendment took effect during pendency of the proceedings. The court
found the amendment applicable despite the statute's silence on the issue of retroactive application. 1220 The court reasoned that the retroactive application would not result in an unanticipated burden because
the court formerly had the discretion to order payment of attorney's
fees. 1221 The court bolstered its decision with the general proposition
that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is a
statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.' 2 2 2 In two
1223
recent decisions, San Pedro Fisherman's Wefare v. Di Bernardo,
and M&R Investment Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 1224 the Ninth Circuit addressed the retroactive application of the 1980 amendment.
In San Pedro Fisherman'sWe/fare v. DiBernardo,'122 a union welfare trust fund brought suit to enforce an employer's payment of trust
fund contributions pursuant to a multiemployer collective bargaining
agreement. The district court granted the trust fund's motion for summary judgment and denied its motion for attorney's fees. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the denial of attorney's fees, applying the 1980 amendment to section 1132.1226 The court concluded that the 1980 amendment is applicable to actions decided on or after its effective date and,
1218. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (Supp. V 1982). Section 1132(g) provides in part: "(2) In any
action under this subchapter by a fiduciary. . . to enforce section 1145 of this title in which
a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan - .. .
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant. . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g) (Supp. V 1982) (emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (Supp. V 1981) requires an employer participating in a multiemployer plan to make contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of the plan.
1219. 522 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
1220. Id. at 925.
1221. Id. at 933.
1222. Id. at 924 (citing Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 715 n.21 (1973)).
1223. 664 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1982).
1224. 685 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982).
1225. 664 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1982).
1226. Id. at 1346; see supra note 1218.
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therefore, an award of attorney's fees was mandatory. 1227
In M&R Investment Co. v. Fitzsimmons,1228 an investment company brought suit against pension fund trustees for breach of contract.
Judgment was entered against the investment company and the trustees' claim for attorney's fees was denied. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that the amendment was inapplicable because the suit was
initiated by the investment company and not by a " 'participant, beneficiary or fiduciary.' ",1229 Thus, to be awarded attorney's fees pursuant
to the 1980 amendment, the underlying suit must have been initiated
by an appropriate party.
C. Section 515

Under ERISA, delinquent contributions were enforced by an action founded either on state law, the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties, or the trust agreement forming the foundation for
the employee benefit plan. However, section 515, added as part of the
1980 amendments, created an unambiguous ERISA cause of action
against a delinquent employer.1230 According to the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, section 515 was added because "simple collection actions brought by plan trustees have been converted into
lengthy, costly and complex litigation concerning claims and defenses
unrelated to the employer's promise and the plans' entitlement to the
23
contributions," and steps must be taken to simplify collection.' '
232
In a recent Supreme Court case, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mu//ins,
interpretation of section 51-5 was at issue. In 1974, Kaiser Steel Corporation and the United Mine Workers (UMW) entered into a collective
bargaining agreement. The agreement included a purchased-coal
clause requiring Kaiser to contribute to employee health and retire1227. 664 F.2d at 1346.
1228. 685 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982).
1229. Id. at 288 (quoting § I132(a)(3) (1976)); see supra note 1216. The court further
stated that "[t]here is no ambiguity in the wording of the section. . . . Perhaps if Congress
had considered the situation we are faced with, it might have written the statute differently.
However, it did not, and it is not within our power to amend the clear language of the
statute. Id. at 288.
1230. 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (Supp. V 1981) which provides:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan
under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with the law, make such contributions in
accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.
1231. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESs., REPORT ON THE MULTIEMPLOYER PLAN AMENDMENTS AcT OF 1980 44 (Comm.

Print 1980).
1232. 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
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ment plan funds, based in part upon the amount of coal purchased by
Kaiser from non-UMW mines. Kaiser complied with only part of the
1974 agreement. Although it contributed based on the coal it produced
and the hours worked by its miners, it did not report the coal it acquired from others or make contributions under the purchased-coal
clause. Upon the expiration of the 1974 agreement, the fund trustees
1233
sued Kaiser to enforce the purchased-coal clause.
Kaiser conceded that it did not adhere to the purchased-coal
clause but defended on the ground that the purchased-coal clause was
void and unenforceable as violative of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act,1234 and section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.1235 Specifically, it was Kaiser's contention that making the payments would
result in an illegal restraint of trade, or would allow the trustees to reap
the benefits of an illegal "hot cargo" clause. 1236 The trustees argued,
however, that section 515 established "a special rule governing the
availability of illegality defenses in actions for delinquent contributions
brought by pension fund trustees,"' 1 23 7 and that proper interpretation of
section 515 therefore precludes illegality defenses.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trustees' interpretation
of section 515. The Court explained that although Congress enacted
section 515 to simplify delinquency collection by discouraging "complex litigation concerning claims and defenses unrelated to the employer's promise and the plans' entitlement to the contributions,"' 12 38 it
12 39
did not intend to preclude the assertion of related, valid defenses.
24
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.1 o
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
Justice Brennan argued that the Court ignored the legislative prescription by failing to interpret section 515 as a limitation on the viability of
illegality defenses. The Court frustrated Congress' paramount concern
in enacting section 515 which was to "expedite and simplify the collec1233. id. at 73-76.
1234. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). "Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as monopolization and attempts
to monopolize." 455 U.S. at 78.
1235. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). "Section 8(e) of the NLRA forbids contracts between a
union and an employer whereby the employer agrees to cease doing business with or to
handling the products of another employer." 455 U.S. at 78.
1236. 455 U.S. at 78.
1237. Id. at 86.
1238. See supra note 1232.
1239. 455 U.S. at 86.
1240. Id. at 89.
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tion of delinquent contributions by plan trustees."' 24' The majority
merely "impose[d] its own view of the wisdom of [section 515] upon
' 242
Congress and upon respondents, in the guise of judicial restraint."'
The dissent, relying on the legislative history, concluded that section
515 was specifically designed to cut off all illegality defenses except
which involve a
those falling within the prohibition of section 1186
243
claim of illegality inherent in the payment itself.
D. Regulation of DiscretionaryActs of Trustees

Absent violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
discretionary acts of trustees are subject to regulation under ERISA in
the appropriate district court, and not by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). 12 4
In NLRB v. DriverSalesmen Local582, 2 45 trustees voted to implement vision care benefits. The employer participants in the plan
brought suit alleging that the trustees committed an unfair labor practice by adopting the vision care benefits. Specifically, the employers
contended that the trustees violated section 8(b)(3) and 8(d) 1246 of the
NLRA by making a unilateral decision on behalf of the union. The
NLRB agreed that the trustees were acting as agents of the union and
held that the extension of the benefits was an unfair labor practice. 247
1241. Id. at 94.
1242. Id. at 98.
1243. Id. at 95. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976) states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer or association of employers or any person who acts as a labor relations expert, advisor, or consultant to an employer or
who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend or deliver, or agree to pay, lend
or deliver, any money or other thing of value(1) to any representative of any of his employees. . .; or (2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employer thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or
would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer. . .; or (3) to
any employee or group of committee of employees of such employer. . . inexcess
of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group
or committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise
of the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization. . . with intent to influence
him in respect to any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or employee of such labor organization.
1244. NLRB v. Driver Salesmen, Local 582, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982); 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1976).
1245. 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
1246. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents-.. . (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of
this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) defines collective bargaining.
1247. 670 F.2d at 857.
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The NLRB petitioned this court to enforce its order. The trustees
defended on the ground that the Board's order was unenforceable be-

cause discretionary acts by trustees are outside the purview of the
NLRB. Moreover, the trustees expressed concern that "the Board's de-

cision would make all internal decisions by trustees subject to collective

bargaining."12' 4 The Ninth Circuit denied the Board's petition holding
that there was insufficient evidence to find that the trust was an agent of
the union, and therefore, there was no violation of 8(b)(3). 124 9 Thus the
trustee actions were subject to regulation only under section 302 and

ERISA, neither of which is within the jurisdiction of the Board.1250 Internal decisions by trustees, therefore, are subject to Board review only

if an unfair labor practice is found.
E. Section 406

Section 406 of ERISA prohibits loans from a pension fund to a
party in interest. 125' A party in interest is an employer whose employees are covered by the plan, an owner of a majority of voting stock in a
corporation, or any fiduciary of such employee benefit plan. 1252 Sec1248. Id. at 859.
1249. Id. at 858-59.
1250. Id. at 860.
1251. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (1976) states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in section 1108 of this title;
(1) a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a
transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a
direct or indirect(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the plan and
a party in interest.
1252. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides:
(14) The term "party in interest" means, as to an employee benefit plan(A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator, officer,
trustee, or custodian), counsel or employee of such employee benefit plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) any employer organization any of whose members are covered by such
plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or
the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation.
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest partnership, or
(iii)
the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph
(C) or (D);
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15)) of any individual described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which) 50
percent or more of(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or
the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

tion 408,1"

s

[[Vol.

17

however, establishes an exemption procedure whereby if it

is administratively feasible, and in the interests of and protective of the
plan and its participants and beneficiaries, a loan from a fund to a

party in interest may be exempt from the statutory prohibition.
In M&R Investment Co. v. Flitzsirmons,125 4 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the ERISA loan prohibition applies when

the party in interest problem was eliminated prior to the disbursal date
in the loan agreement. In December 1974, M&R applied for a forty
million dollar loan from a pension fund. After amending the terms, the
trustees approved the loan. In June 1976, however, the trustees voted

to rescind the loan agreement because of the section 406 prohibition.
M&R consequently brought suit against the trustees for breach of contract relating to the loan agreement.
The trustees contended that the loan violated section 406 because

at the time of the loan agreement M&R's parent corporation also
owned a third entity which was an employer contributing to the fund.
Therefore, according to section 1002(14)1255 M&R was a party in

interest.
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate, is owned directly or
indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C),
(D), or (E);
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 percent or more
shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person described in subpargraph (B),
(C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee benefit plan; or (1) a 10 percent or
more (directly or indirectly in capital or profits) partner or joint venturer of a
person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50 percent for subparagraph (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent for subparagraph (H) or (1). The
Secretary may prescribe regulations for determining the ownership (direct or indirect) of profits and beneficial interests, and the manner in which indirect stockholdings are taken into account ....
1253. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976) provides:
(a) The Secretary shall establish an exemption procedure for purposes of this
subsection. Pursuant to such procedure, he may grant a conditional or unconditional exemption of any fiduciary or transaction, or class of fiduciaries or transactions, from all or part of the restrictions imposed by section 1106 and 1107(a) of
this title. Action under this subsection may be taken only after consultation and
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury. An exemption granted under this
section shall not relieve a fiduciary from any other applicable provision of this Act.
The Secretary may not grant an exemption under this subsection unless he finds
that such exemption is(1) administratively feasible,
(2) in the interests of the plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and
(3) protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan.
1254. 658 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982).
1255. See supra note 1251.
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M&R argued that the statutory prohibition did not apply because
the parent company sold the employer subsidiary prior to the actual
disbursement of any money. M&R's argument was based on the language of section 4061256 which prohibits a plan from lending money or
extending credit to a party in interest. M&R argued that ERISA was
not violated because a loan had never occurred and that the "loan contract is a separate part of the transaction not prohibited by ERISA."' 257
The Ninth Circuit rejected M&R's argument, holding that the sale
of the subsidiary did not remove the ERISA impediment because the
fact that the contract existed prior to the divestiture vitiated the effect of
any change in the relationship between the companies. 25 8 The court
also held that a contractually created right is not severable from the
contract that created it explaining that "[d]isbursement is meaningless
without reference to the contract. The culpability arises with the contract's creation; it cannot be eliminated by merely dissolving the improper relationship prior to the contract's execution."' 1259 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the loan transaction was unenforceable as a
matter of law because it violated section 406.
.

Preemption

Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts state participation in regulation
of employee benefit plans by specifying that the provisions of ERISA
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."'126° An employee benefit plan is defined as a welfare plan or pension plan.12 6 ' The preemption provision, however, "shall not apply with respect to any cause of
action which arose, or any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975. ' ' 1262 Crucial to an inquiry into preemption, therefore, is

the determination of when the cause of action arose and the judicial
interpretation of whether a given state law "relates to" an employee
benefit plan.
2 63
The Ninth Circuit, in Lafferty v. Solar Turbines International,
set forth a test for determining when a cause of action arises under
ERISA. Solar International began contributing to a pension plan in
1256. See supra note 1250.
1257. 685 F.2d at 287.

1258. Id.
1259.
1260.
1261.
1262.
1263.

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1976).
666 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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1966. When the plan was amended in 1976, employees who were previously prohibited from contributing to the plan were allowed to begin

contributing and receiving the same benefits as those employees contributing since 1966. Employees who had contributed since 1966
brought suit in state court claiming unfair discrimination in connection
with the pension plan. The case, originally filed in state court, was removed to federal court by the employer. 1264 The employees sought and
the district court denied a motion to remand the case to the state court.
The Ninth Circuit affrmed on the ground that ERISA preempted

plaintiff's alleged claim under state law.
The court explained that ERISA was applicable because the adoption of the 1976 plan was a substantial act contributing to the cause of
action since it rendered the employee's previous agreements valueless
and it occurred after the preemption date.

265

The court noted that the

agreement or the making of contributions in this case were not substan-

1266
tial acts because they were not, in themselves, actionable.
12 6 7
The Supreme Court, in Alessi v. Raybeslos-Manhat/an, Inc.,

adopted a broad interpretation of what "relates to" employee benefit
plans pursuant to section 1144(a).12 6 1 In Alessi, the Court concluded
that the New Jersey statute in question was preempted by federal law
because it eliminated one method for calculating pension benefits permitted under ERISA. 269 To the Alessi Court it did not matter that the
statute intruded indirectly, "through a workers' compensation law,
rather than directly, through a statute called 'pension regulation' [since]
ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing on private
2 70
pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern." 1
1264. The removal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
1265. Id. at 410.
1266. Id. The Ninth Circuit has declined to apply ERISA if acts after the preemption date
were mere formalities adjunct to actions more substantially related to the cause of action
taken before the preemption date. Id. See Ponce v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
628 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1980) (the court declined to apply ERISA to plaintiffs formally denied
benefits after the preemption date); Bacon v. Wong, 445 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(ERISA not applicable to a cause of action for mistaken payments to a pension fund made
and discovered after the preemption date); see also Woodford v. Marine Cooks & Stewards
Union, 642 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1981); Quinn v. Country Club Soda Co., 639 F.2d 838 (1st Cir.
1980); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1980); Martin v.
Bankers Trust Co., 565 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1977).
1267. 451 U.S. 504 (1980).
1268. Id. at 521-26.
1269. Id. at 524. The New Jersey statute was designed to ban pension benefit offsets based
on workers' compensation benefits. ERISA, however, permits integration of pension funds
with other public income maintenance moneys when calculating benefits.
1270. Id. at 525.
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In Employee Benefits Committee v. Pascoe1271 and FranchiseTax Board
v. Construction Laborers,1 272 two simultaneously decided cases, the
Ninth Circuit embraced and expanded the Alessi approach.
In Employee Benefits Committee v. Pascoe,1273 the employees received both pension and Hawaii workers' compensation benefits. The
committee and the company brought an action to offset the employees'
workers' compensation benefits against the benefits they would receive
under the pension plan. The employees, however, contended that the
Hawaiian compensation law prevented such an offset. 1274 The court
stated that it was immaterial that the state compensation law may have
275
prevented such an offset because ERISA preempted the state law.
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Alessi, the Ninth Circuit
also rejected the argument that "since the state law did not directly
regulate pension plans and had only a 'collateral' effect on them, it was
' 276
not preempted."'
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers,12 77 three union
members owed the state unpaid personal income tax. The Franchise
Tax Board, under statutory authority,' 27 8 levied against money held in
trust for the members. The trustees of the fund, however, refused to
pay and the state brought action for declaratory relief.'2 79 The trustees
contended that ERISA preempted the state's attempt to levy on the
vacation trust for unpaid taxes. 2 80 The state, on the other hand, argued that ERISA does not protect vacation funds from creditor's
claims. It reasoned that there is a "difference between vacation benefits
and retirement benefits, and . . . [that] Congress intended to protect
28
only the latter."'1 '
The Ninth Circuit held that ERISA preempts the levying statute.
1271. 679 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1982).
1272. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982).
1273. 679 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1982).
1274. Unlike Lafferty v. Solar Turbines Int'l, 666 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1982), there was no

question of ERISA applicability here because "the facts giving rise to any cause of action
.. . did not occur at least until the award of worker's compensation benefits, an event which
occurred several months after the effective date of the preemption provision." 679 F.2d at
1323 n.5.
1275. 679 F.2d at 1322.

1276. Id. at 1323.
1277. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982).
1278. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 18817 provides in pertinent part that the Franchise Tax

Board may require an employer who has "possession... of things of value belonging to a
taxpayer... to withhold the amount of any tax.. . due from the taxpayer."
1279. 679 F.2d at 1308.
1280. Id.
1281. Id.
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The court explained that although pension funds might differ from vacation funds in terms of other protections, ERISA clearly preempts
state action relating to both pension 1and
welfare benefit plans 128 2 and
283
the latter includes vacation benefits.

G. Minimum Vesting Standards

One of the primary purposes of ERISA is to insure that pension
plan participants do not lose vested benefits because of "unduly restrictive" forfeiture provisions. 12

4

Under section 1053 of ERISA, a pension

fund must provide an employee with a nonforfeitable right to his normal retirement benefit when he reaches retirement age1285 and a non-

forfeitable right to a percentage of his accrued benefit; the percentage
being related to length of employment. 286 Such nonforfeitable rights
are the employee's vested interest in his pension fund. An "accrued
benefit" is defined in section 1002(23) to mean "in the case of a defined
benefit plan, the individual's accrued benefit determined under the
plan, and. . . expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing
at normal retirement age." 1287 "Normal retirement benefit" is defined

as "the greater of the early retirement benefit under the plan, or the
benefit under the plan commencing at normal retirement age.' 2 8 8
"Normal retirement age" is defined as the "earlier of (a) the time a plan

participant attains normal retirement under the plan, or (b) the later of
- (i) the time a plan participant attains age 65, or (ii) the 10th anniversary of the
time a plan participant commenced participation in the
9
plan."

128

During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit interpreted ERISA's
minimum vesting requirements under section 1053 in Hernandez v.
1282. Id. at 1309 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976)).
1283. d. at 1309. Section 1002(1) defines a welfare benefit plan as a plan with "medical,
surgical. . . accident, disability. . . or vacation benefits." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
1284. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 4670, 4677 & 4719; S.REP. No. 383 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1974 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEws, 4890, 4898.
1285. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976).
1286. Section 1053(a) requires that an employee's interest in his pension benefits be tied to
his length of service. The plan may satisfy this requirement in three ways: 100% vesting
after ten years of service (§ 1053(a)(2)(A)); 25% vesting after five years of service rising to
100% vesting after fifteen years of service (§ 1053(a)(2)(B)); or 50% vesting when age plus
years of service equals forty-five rising to 100% vesting when age plus years of service equals
fifty-five (§ 1053(a)(2)(C)).
1287. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1976).
1288. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(22) (1976).
1289. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1976).
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Southern Nevada Culinary andBartendersPension. 1290 In Hernandez,
the wife filed suit under ERISA seeking a declaration that she was entitled to her husband's pension benefits. Under the husband's plan, the
wife was a joint beneficiary. The husband, who was sixty-one when he
died, had a one hundred percent vested interest in his accrued benefits. 12 91 The normal retirement age of his pension plan was sixty292

two. 1

Mrs. Hernandez contended that under ERISA "accrued retirement
benefits" differ from "normal retirement benefits" insofar as the former
vest and become nonforfeitable upon satisfaction of the service requirement while the latter vest upon satisfaction of both the service requirement and the normal age requirement. 293 She argued that since her
husband had met the service requirement for "accrued retirement benefits," she, as his survivor, was entitled to receive benefits regardless of
the fact that her husband died prior to reaching the normal retirement
1294
age under the plan.
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that the proper interpretation of section 1053 is that in order to receive either "accrued benefits" or "normal benefits" the employee must satisfy both the length of
service and age requirements of the plan.1295 According to the court,
Mrs. Hernandez misconceived the nature of the right which became
vested because a right which is vested is not the same as the right to
receive the vested pension benefits. 296 Thus, although the husband's
accrued benefits were one hundred percent veste~d at the time of his
death, he was not entitled to receive the vested benefits because the age
requirement was not met. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, distinguished
between the right to receive vested benefits and the right to vested

benefits. 1297
The Ninth Circuit addressed ERISA's minimum vesting standards
in another recent case, FentronIndustries v. National Shopmen Pension
1290. 662 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1981).
1291. Id. at 618.
1292. Id.
1293. Id. at 619.
1294. Id.
1295. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing,
648 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1981); Spitzler v. New York Post Corp., 476 F. Supp. 386,
389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid, 620 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980); Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 452
F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), ajt'd, 586 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1978); see Capocci v. General
Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1306, 1307-08 (D. Hawaii 1978)).
1296. 662 F.2d at 619.
1297. Id.
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Fund.1298 In Fentron, an employer and a class composed of employees
who were members of the Shopmen's Union with vested credits under
the plan, brought suit against the pension fund and its trustees. They
alleged that the trustees violated section 1053 by adopting an amend1299
ment to the plan which cancelled employee past service credits.
The amendment empowered the trustees to cancel plan obligations to
employees whose employer withdrew from the plan. 1300 Fentron contributed to the fund according to the collective bargaining agreement
until it expired. One year later, the trustees, pursuant to the amendment, cancelled the past service credits of the Fentron employees.
The Ninth Circuit held that the amendment violated section 1053
because under ERISA's minimum vesting requirements, the alteration
of vested past service credits of employees is prohibited "unless each
participant having not less than 5 years of service is permitted to elect,
within a reasonable period after the adoption of such amendment, to
have his unforfeitable percentage computed under the plan without regard to such amendment."' 130 1 The court noted that not all amendments which alter plan benefits are per se invalid under section 10531302
because a pension plan may cancel benefits not required by ERISA's
minimum vesting standards.
H. Standing Under Section 1132

The test for standing to sue for a violation of a federal statute set
forth by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp ,1303 and Barlow v. Collins130 4 requires:

(1) that plaintiff suffer injury in fact (but it need not be economic),
(2) that plaintiff is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
by the statute sought to be enforced; and (3) that the statute does not
1298. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra note 1210.
1299. Id. at 1303.
1300. Article II, § 2.09 (part of the 1976 amendments to the shopmen's pension plan)
provided:
(a) If an Employer participation in the Fund with respect to a bargaining unit or
group terminates, the trustees are empowered to cancel any obligation of the Trust
Fund that is maintained under the Trust Agreement with respect to that part of any
pension for which a person was made eligible on the basis of employment in such a
bargaining unit or group prior to the contribution period with respect to that unit
or group.
Id. at 1303 n.3.
1301. Id. at 1306 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 1053(c)(1)(B) (1976)).
1302. Id. (citing Hummel v. S.E. Rycoff, 634 F.2d 445-50 (9th Cir. 1980); Freemont v.
McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 45 U.S. 951 (1980).
1303. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
1304. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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preclude the suit. 3 °5 In addition, section 1132 designates the Secretary
of Labor, participants in ERISA trusts, beneficiaries of ERISA trusts
of ERISA trusts as persons who can bring suit under
and fiduciaries
30 6
ERISA1
During the survey period, in Fentron Industries v. National
Shopmen Pension Fund,1317 the Ninth Circuit relied on the Data
Processing and Barlow test to determine an employer's standing to sue
under ERISA. In Fentron, an employer and a class of its employees
brought suit against a pension fund and its trustees for violations of
ERISA. Subsequently, the fund challenged the employer's standing to
sue under section 1132.1308 The Ninth Circuit found that the employer
satisfied the requirements of Data Processing and Barlow and, therefore, had standing to sue under ERISA. Specifically, the court found
that the employer suffered injury because the fund's failure to pay pension benefits would impair the employer's relationship with the union,
and because the fund offered to restore benefits to those who quit Fentron and went to work for a contributing employer. 30 9 Moreover, the
alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests that Congress intended
to protect when it enacted ERISA. The court stated that ERISA recognizes that pension plans "have become an important factor affecting
the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial relations. 13 ' 0 Although section 1132 does not explicitly empower
employers to bring civil actions to enforce ERISA, the Ninth Circuit
did not find the omission preclusive. The court stated that "[t]here is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest either that the list of parties
empowered to sue under this section is exclusive or that Congress intentionally omitted employers."' 13 ' Accordingly, the employer was allowed to sue notwithstanding a literal reading of section 1132.
1305. 674 F.2d at 1304 (citing DataProcessing,397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
1306. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).
1307. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 1211 & 1291.
1308. Id. at 1304.
1309. Id. The court noted that "[t]hese are neither the general allegations of adverse impact condemned in Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 908-11
(9th Cir. 1974) nor the assertion of third party rights condemned in Fisher v. Tucson School
District, 625 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1980)." Id.
1310. 674 F.2d at 1305 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976)).
1311. 674 F.2d at 1305. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 326-28 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5038, 5106-08.
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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT

A.

Introduction

Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act 3 12 (CSRA) of
1978 to regulate public employee labor relations. It is the purpose of
this Act to prescribe certain rights and obligations of federal government employees and to establish procedures designed to meet the needs
of government. 31 3 Simultaneously, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) 314 was created to administer the Act by establishing
3t 5
policy, providing guidance, and resolving unfair labor practices.'
B.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Cases involving public employee labor relations are adjudicated
before the FLRA because "where Congress has provided statutory review procedures designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to
bear on particular problems and where court jurisdiction to make initial determinations would undermine the effectiveness of the statutory
design, [those] procedures are to be exclusive."' 13 16 To permit a district
would undercut the effectiveness of the statutory
court to 1 interfere
3 7
design.
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, Columbia Power Trades Council v.
United States Department of Energy, 131 8 the application of this principle was at issue. After the FLRA refused to issue a complaint against
the Department of Energy for an alleged unfair labor practice, the
union sought relief in district court. The district court entered judgment against the union and the union appealed. On appeal, the Ninth
with instructions to disCircuit remanded the case to the district court
31 9
jurisdiction.
lacked
it
miss the suit because
The court, relying on an analysis of congressional intent and statutory interpretation, held that the FLRA is the "exclusive source of re1312. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-8913 (Supp. V 1981).
1313. Id § 7101(b).
1314. Id § 7104.
1315. Id

§ 7105(a)(1).

1316. Columbia Power Trades Council v. United States Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325, 326
(9th Cir. 1982) (citing Whitnew Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S.
411, 420 (1965)); see, e.g., Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507
(1953); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
1317. Whitney Nat'lBank, 379 U.S. at 420. See also Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1952).
1318. 671 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1982).
1319. Id at 329.
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dress for a public union from unfair labor practices."' 1320 The court
explained that Congress intended the Civil Service Reform Act to mir-

ror the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 132 by filling "the identical role in the public sector that the NLRA performs in the private
sector." 1322 The scope of the FLRA's power, therefore, is as extensive

as that of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 13 23 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the FLRA's jurisdiction, like
that of the NLRB, is exclusive. 32 4 Nevertheless, the judicial role in the
settlement of unfair labor practices is not entirely precluded because

the Civil Service Reform Act, like the NLRA, provides for limited judi32 5
cial appellate review.
C.

Collective Bargaining
1. Section 718(a)

Pursuant to section 7103(a)(12) 1326 of the CSRA, collective bargaining is defined as the "mutual obligation. . . to meet at reasonable
times and to. . . bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with
1320. Id at 326-27.
1321. Id at 326.
1322. Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprintedin 1 HOUSE COMM.
ON POST OFFICE & CIVIL SERVICE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, at 678-79 (1979)).
1323. 671 F.2d at 326. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976), the NLRB's power to interpret
what constitutes an unfair labor practice is broad. As a result, it is well settled that federal
and state courts lack jurisdiction to remedy conduct covered by the NLRA because administration of labor policy must be centralized in one body. Id at 327 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 179 (1967); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959)).
In short, the NLRB preempts both federal and state court jurisdiction. 671 F.2d at 327. As
Justice Jackson stated in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953):
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal . . . . Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application
of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. ...
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.
1324. 671 F.2d at 327.
1325. Id See 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (Supp. V 1981).
An aggrieved party may appeal the Authority's action to a court of appeals, the
Authority may petition a court of appeals for enforcement of its orders, and the
Authority may seek an injunction in a district court after it has issued a complaint.
At no point does the Act entitle aparty to petition a district court for relief.
671 F.2d at 327 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
1326. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (Supp. V 1981).
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respect to the conditions of employment."'' 3 27 A collective bargaining

agreement is defined as "an agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining."' 3 2 In addition, employer and employee representatives are required to meet "as frequently as may be necessary ' 1329 to

fulfill the obligation to negotiate in good faith. Furthermore, pursuant
to section 7131(a),1330 representatives attending collective bargaining

negotiations are entitled to reimbursement for official time.
In Bureau ofAlcohol Tobacco andFirearmsv. FLRI ,

the Ninth

Circuit addressed the issue of whether reimbursement for official time,
travel expenses, and per diem is authorized under section 7131(a) for
employee representatives during midterm negotiations. 332 In November 1978, the employer notified the union that it intended to move its
office to another location. The union wanted to negotiate the move

and, therefore, designated an employee representative. After the move
was negotiated, the employee representative sought to have the meeting
classified as official time in order to be reimbursed. The employer,
however, denied the reimbursement request and informed the repre-

sentative
that he could take leave without pay or annual leave for the
33
day.

13

The Administrative Law Judge held that it was an unfair labor

334
practice for the employer to refuse to reimburse the representative. 1

The judge based his decision on an "Interpretation and Guidance" 13 35

for section 7131(a) issued by the FLRA. The interpretive rule "mandated the authorization of official time for all collective bargaining ne1327. Conditions of employment are defined as personnel policies affecting working conditions. 672 F.2d 736 n.1 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14) (1980)).
1328. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
1329. Id § 7114b)(3).
1330. Id § 7131.
1331. 672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982).
1332. Id at 736-37.
1333. Id at 734.
1334. I1d at 735.
1335. Pursuant to § 7134, the FLRA has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out the provisions of the CSRA. 5 U.S.C. § 7134 (Supp. V 1981). Moreover,
§ 7105(a)(1) authorizes the FLRA to issue interpretations of the CSRA in order "to provide
leadership in establishing policies and guidelines and to take responsibility for carrying out
the purpose of Title VIII." 672 F.2d at 735.
An "Interpretation" pursuant to § 7105(a)(1) may be accorded less weight than a rule
promulgated pursuant to § 7134. Id (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141 (1976)). Nevertheless, in the absence of a § 7134 rule, interpretive guidelines are given
deference if reasoned and supportable. 672 F.2d at 735 (citing Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,
445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 645 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940 (1981); Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 345 (9th Cir.
1979)).
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gotiations, and that if representatives were entitled to official time they
were also entitled to travel and per diem reimbursements."'' 33 6 Accordingly, the judge ordered the employer to pay the representative the ap3 37
propriate sums owed to him.
On appeal, the employer argued that Congress intended to restrict
the availability of official time for midterm negotiations because the
statute did not explicitly provide for it. 13 38 Therefore, the employer
argued that only time spent negotiating basic collective bargaining
agreements is compensable. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the employer, upholding the FLRA "Interpretation and Guidance."' 1339 The
court held that official time is authorized for employee representatives
during midterm negotiations as well as during negotiations of a basic
collective bargaining agreement. 134 0 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the statute's silence with respect to the availability of official time for
midterm negotiations does not imply that Congress intended to restrict
reimbursement. The court noted that Congress specifically rejected
language that would have limited official time to negotiations of basic
collective bargaining agreements.134 1 The court further noted that
since official time is granted for midterm negotiations, an employee
representative is also entitled to recover travel expenses and a per
diem.

134 2

2.

Extent of the duty to bargain

Although section 71171313 of the Civil Service Reform Act imposes
an extensive duty on an employer to bargain over employment conditions with the employee representative, certain limitations on the collective bargaining duty exist. One such limitation provides that
employer's authority to discipline employees and to assign work is nonnegotiable. 13 1 Section 7106(b)(2), however, provides that the proce1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.

672 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added). See 44 Fed. Reg. 76,581 (1979).
672 F.2d at 735.
Id at 737.
Id
Id
Id at 736-37 (citing S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2723, 2834).
1342. Id at 737-38.
1343. 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (Supp. V 1981).
1344. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (Supp. V 1981) provides in part:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall affect the
authority of any management official...
(2) in accordance with applicable laws(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency, or
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345
dures used in exercising this authority are subject to negotiation. 1
In Navy Public Works Center v. FLRA ,1346 the Ninth Circuit considered the negotiability of a union proposal giving employees the right
to remain silent during disciplinary investigations and requiring the
employer to inform employees of that right. 1347 The FLRA found that
because it fit within the "procethe proposal was subject to negotiation
348
dural pigeon-hole" of 7106(b)(2).1
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with the FLRA's determination. Instead, the court held that the proposal was nonnegotiable
because it intruded on the managerial authority protected by section
7106(a)(2). 1349 The court explained that the proposal would undermine
in a reducthe employees' duty to account to their employer, resulting
1350
employees.
discipline
to
power
employer's
the
tion of

D.

Standardof Review

As previously stated, the FLRA has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims, 135 1 subject to review by the appropriate

court. The reviewing court, however, is not free to set aside every
FLRA finding with which it disagrees. Instead, the court must follow
the standard of review set forth in section 7061352 of the Civil Service
to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary
action against such employees;
;
(B) to assign work.
(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from negotiating...
(2) procedures which management officials of the agency win observe in exercising any authority under this section ....
1345. Id § 7106(b)(2).
1346. 678 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1982).
1347. Id at 99. The proposal stated:
[D]iscussions that may lead to disciplinary actions will be held between a supervisor having authority to propose the action, the employee concerned, and his steward if requested. The employee has the right to speak or remain silent or refuse to
give a written statement andshall be so informed by the employer at the outset ofthe
inquiry or investigation.
Id at 99 n.2 (emphasis added).
1348. Id at 100.
1349. Id at 101.
1350. Id The court stated that its decision was based upon one of Congress' major reasons
for enacting the 1978 Act: "'[T]o make the government more efficient and accountable.'"
Id See Senate Report cited supra note 1341.
1351. See supra note 1316.
1352. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) provides in part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
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Reform Act. Specifically, the reviewing court may set aside an FLRA

finding only if it is deemed arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 35 3 Furthermore, an

FLRA finding based on an agency-issued statutory interpretation
should be upheld by the reviewing court if it is reasonably defensi-

ble.1351 "[An agency's construction.

. .

should not be rejected simply

because a court might prefer another view. . ..
In two recently decided cases, the Ninth Circuit applied the stan-

dard of review to determine whether it should enforce or deny an
FLRA decision. In Navy Public Works Center v. FLRA4 ,1356 the court
refused to enforce an FLRA negotiability determination. The court,
however, in Bureau of 4lcohol Tobacco andFirearmsv. FLR,4 357 upheld the FLRA's determination based on an "Interpretation and Guidance." In the former case, the court found that the FLRA's statutory
analysis was arbitrary and capricious1358 while in the latter case the
35 9
FLRA's finding was deemed reasonably defensible.
In Navy, the court concluded that the FLRA's determination was
arbitrary and capricious because it conflicted with the purpose of the

Act. Congress intended "to make government more efficient and accountable"'1360 and "to provide a 'balanced bill' that would 'allow civil
servants to be able to be hired and fred more easily, but for right rea(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
1353. 672 F.2d at 735.
1354. Id
1355. Id See Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979).
1356. 678 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1982).
1357. 672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982).
1358. 678 F.2d at 99.
1359. 672 F.2d at 735-36.
1360. 678 F.2d at 101.
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sons.' "1361 The second part of this proposal would give employees a
contractual right to remain silent during disciplinary proceedings. According to the court, this right is substantive. Thus, the adoption of this
proposal would infringe upon nonnegotiable employer powers, thereby
defying congressional intent of retaining the balance of power between
employers and employees.
In Bureau, the court found that the FLRA's "Interpretation and
Guidance," which authorized official time for midterm negotiations,
was reasonably defensible because both the statutory language and the
legislative history supported its conclusion. First, the court found that
the requirements of collective bargaining set forth in section 7131 (a) do
not merely refer to negotiation of basic agreements but encompass "all
situations in which agency and union personnel meet."'' 362 Second, the
court noted that during debate, Congress rejected language which
would have restricted the award of official time. 1363
IX.

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT

The Urban Mass Transportation Act 1364 was designed to provide

federal aid for local governments to acquire failing private transit companies, so that urban communities could continue to receive the benefits of mass transportation despite the collapse of private operations. 1365
Congress feared that public ownership might threaten existing collective bargaining rights of unionized transit workers employed by private companies. Therefore, it included
section 13(c) in the Urban Mass
3
Transportation Act (UMTA).' 66

Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal assistance under
the UMTA, that the Secretary of Labor certify that "fair and equitable
arrangements" be made "to protect the interests of employees affected
by [the] assistance."'1367 Under the statute, several protective steps must
be taken before a local government may receive federal aid. These
steps include the preservation of benefits under existing collective bargaining agreements and the continuation of collective bargaining
rights. Furthermore, the contract granting aid must specify protective
1361.
CONG.
1362.
1363.
1364.
1365.
1366.
CONG.
1367.

Id (quoting S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 2723, 2726).
672 F.2d at 736.
Id at 736-37.
49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601(b)-1602 (1976).
See H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 2583-85.
49 U.S.C. §1609(c) (1976).
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arrangement. 1368
Several circuits had decided that section 13(c) authorized federal
suits for violations of section 13(c) agreements. 1369 However, during
the survey period, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a Sixth Circuit decision and held, in Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division
1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 1370 that violations of section 13(c)
1
do not create a federal private right of action. 137
In Jackson, the union and district cooperated under a section 13(c)
agreement from 1966 until 1975. By complying with UMTA requirements, the district received federal funding for a public transit authority. However, in 1975, the district unilaterally repudiated its current
collective bargaining contract and reduced certain employee
372
benefits. 1
The union filed an action in general court, and the action was dismissed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
complaint rested on state created contractual rights. 13 7 3 The court of
1368. Section 13(c), as incorporated into 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976), provides in full:
It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 1602 of this title that.fair
and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to
protect the interests of employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including
continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining
agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the
protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired
mass transportation systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such arrangements
shall include provisions protecting individual employees against a worsening of
their positions with respect to their employment which shall in no event provide
benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of this title. The
contract for the granting of any such assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of the protective arrangements.
1369. See Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1981); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 650 F.2d 1379 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1079 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S.
15 (1982); Local Div. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist.,
589 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1978) (disapproved on other grounds in Local Div. 589, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 635 (1st Cir. 1981)); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util., 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
Contra Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982).
1370. 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
1371. Id at 29.
1372. Id at 19.
1373. 447 F. Supp. 88, 94-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
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appeals reversed, 1374 and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 375 The Court found that while the language of section 13(c)
supplies no definitive answers, 376 the legislative history is conclusive
that Congress intended such agreements be governed by state law applied in state courts. 377 The Court therefore concluded that Congress
1378
did not intend to substitute section 13(c) for state labor law.
Prior to the Jackson case, the Ninth Circuit, in Division 587,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 1379 ruled on the precise question put before the Supreme Court in
Jackson, namely whether violations of section 13(c) create federal subject matter jurisdiction and a federal cause of action. 380 The Ninth
Circuit held that suits38brought for section 13(c) violations created a federal cause of action.1 1
In Division 587, the city appealed from a preliminary injunction
ordering it to submit to interest arbitration of a new collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the terms of a contract required by section
13(c). The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction, adopting the position
of the First Circuit in Local Division 714,Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Greater Portland Transit District, 38 2 that "Congress implicitly man-

dated both compliance
with those arrangements and a federal remedy
1383
breach."'
their
for
X.

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

The object of the Railway Labor Act 3 4 (RLA) is to avoid interruption of commerce by promoting free association among employees
35
for the purpose of settling disputes between them and the carriers.
Although the RLA is designed to facilitate the peaceful and orderly
adjustment of disputes, strikes are not outlawed.' 3 6 The RLA merely
1374. 650 F.2d 1379, 1388 (6th Cir. 1981).
1375. 457 U.S. at 29.
1376. Id at 24.

1377.
1378.
1379.
1380.
1381.
1382.
1383.
1384.
1385.
1386.
(1969).

Id at 24-28.
Id at 28.
663 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id at 877-78.
Id at 878.
589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
663 F.2d at 878 (quotingLocal Div. 714, AmalgamatedTransit Union, 589 F.2d at 7).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 399 (1942).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378-79
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provides the machinery to minimize crippling strikes in the nationally

important transportation industry.
During the survey period, in United TransportationUnion v. Long
IslandRailRoad,3 7 the Supreme Court held that the RLA applies to
a state owned railroad where such application does not impair a state's

ability to carry out its constitutionally preserved function under the
3 88

tenth amendment.1
In United Transportation,a privately owned railroad was acquired
by New York State and operated in interstate commerce. Thirteen
years after the acquisition, the union and the state failed to reach an
agreement after conducting collective bargaining negotiations pursuant
to the RLA. Mediation efforts also failed to produce an agreement.
This triggered a thirty day cooling-off period under the RLA, at the
expiration of which the RLA permits a union to resort to a strike. 1389
Anticipating that New York would challenge the RLA's applica-

bility to the railroad, the union sued in federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the labor dispute was covered by the RLA
390
and not the Taylor Law.'
The railroad then filed suit in a New York state court seeking to
enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law. Before the state

court acted, the federal district court held that the railroad was subject
to the RLA rather than the Taylor Law. 139 1 The district court rejected

the railroad's argument that application of the RLA to a state owned
92

railroad was inconsistent with NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery. 13
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court, holding that the
1387. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
1388. Id at 686.
1389. Id at 681.
1390. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (Consol. 1969).
1391. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
1392. Id at 1306 n.4. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), held the
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required states and their political
subdivisions to pay state employee minimum wages and overtime, unconstitutional under
the tenth amendment. Id at 852. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Court set out a three-prong test for determining the validity
of tenth amendment claims:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is
invalid under the reasoning of [Usery] must satisfy each of three requirements.
First, there must be a showing that the challenged regulation regulates the "States
as States.". . . Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty.". . . And third, it must be apparent that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting Usery, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852) (emphasis in original).
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operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is clearly "not
an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from
federal regulation."' 1393 Moreover, the Court concluded that federal
regulation of state owned railroads does not impair a state's ability to
1394
function as a state.
The Court reasoned that to allow individual states to circumvent
the federal system of railroad regulation by acquiring railroads would
destroy the comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of railroads
and their labor regulations. 1395 The holding in this case was particularly justified because New York knew and accepted the federal
scheme of regulation when it acquired the railroad, and had operated
under the RLA for thirteen years without claiming an impairment to its
396
sovereignty. 1
XI.

COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT

1397
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
was enacted to provide job training and employment opportunities for
economically disadvantaged, unemployed or underemployed persons1 398 which would result in an increase in their earned income.
Originally, grievants' actions under CETA were limited to actions
399
for discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin or sex. 1
In 1978, Congress created new rights and a new remedy by passing
section 816 (f).14° In 1979, the Secretary of Labor promulgated regula-

1393. 455 U.S. at 685.
1394. Id at 686.
1395. Id at 687.
1396. Id at 690.
1397. 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (Supp. V 1981).
1398. 29 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V 1981) (statement of purpose in statute).
1399. 29 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1976) (similar provision currently at 29 U.S.C. § 834(a) (Supp. V
1981)).
1400. 29 U.S.C. § 816(f) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
If the Secretary determines that any recipient under this chapter has(1) discharged or in any other manner discriminated against a participant or
against any person in connection with the administration of the program involved
or against any person because such person has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or investigation under or related to
this chapter, or otherwise unlawfully denied to any person a benefit to which that
person is entitled under the provisions of this chapter or the Secretary's regulations,
or
(2) discriminated against any person, failed to serve equitably significant
segments of the eligible population, or failed to provide employment or training
opportunities at levels of skill and remuneration that are commensurate with the
participant's capabilities or potential capabilities; the Secretary shall, within 30
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tions 14 11 which specifically allowed for back pay awards.
During the survey period, in City of Great Falls v. United States
Department of Labor,"4 2 the Ninth Circuit refused to apply section
816(f) retroactively and denied an award of back pay. In 1974, the
plaintiff Parks was denied employment pursuant to an unwritten local
anti-nepotism policy. During Parks' administrative appeal process, the
law was changed to specifically allow for back pay awards. 140 3 Ultimately, Parks was successful in his complaint and was awarded back
pay. The City of Great Falls appealed, contending that the new law
should not be retroactively applied.'"
The court found that, in the absence of manifest injustice, section
816(f) should be applied retroactively.14 05 The test used to determine if
manifest injustice would occur was an examination of: "'(a) the nature
and identity of the parties, (b) the nature of their rights, and (c) the
nature of the impact of the change in law on those rights.' "1406
In discussing the first factor, the court found that this case did not
involve issues of "great national concern" between the parties. Therefore, the application of the existing law to this case would not further
140 7
an important congressionally expressed federal policy.
The court then found that Great Falls had no vested or unconditional right to CETA funds. The retroactive application of section
816(f) would not infringe upon or deprive the city of a right that had
matured or become unconditional. 14 8 Finally, the court determined
that if the law was applied retroactively the City would be subject to far
greater liability than it would have reasonably expected for a technical
violation. Thus, retroactive application would effect a change in the
substantive obligations of the parties.' 4°9 The court therefore concluded that although the case was close, it would be manifestly unjust
in this case to apply the change in the law retroactively to award back
4 10
pay.
days, take such action or order such corrective measures, as necessary, with respect
to the recipient or the aggrieved person, or both.
1401. 20 C.F.R. § 676.91(c) (1982).
1402. 673 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1403. See supra notes 1400 & 1401 and accompanying text.
1404. Great Falls sought review solely to challenge the Secretary's authority to make a
backpay award. 673 F.2d at 1067.
1405. Id at 1068.
1406. Id (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 718 (1974)).
1407. 673 F.2d at 1069.
1408. Id
1409. Id
1410. Id at 1070.
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FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FMSHA) 14 11 was enacted to protect the health and safety of miners by providing standards
for their safety and health. 4 12 In addition, the Act provides for enforcement procedures to ensure that the standards are met.
Prior to the 1977 amendments,1 4 13 the Act was entitled "Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969"'14 4 and provided primarily
for coal miners. Currently, however, FMSHA provides for the entire
141 5
mining industry.
The definition of "mine" under FMSHA is derived from section
802(h)(1). 411 6 In section 802(h)(1), the definition was extended from
the original Act to include a broad spectrum of areas which may be
considered within the purview of FMSHA. The Legislature clearly in141 7
tended that the Act have the broadest possible interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit, in Cyprus IndustrialMinerals Co. v. Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,4 18 further extended the

definition of "mine." In Cyprus, a federal mine safety and health inspector cited Cyprus for a violation 4 19 and issued a withdrawal order
after a fatal accident. After an unsuccessful review petition before the

Mine Safety and Health Administration, Cyprus sought review by the
Ninth Circuit, contending that the operation where the accident oc1411. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1412. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3401, 3408-09. See also 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (Supp. V 1981).
1413. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. V 1981).
1414. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
1415. 30 U.S.C. § 803 (Supp. V 1981).
1416. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides that:
"coal or other mine" means (A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted
in nonliquid form or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground,
(B) private ways and roads appurtenant to such area, and (C) lands, excavations,
underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels and workings, structures, facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property including impoundments, retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or underground, used in, or to be
used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting such minerals from their natural
deposits in nonliquid form, or ifin liquid form, with workers underground, or used
in, or to be used in, the milling of such minerals, or the work of preparing coal or
other minerals, and includes custom coal preparation facilities. In making a determination of what constitutes mineral milling for purposes of this chapter, the Secretary shall give due consideration to the convenience of administration resulting
from the delegation to one Assistant Secretary of all authority with respect to the
health and safety of miners employed at one physical establishment.
1417. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3401, 3414.
1418. 664 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1981).
1419. Cyprus was cited for a violation under 30 C.F.R. § 57.3-22 (1980). 664 F.2d at 1117.
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curred was not a mine within the meaning of FMSHA 4 2 ° Cyprus
argued that the accident site was not a mine because the work under
way consisted of driving exploratory drifts in search of a commercially
421
exploitable deposit of talc, rather than the extraction of minerals.'
The court held that in view of the legislative intent to broadly construe section 802(h)(1), the exploratory drifts were "mines" and would
therefore fall within the purview of FMSHA1 42 2 In reaching its decision, the court noted that cases in the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit have interpreted "mine" under section 802(h)(1) very broadly, to
include a backyard rock quarry 14 23 and a sand and gravel preparation
424
plant.1
XIII.

SERVICE CONTRACT ACT

"[T]he Service Contract Act [(SCA)]' 4 25 requires the inclusion of
specific provisions establishing minimum wage and fringe benefit levels
in every contract entered into by the United States in excess of
$2,500.'' 426 The SCA further prohibits a successor contractor or subcontractor, who will receive substantially the same services as those furnished under the original contract, from paying any service employee
wages and fringe benefits in an amount less than that to which the service employee would have been entitled had he remained employed
under the predecessor contract.' 4 2 7 The SCA does not expressly provide for a private cause of action.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether violations under the SCA
give rise to an implied private right of action in Miscellaneous Service
Workers Local 427 v. Phikco-Ford Corp.1428 In Philco-Ford,certain
workers were employed by Lockheed under a United States Air Force
contract. Although Aeronutronic Ford Corporation (AFC) was subsequently awarded the contract, most employees remained to complete
the work. AFC entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
which the employees altered entitlements to pension benefits formerly
1420. 664 F.2d at 1117.
1421. Id

1422. Id at 1117-18.
1423. Id. at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Wait, 628 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1980)).
1424. 664 F.2d at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980)).
1425. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1976).
1426. Miscellaneous Service Workers Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 778
(9th Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
1427. 41 U.S.C. § 353(c) (1976).
1428. 661 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
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enjoyed under the Lockheed contract. 1429
The employees claimed that the contract violated the SCA because
the contract failed to recognize fringe benefits under the Act.' 43 0 Furthermore, they contended that the legislative history431
of the SCA provides a "private right of action" to enforce the Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that the SCA does not specifically grant a
private right of action, nor does the language or history of the Act imply such a right.1 432 Therefore, the court concluded that the employees
had no standing3 under
the SCA to institute a private action for viola14 3
tions by AFC.
The Court interpreted the Act to restrict employee remedies to administrative channels, 14 34 noting that the Secretary of Labor may compensate employees for violations under the Act by allowing the
government contracting agency to withhold funds for such a purpose. 1435 Moreover, the government may cancel a contract which vio436
lates the Act. 1
XIV.

EQUAL PAY ACT

Generally, the Equal Pay Act 1437 requires that women receive
equal pay for equal work.' 438 Each suit brought under the Equal Pay
Act, however, must be determined on a case-by-case basis because job
1439
duties vary widely.
In Padway v. Palches, 440 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of defendants with respect to an Equal Pay Act
claim. "'1 In Padway, an elementary school teacher was dismissed
along with eight other teachers. Padway claimed that her termination
was the result of sex discrimination. She also claimed that she had
1429. Id. at 778. Plaintiffs contended that AFC modified certain pension benefits enjoyed
under the Lockheed contract when it refused to recognize various seniority rights under the
former contract. However, the court never reached this issue because it disposed of the case
on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 778 n.5.
1430. Id. at 779. See 441 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2) (1976).
1431. 661 .2d at 779.
1432. Id.
1433. Id.
1434. Id.
1435. Id. See 41 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1976).
1436. 661 F.2d at 779. See 41 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1976).
1437. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
1438. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981).
1439. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted).
1440. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
1441. Id at 970.
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received a lower salary because she was a woman. She raised various
statutory and common law grounds for her claims.'" With respect to
the Equal Pay Act, the court found that Padway failed to establish that
the school district had denied females equal wages and retirement benefits in violation of the Act. 44 3 The court stated that the exhibits submitted showed conclusively that Padway had been paid and promoted
in accordance with a bona fide salary plan. 44 Furthermore, the fact
that two male employees were paid a higher salary than Padway was
justified by other factors such as previous experience and doctorate
1 445
degrees.
XV.

LONGSHOREMENS' AND HARBOR WORKERS'

COMPENSATION ACT

The Longshoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA)' 446 is intended to afford relief to persons engaged in maritime employment who incur injuries in the course of that employment. 1447 The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA 144 were intended to
provide for "'adequate, increased and sure compensation for injured
longshoremen'" and to encourage safe practices "'within the industry
by placing the duty of care on the [employer, who is] best able to prevent accidents.' "1449 Intended as a humanitarian act, the LHWCA is
1450
to be construed liberally in order to effectuate its purpose.
A.

Statutory Presumptionof Compensability

Under section 920(a) of the LHWCA, an injured employee's claim
for compensation is presumed to be compensable absent substantial evidence to the contrary. 14 5 1 Section 903(a) provides that
"[c]ompensation shall be payable . . . but only if the disability . . .
1442.
1443.
1444.
1445.
1446.

Id. at 966.
Id at 969-70.
Id at 970.
Id
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).

1447. Id
1448. Amended in 1972 were §§ 902, 903, 905-910, 912-914, 917, 919, 921, 921(a), 923, 927,
928, 933, 935, 939, 940, 944, and 948(a).

1449. Garofalo v. Malaysia Overseas Export Lines, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (citing Munoz v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977)).
1450. Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952).

1451. 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976) provided that: "In any proceeding for the enforcement of
a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary - (a) [t]hat the claim comes within the provisions of this
chapter."
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results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
.
"Injury" is defined as an "accidental injury
United States
• . .arising out of and in the course of employment ....
In the recent case of United States Industries/FederalSheet Metal,
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,1454 the
Supreme Court denied an employee the benefit of the statutory presumption of compensability without requiring the employer to present
relationship besubstantial evidence refuting the existence of a causal
1 45 5
employment.
his
and
injury
tween the claimant's
In FederalSheet Metal, a claim for compensation was made under
the LHWCA by a sheet metal worker who claimed that he had incurred an injury on November 19, 1975, as a result of lifting heavy
ducts. He awoke early the next morning with severe pain in his neck,
shoulders and arms. He was subsequently taken to the hospital where
it was diagnosed that his discomfort was due to an exacerbated arthritic
"1452

condition. 1456
The Administrative Law Judge found "'that Claimant sustained
no injury within the meaning of [section] 2(2) of the Act on November
19, 1975, as alleged .... ,',,45 A divided panel of the Benefits Review Board affirmed the denial of disability benefits. 4 58 The court of
appeals vacated and remanded the case, agreeing with the dissent filed
by the Benefits Review Board: "'The Act does not require that claimant prove an accident in order to establish a claim. To the contrary,
compensation is payable under the Act if claimant is disabled because
of injury which is causally related to his employment.' 1459 The issue
on remand was not whether the "injury" stemmed from a "work-re'
lated incident," but whether the injury was "employment-bred."1461
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because its opinion had ignored the statutory language relating section 20(a) to the employee's claim, as well as the statutory definition of the term
"injury."' 1461 The Court reasoned that the section 20(a) presumption
only attaches to the "claim" made by the injured employee. Since the
1452. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
1453. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1976).

1454. 455 U.S. 608 (1982).
1455.
1456.
1457.
1458.
1459.
1460.
1461.

Id at 614.
Id at 609.
Id at 610.
Riley v. United States Indus./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc., 9 B.R.B.S. 936 (1979).
FederalSheet Metal, 455 U.S. at 610-11.
Id at 612.
Id
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employee claimed that he was injured on November 19, 1975, and not
that his injury was generally "employment-bred," he was not entitled
4 62
to the benefit of a presumption to a claim that was never made. 1
In addition, the Supreme Court found error in the circuit court's
use of the term "injury."' 146 3 The Court held that a claimant must allege both that the injury was caused by the employment and that it
arose during the employment. 14'4 In contrast, the District of Columbia
Circuit had adopted a liberal standard, consistently holding that an injury need not have occurred during working hours and need not be
traceable to any particular work-related incident in order to be

compensable. 1465
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, vigorously dissented.
He pointed out that the issue to be decided was a relatively simple one,
namely, whether the injuries suffered by the claimant may have been
"employment-bred."' 4 66 "Absent a finding excluding this possibility,
[he argued] compensation could not be denied."' 1467 Brennan stated
that the case should be remanded so that the necessary determination
could be made because the Administrative Law Judge failed to focus
on this crucial issue. Brennan further pointed out that all that is statutorily required to make a "claim" is a "simple request for payment,
carrying with it the implicit assertion of an entitlement to compensation."1468 He noted that in FederalSheet Metal there was no indication
that the employer suffered any prejudice or lacked sufficient notice to
properly defend the claim.1469
The net effect of FederalSheet Metal is the insertion of needless
distinctions which constrict the statutory language of section 920(a) of
the LHWCA, originally enacted as a humanitarian act to be liberally
construed. Future claimants will have to be more careful to include in
their claims submissions legal theories setting forth a prima facie case
for compensation. The question to be asked after FederalSheet Metal
1462. Id at 614.
1463. Id at 615.
1464. Id
1465. See Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir.) (back injury manifested a year after claimant's fall held compensable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976); J.V.
Vozzolo, Inc. v. Britton, 377 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (heart attack due to an employmentrelated injury five years before held compensable); Butler v. District Parking Management
Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (compensating for a mental breakdown suffered as a
cumulative result of claimant's 20 years of employment).
1466. 455 U.S. at 619-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1467. Id at 620.
1468. Id at 621.
1469. Id at 622-23.

LOYOL,4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

is whether the claimant's disability was occasioned by an "accidental
injury," or whether the disability was generally "employment-bred," or
both.
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction

An injured employee cannot be compensated under the LHWCA
1470
without satisfying certain maritime situs and status requirements.
To satisfy the situs requirement, the injury must occur "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf,
dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel)."' 147 1 To meet the status requirement, the em-

1472
ployee must be "engaged in maritime employment."'
Prior to 1977, some courts employed the "point of rest" theory 47to3
decide whether an employee was covered under the LHWCA.1
Under that test, maritime employment would include only the portion
of the unloading process that took place before the stevedore gang
placed cargo onto the dock. Thus, a worker who carried cargo directly
from a ship to a warehouse or truck would be engaged in maritime
employment and therefore covered under the Act, but one who carried
cargo from a warehouse to a truck would not. In loading operations,
only those employed to the seaside of the last point of rest would be
covered. 1474
In Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 4 the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the "point of rest" theory. In Caputo, one of
the claimants was injured while checking and marking goods as they
were removed from a container which had been removed from a ship
and trucked to a different pier before being emptied. 1476 The other
claimant was injured while rolling a loaded dolly into a consignee's
truck. 14 7 7 In holding that the claimants were covered by the Act, the
Court noted that clear legislative history anticipated that some persons

1470. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 78 (1979).
1471. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
1472. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). Section 902(3) provides that "employee" includes persons
"engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder,
and shipbreaker .... "
1473. See, e.g., I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1087-88 (4th Cir.
1975), modofed, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
1474. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 75 (1979).
1475. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
1476. Id at 253.
1477. Id at 255.
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who work only on land would receive benefits.
The Ninth Circuit incorporated the Caputo decision in Ramos v.
UniversalDredgingCorp. 1479 Ramos was a deckhand who was injured
on a dredge while performing his duties of cleaning the deck, checking
the fuel, inspecting the pipes, and supplying general maintenance. The
Administrative Law Judge determined that Ramos was entitled to compensation under the LHWCA because he was engaged in "maritime
employment" and was not a crew member of a vessel, and because the
dredge was in navigable waters. 14 80 The Board vacated the award,
holding that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because Ramos'
48
work was not significantly related to commerce on navigable waters.1 1
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the Board
had confused jurisdiction with coverage under the Act. 14 82 The court
noted that the touchstone in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists is whether the case "involves a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."' 148 3 The court concluded that subject
of a dredge is clearly
matter jurisdiction existed because the operation
14 84
related to traditional maritime activity.
In Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corp.,1485 the Ninth Circuit held
that it had subject matter jurisdiction where the injured employee was
engaged in maritime employment, which constituted a sufficient nexus
486
to traditional maritime activity to create admiralty jurisdiction. 1

In Perkins, a longshoreman was injured in his own automobile on
his way home from work. He was being compensated, however, for the
travel time to and from work. 148 7 The employee filed for compensation
under the LHWCA. The Benefits Review Board vacated a compensation award by an Administrative Law Judge, and remanded to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Board concluded, prior to
Ramos, that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the site of
1478. Id at 273. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. at 84 (injuries deemed compensable where worker injured while fastening vehicles delivered to port onto flatcars, and where
another worker injured while unloading a bale of cotton from a dray wagon into a pier
warehouse).
1479. 653 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1981).
1480. Id at 1354.
1481. Id at 1355.
1482. Id
1483. Id at 1358 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972)).
1484. 653 F.2d at 1358.
1485. 673 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1982).
1486. Id at 1101.
1487. Id at 1100.
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the accident was not connected with maritime activity. 1488
In order to be consistent with Ramos, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
reasoning that "[ilt is undisputed that Perkins was engaged in maritime
employment for purposes of the status test set forth in [section 2(3) of
the LHWCA, and] this factor alone constitutes a sufficient nexus to
traditional maritime activity to create admiralty jurisdiction."' 14 8 9 The
court pointed out that in some cases the connection with maritime activity may be so remote that a subject matter jurisdiction issue would
be presented. The court, however, found that this was not such a case,
noting that "'[i]t is the existence of the special employer-employee relationship . . . that is significant for purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction.' "1490
The Ninth Circuit further expanded coverage under the LHWCA
in Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats.149 1 In that case, Schwabenland was
injured while employed as the sales manager for Sanger Boats, a manufacturer and seller of custom-built, high performance recreational and
racing boats. He spent approximately thirty percent of his working
time inspecting boats in various states of production. In addition to his
sales and inspection duties, Schwabenland was a primary test49driver.
2
When Schwabenland was injured, he was test driving a boat.1
Schwabenland filed for compensation under the LHWCA and the
Benefits Review Board refused his claim. The Board focused on
Schwabenland's overall employment and held that "a worker must
maritime duties in
spend a substantial amount of work time performing
14 9 3
order to fall within the coverage of the Act."'
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "Schwabenland's regular
performance of maritime operations, even though it constituted less
time, was sufficient to
than a 'substantial portion' of his overall working
14 94
2(3)."'
section
of
requirement
status
satisfy the
The court reiterated that for employment to be maritime, it "must
have a realistically significant relationship to 'traditional maritime activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters.' ,,491
1488. Id
1489. Id at 1101.

1490. Id (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 636 (3d Cir. 1976)).
1491. 683 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 814 (1983).
1492. Id at 310.
1493. Id
1494. Id at 312 (footnote omitted).
1495. Id at 311 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976)).
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Moreover, the court rejected the "substantial portion" test, 1496 stating
that "[it departs] from the letter and the spirit of Caputo . . . and
would be contrary to the Supreme Court's directive to take an expansive view of the coverage to give effect to the remedial purpose of the
497
Act." 1
The Ninth Circuit further solidified its expansive interpretation of
"status" in Kelly v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. 498 In its abbreviated opinion, the court found the facts of Kely
indistinguishable from those in the Second Circuit case of Arbeeny v.
McRoberts ProtectiveAgency. 1499 In Kelly, the claimant's job involved
protecting shipping containers from theft damage. In Arbeeny, the
claimants were pier guards whose duty was to insure the protection of
cargo on the pier, dock and adjacent areas of marine terminals against
theft, pilferage, vandalism and fire. In both cases, the Board denied the
claim for compensation under the LHWCA.
In Arbeeny, the Benefits Review Board held that the claimants
could not be compensated because their duties "'lacked the realistically significant relationship to maritime activities involving navigation
and commerce over navigable waters.' ,,1o The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the claimants' tasks were "'clearly an integral part

of the unloading process

....

'

"o1501

The court reasoned that the

guards could be likened to the checker in Caputo, and in the spirit of
broad construction appropriate in remedial legislation, the claimants
°2
satisfied the status requirement of section 2(3) of the LHWCA.'1
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,50 3 an employee who repaired and maintained tractors and trailers used to move cargo and containers was found to satisfy
the "status" requirement of section 2(3) of the LHWCA.'5 4 In Sea1496. The test requires that a claimant spend a "substantial portion" of his work time
performing maritime duties. See Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co., 632 F.2d 1346, 1348
(5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the test), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981). The Supreme Court
regards the status requirement satisfied as long as "some portion" of the employee's work
time involves maritime activities. See, e.g., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432

U.S. 249, 273 (1977).
1497. 683 F.2d at 312 (citations omitted).
1498. 678 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 140 (1982).
1499. 642 F.2d 672 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
1500. Id at 673.
1501. Id at 675 (quoting Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 271
(1977)).
1502. 642 F.2d at 675.
1503. 685 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1504. Id at 1123.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Land, the claimant was injured while installing a transmission and
while removing air tanks from a truck. He applied for compensation
under the LHWCA, and the Benefits Review Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the claimant was covered.
The employer appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court relied on what it perceived
to be a growing recognition that "[t]he repair and maintenance of
equipment necessary to loading and unloading ships is integral to the
process0 5and is therefore 'maritime employment' covered by the
Act." 15
C. Statute of Limitations

The 1972 amendments to section 13(a) of the LHWCA 15 0 6 expanded the period for filing a claim for compensation from one year
after the injury to one year after the employee becomes aware of his or
her injury.'50 7 The Fifth Circuit has held that the 1972 amendment is
therefore applies to claims pending at the time of its
procedural and
08
15
enactment.
In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Allan,1509 the Ninth Circuit upheld the

Benefits Review Board's application of the 1972 amended statute of
limitations to an employee's pending pre-1972 injury because he was
not aware of the full character, extent and impact of the harm done to
him within one year after his injury. 1510
In Todd, employee Allan was injured when a piece of metal fell on
his neck and shoulder. The injury was diagnosed as just a bruise, and
Allan continued to work. The pain persisted and nearly two years later
it was determined that the incident initiated a progressive ailment that
rendered Allan permanently partially disabled.' 51
The court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that the claim
was covered by the amended version of section 13(a) because the
amendment was procedural and therefore applied to pending
claims. 512 Moreover, since the statute was remedial, the court read it
1505. Id
1506. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1972).
1507. 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1972).
1508. Cooper Stevedoring, Inc. v. Washington, 556 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (new
wording applied where claimant's accident occurred a few months prior to the effective date
of the 1972 amendment to section 13(a)).
1509. 666 F.2d 399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 444 (1982).
1510. Id at 401-02.

1511. Id at 400-01.
1512. Id at 401 (citing Cooper Stevedoring, 556 F.2d at 274).
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liberally to "'best effectuate' the Congressional purpose." 151 3
D.

'Zone of Danger" Concept

In O'Leary v. Brown-Pacjlc-Maxon,Inc.,1514 the Supreme Court

articulated the standard of coverage for the LHWCA:
The test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the accident.
Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time
of the injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is
required is that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the in51 5
jury arose.

The Ninth Circuit recently applied the "zone of special danger"
concept in FordAerospaceand Communications Corp. v. Boling.1516 In

Ford,the employee began experiencing chest pains while quartered in
barracks provided by his employer. An ambulance was called, but a
stretcher could not be maneuvered to his room because of the narrow
construction of the barrack passageway. As a result, the employee had
to walk from his room to a larger room where a stretcher was waiting.
He made this walk while suffering from a myocardial infarction. He
151 7
was taken to the hospital, where he died.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the widow's claim
compensable. 518 The Benefits Review Board affirmed, and Ford appealed, arguing that the decision was unreasonable because it imposed
"absolute liability on an employer for any injury as long as the job
location is less than the best place imaginable to survive a heart attack."' 519 The Ford court disagreed, and upheld the ALJ's finding that
the "zone of danger" was created by the construction of the barracks. 520 Moreover, the court noted that Ford failed to show error in
the finding that the construction of the building prevented the stretcher
1 52
from being carried to the employee's room.
1513.
1514.
1515.
1516.
1517.
1518.
1519.
1520.
1521.

'

666 F.2d at 401 (citing Cooper Stevedoring, 556 F.2d at 272).
340 U.S. 504 (1951).
Id at 506-07 (citations omitted).
684 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 641.
Id
Id at 642.
Id.
d
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E. Duty of Care Under the LHWCA
As a result of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, an injured
longshoreworker can recover damages against a shipowner only by
showing the shipowner's negligence.15 22 Under this statutory authority,
the Secretary of Labor has promulgated safety and health regulations
for longshoring.1523 These regulations provide that work areas be kept
clear of loose tripping or stumbling hazards. 1524 In addition, the regulations impose a duty of care on stevedores, so that a negligent shipowner's liability may be reduced to the extent that an accident is due to

a stevedore's negligence. 1525
In the Supreme Court case of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De
Los Santos, 52 6 a longshoreworker was injured by cargo that fell from
an allegedly defective winch that was part of the ship's gear, but which
was being operated by another longshoreworker. 1527 The Supreme
Court held that a "shipowner has no general duty. . . to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the
15 28
confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore."
The Court warned, however, that until a stevedore begins work, a shipowner does have a duty of care to warn of defects and make conditions
safe.

52 9

In Davis v. PartenreedereiM.S. Normannia,153 0 the Ninth Circuit
adopted the distinction set forth in Scindia and found a shipowner liable for failing to warn of defects and to make conditions safe.' 53 ' In
Davis, a longshoreworker was injured when struck by cargo positioned
dangerously close to a gangway. 1532 The Davis court held that even
though the sole responsibility for safety in unloading cargo is vested in
the stevedore, the shipowner could also be found liable for failure to
1533
warn of a dangerous condition.
The Ninth Circuit in Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd ,"
applied the reasoning of Scindia and Davis to deny summary judgment
1522.
1523.
1524.
1525.
1526.
1527.
1528.
1529.
1530.
1531.
1532.
1533.
1534.

33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 941 (1976).
29 C.F.R. § 1918.91(a) (1983).
29 C.F.R. § 1918-2(b) (1983).
451 U.S. 156 (1981).
Id at 159-60.
Id at 172.
Id at 167.
657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id at 1049.
Id at 1050.
Id at 1050-51.
682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982).
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to a shipowner. In Subingsubing, a longshoreworker died from injuries
sustained when he stepped on a "dead-eye," a small piece of wood used
to stop the step of a rope ladder from moving. The plaintiff-widow
brought forth evidence to show that the "dead-eye" came from a ladder
took place ten minutes
used by the vessel's crew and that the accident
1535
after the longshoring crew came on board.
The district court granted summary judgment for the vessel owner,
citing Scindia.153 6 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that although the vessel owner may have owed the longshoreworker no
duty to supervise stevedoring operations, it owed a duty of care to clear
1537
the deck of tripping hazards before longshoring operations began.
The court further noted that:
[plerhaps the crew acted negligently by failing to find the defect in the rope from which the "dead-eye" was lost. [Or perhaps] the "dead-eye" may have been on the deck for a period
to
of time sufficient to make the vessel negligent for failing
1538
remove it. Such questions are typically left to the jury.
XVI.

AGE DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

A.

Notice of Intent.to Sue

1539
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of age. Congress has declared that the purpose of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
5
impact of age on employment."'1 1
Under section 626(d)(l)-(2), the ADEA requires a grievant to file a
"notice of intent to sue" with the Secretary of Labor.' 54 1 This notice
provides the Department of Labor with sufficient information to notify
prospective defendants and gives the Secretary an opportunity to elimi-

1535. Id at 779-80.
1536. Id at 780.
1537. Id. at 782.
1538. Id at 781.
1539. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1540. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
1541. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1), (2) (1976). In 1978, this section was amended so that only a
charge alleging unlawful discrimination need be filed. See 29 U.S.C.. § 626(d) (Supp. V
1981). The amendment also requires that charges be filed with the EEOC rather than the
Department of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 625 (Supp. V 1981).
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nate the alleged unlawful practice through informal conciliation. 15 42
The grievant must file the "notice of intent to sue" within 180 days of
an alleged statutory violation, or in a deferral state (a state which provides an additional cause of action for age discrimination), 1543 within
544
300 days.
Confusion has developed in reconciling section 626 and 633(b) of
the ADEA. Section 633(b) provides that in cases occurring in deferral
states, no suit may be brought under section 626 until sixty days after
proceedings have commenced before the state agency unless the state
545
proceedings terminated earlier.
In OscarMayer & Co. v. Evans,1 46 the Supreme Court attempted
to reconcile sections 626 and 633(b). In Oscar Mayer, an employee was
involuntarily retired after twenty-three years of employment. He filed
a notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor, charging that he
had been forced to retire because of his age in violation of the ADEA.
Upon Evans' inquiry, the Department informed him that the ADEA
contained no requirement that he file a state complaint in order to preserve his federal rights. After federal conciliation efforts failed, Evans
brought suit against the company in federal district court.
On these facts, the Supreme Court held that section 633(b) required grievants in deferral state actions to resort to state proceedings
before bringing suit in federal court. 5 47 The Court also held, however,
that such commencement of state proceedings for federal ADEA pur548
poses need not be timely or effectual under state law.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Oscar Mayer in Bean v. Crocker
NationalBank.5 9 In Bean, the dispute arose after Crocker discharged
more that 1,000 employees, including the claimant, in the spring and
summer of 1974. On September 12, 1974, an attorney filed letters with
the California Fair Employment Practices Commission and with the
United States Department of Labor alleging that Crocker terminated
several employees because of age. An investigation took place, and on
February 13, 1975, a notice of intent to sue was fied under section
626(d). By May 7, 1975, the Department's attempts to conciliate the
1542. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 504, 534.

1543.
1544.
1545.
1546.
1547.
1548.
1549.

29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
441 U.S. 750 (1979).
Id at 758.
Id at 764-65.
600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
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dispute failed, and on July 3, 1975, the claimant filed an action in fed-

eral district court.
The Bean court held that in a deferral state the claimant must file
with the Secretary of Labor within 300 days whether or not he or she

has filed an action in state court. In so holding, the court indicated that
the only plausible inference to be derived from Oscar Mayer is that

"compliance with state time limitations in a deferral state must also be
deemed irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a complainant
has 180 or 0300 days to file a notice of intent to sue with the

Secretary."'

155

The Ninth Circuit in Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach,1551 was urged

to reconsider its position, as enunciated in Bean, to conform with the
approaches of the First and Sixth Circuits.115 1 In Aronsen, the claim1550. Id. at 759. Since the Bean decision, two other circuits have held that section 626(d)
must be read to imply a requirement that proceedings be commenced within 180 days of an
alleged violation in order to qualify for the 300-day federal filing period. In Ewald v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.), summarily vacated, 449 U.S. 914 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981), the Sixth Circuit held, on facts similar to those of Bean,
that a grievant must file with either the state or federal agency within 180 days in order to
qualify for the additional 120-day filing time. Id at 1187. In Ciccone v. Textron, Inc., 616
F.2d 1216 (Ist Cir.), summarily vacated, 449 U.S. 914 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917
(1981), the First Circuit held that a grievant must file with the state agency within 180 days
in order to secure the 120-day filing extension with the Secretary of Labor. Jd at 1221.
Ciccone relied upon an analogy to the similar filing provisions in Title VII, under which a
complainant has 180 days to file with the EEOC in a non-deferral state and 300 days in a
deferral state. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1978). When Ciccone was decided, at least one
court interpreted section 2000e-5(e) to require a grievant to commence state proceedings
within 180 days of an alleged violation in order to have the 300 days for filing the federal
charge. See Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1233 (8th Cir. 1975) (en
banc). Ciccone relied on the rationale of the Olson case and concluded that the ADEA filing
periods should be construed as Olson construed the Title VII periods.
The Olson court's interpretation of the Title VII filing period, however, has not been
accepted by other circuits. See Doski v. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Silver
v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'don othergrounds, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
Recently, the Ninth Circuit rejected Olson and found that 300 days was the proper time
limit. See Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co., 652 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1034 (1982).
1551. 662 F.2d 584 (1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1183 (1983).
1552. With respect to the position that claimant Aronsen was barred by the 180-day limitation, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807
(1980), summarily vacated the leading cases interpreting the ADEA as imposing the 180-day
filing deadline with the state agency in order to qualify for the extended 120 days in which to
file with the Secretary of Labor. Mohasco involved a similar ruling interpreting the filing
provisions under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit in Ewald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980), and on remand, the First Circuit in Ciccone v. Textron, Inc.,
651 F.2d I (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981), struck down the 180-day limitation in
deferral states. Accord Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1101 (1981).
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ant, Aronsen, worked as a research associate for Crown Zellerbach for
twenty-eight years, virtually his entire working life since college graduation. Aronsen alleged in his complaint that Zellerbach terminated
him solely on the basis of his age pursuant to its policy of replacing
employees nearing retirement age. Furthermore, Aronsen asserted that
Zellerbach terminated him on April 21, 1976, and that he gave the required notice of intent to sue to the Secretary of Labor on January 19,
1977, about 270 days later. This asserted day was within the 300-day
time period of section 626(d)(2) but not within the 180-day period required in section 626(d)(1). There was evidence in the record that a
Zellerbach vice president informally told Aronsen in the spring of 1975
553
that he would be terminated.
Based on the evidence of the informal meeting in 1975, the district
court concluded that Aronsen's "notice of intent to sue" was untimely,
thus failing to satisfy a prerequisite to sue under the ADEA. Therefore, the district court dismissed the action on Zellerbach's motion for
summary judgment. 1554 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded because triable issues of fact existed as to the date of Aronsen's
555
termination. 1
The Aronsen court explicitly reaffirmed the Bean holding and determined that the standard to be used on remand was that ADEA
grievants in deferral states have up to 300 days within which to file
1556
their notice or charge.
B. ADEA "DeterminingFactor"Standard
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge any
individual because of age. 557 The Ninth Circuit, in Kelly v. American
Standard,Inc.,1558 adopted the "determining factor" test. The determining factor test provides that age must make a difference
between
termination and retention of the employee in the sense that, but for the
presence of age discrimination, the employee would not have been
discharged. 1559
In American Standard, Kelly was employed for over twenty years
when he brought suit, alleging that his termination was a violation of
1553.
1554.
1555.
1556.
1557.
1558.
1559.

662 F.2d at 585-86.
Id
Id at 595.
Id
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976).
640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id at 984-85.
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the ADEA and state law. 1 560 Kelly was fifty-seven when terminated,

and he contended that the company terminated him because of his age
to make room for younger employees. 156 1 The company argued that,

under the ADEA, age must be the sole factor determining whether the
employee is retained or discharged. 1562 The court disagreed, adopting
the "determining factor" test as formulated by the Sixth Circuit in

Laugesen v. Anaconda Co. 1563 and restated as a "but for" test by the
First Circuit in Loeb v. Textron, Inc.154 The court in American Standard further stated that the jury should be instructed 1565 that the
"plaintiff has the burden of proving that 'one of the reasons he was
terminated was because of his age. . . ' and that he should prevail if
this factor 'made a difference in determining whether or not [he] was

retained or discharged.' ,1566 A requirement that plaintiff prove that
his age was the only factor in his
termination would impose an intolera567
ble burden on that plaintiff.1
In Cancellierv. FederatedDepartmentStores, 1568 the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed its commitment to the "determining factor" test as set forth

inAmerican Standard. In Cancellier, three employees were terminated
after having been employed at I. Magnin for twenty-five, seventeen,
and eighteen years, respectively. They argued that their terminations
1560. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(2) (Supp. 1982) provides that "[i]t
is an unfair
practice for any employer: To discharge or bar any person from employment because of
such person's age ....
.
1561. 640 F.2d at 977.
1562. Id. at 984.
1563. 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff entitled to recover if one factor is his age
and if in fact it made a difference in determining whether he was retained or discharged).
1564. 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) ("but for" employer's motive to discriminate on
age, employee would not have been terminated).
1565. The Ninth Circuit opinion in.4merican Standard summarized the jury instructions
given by the judge at trial. Those jury instructions in full provided that:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(I) that one of the reasons he was terminated was because of his age; and
(2) that as a result of the termination, he has suffered damage.
Title 29, Section 623(f), United States Code, provides that it shall not be unlawful for an employer to discharge any individual from his employment, or classify his employees in any way, for good cause or where the discharge or
classification is based on reasonable factors other than age.
You are instructed that there may be more than one factor in defendant's
decision to terminate the plaintiffs employment; but plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to recover if one such factor was his age and if,
in fact, it made a difference in
determining whether or not the plaintiff was retained or discharged ....
Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1315-16 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting,
verbatim, jury instructions at trial in Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974).
1566. 640 F.2d at 984 (quoting the trial judge).
1567. Id at 984-85.
1568. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 131 (1982).
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violated the ADEA. 1569 After a0 $1.9 million award in favor of the em1 57
ployees, both sides appealed.

I. Magnin based its appeal on the failure of the trial judge to give
the American Standardjury instruction.157 1 While the judge instructed
the jury that "'[a]ge must be a determining factor in an employer's

personnel policies or practices before violation of the Act occurs,' "1572

he failed to explain the meaning of "determining factor" for lawsuits
1573
under the ADEA.
The Ninth Circuit found that failure to give the American Standard jury instruction was error but, on the facts of this case, was not

prejudicial. 5 74 While the court noted that it was extremely reluctant to
affirm verdicts based on jury instructions different from those approved
in American Standard, it added that the case was not decided
by a
5 75
"hairsbreadth" and that the error was therefore harmless.
C. ADEA Exceptions

Under the ADEA, where it is admitted that an employee was terminated solely because of age, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove that the termination falls within one of the exceptions to the
ADEA's prohibitions.15 76 The employer must show either that age is a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business, or that the termination
1569. Id at 1315. Plaintiffs also raised pendent state claims. Id California law recognizes a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
at-will dismissal cases. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(alternative holding). See also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12,
610 P. 2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980) (stated in dicta).
1570. 672 F.2d at 1315. The employees appealed for reinstatement and for injunctive relief. The court denied relief. Reinstatement and injunctive relief are both within the discretion of the trial court for ADEA claims. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, given the facts of
the case, the trial court had not abused its discretion by limiting relief to monetary damages.
Id at 1319-20. The trial court noted that reinstatement would not be practicable because of
animosity between plaintiffs and I. Magnin which would interfere with business relationships. Id at 1319. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that the large damage award and
attorney's fees would deter I. Magnin from future age discrimination and therefore an injunction was not necessary. Id at 1320.
1571. Id at 1315.
1572. Id at 1316.
1573. Id
1574. Id at 1316-17.
1575. Id at 1316. The court noted that there was ample evidence that consideration of age
"made a difference" in I. Magnin's decision to terminate the three plaintiffs.
1576. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976); see also Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.
1981); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981).
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was in compliance with terms of a bona fide seniority plan. 1577
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,1578 the Fifth Circuit formu-

lated a two-pronged test for the applicability of the BFOQ defense. In
Tamiami, a bus company refused to hire employees above a specific
age asserting that the refusal was a BFOQ due to safety reasons inherent in its business. The court agreed, reasoning that there existed a
"factual basis" for the bus company's discrimination based on age. 1579
The test the court used was that the employer must establish (1) that
the qualification is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business;
and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all persons over a certain age would be unable to perform the duties of
the job safely and efficiently, or that it is impossible or impracticable to
ascertain the difference between older employees who can and cannot
perform the job safely. 15 80
In E.E. 0. C. v. County of Santa Barbara,1581 the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Fifth Circuit's two-pronged test for the applicability of the
BFOQ defense. 582 In Santa Barbara, the county contended that its
dismissal of two correctional officers was based on safety concerns and
therefore fell within the BFOQ exception. The court denied the
county's motion for summary judgment because of a lack of factual
evidence to show that age impacted on an employee's ability to perform the tasks required of a correctional officer. 1583 Moreover, the
court was reluctant to accept unsubstantiated assumptions that older
people are unable to perform adequately the tasks of the job. The
court concluded that such assumptions are condemned by the ADEA,
which seeks to promote employment of older persons based on their
584
abilities without reference to age.'

Prior to the 1978 amendment to the ADEA, an employer was permitted to force an employee to retire involuntarily if the employee was
covered by a bona fide retirement plan which stipulated a specific re-

tirement age.' 58 5 In the Ninth Circuit, a bona fide plan is defined as a
1577. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(l)-(2) (1976).
1578. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
1579. Id at 238.
1580. Id at 235.
1581. 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982).
1582. Id at 376.
1583. Id at 376-77.
1584. Id at 376.
1585. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2). See United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)
(airline pilot member of retirement plan with normal retirement age 60 years). In 1978,
Congress amended section 623()(2) to preclude the retirement of any individual on the basis
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genuine plan that pays substantial benefits.'5 8 6
In EEO.C v. County of Santa Barbara,5 87 the court refused to
apply the bona fide seniority plan exception because the employees

of a Safety
were retired pursuant to the involuntary retirement terms
15 88
Member Plan in which they were unable to participate.
I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
Melissa L. Garrity
II.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

John J Collins
III.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A. Scott A. Meyerhoff
B. Pollyann L. Brophy
C. Pollyann L Brophy

IV.

CONCERTED ACTIONS

Pollyann L. Brophy
V.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

Juliana Stamato
VI.

SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE

VII

Juliana Stamato

VII.

EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME AND SECURITY ACT

Tracy B. McCulloch
VIII.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT

Tracy B. McCulloch
IX.

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT

Barry P. Goldberg
X. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Barry P. Goldberg
XI.

COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT

Barry P. Goldberg

XII.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

Barry P. Goldberg
XIII.

SERVICE CONTRACT ACT

of age pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan or seniority system. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)
(Supp. 1983).
1586. 666 F.2d at 377 (citing Marshall v. Hawaiian Telephone Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
1587. 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982).
1588. Id at 377. The Safety Member Plan required retirement at age 60. Although the
plaintiffs were classified as law enforcement personnel, they were excluded from the plan
because they had been hired after they were age 35. Id at 374-75.
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Barry P. Goldberg
XIV.

EQUAL PAY ACT

Barry P. Goldberg
XV.

LONGSHOREMENS' AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION

ACT

Barry P. Goldberg
XVI.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Barry P. Goldberg

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIA TION v. ALLIED INTERNA TIONL,
INC.: SUPREME COURT AVOIDS
SPECIFIC GUIDELINES TO
DETERMINE ILLEGALITY OF POLITICALLYMOTIVATED SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA),I protects
both employers and employees from unfair labor practices. Accordingly, section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts.' Traditionally, a secondary boycott occurs when a labor organization exerts
pressure on an employer with whom it is involved in a dispute (the
primary employer) by coercing another employer, with whom the labor
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
2. Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), is commonly known as
the secondary boycott prohibition. However, the statute, by its terms, does not differentiate
primary and secondary activity. In fact, the term "secondary boycott" does not appear in
section 8(b)(4). Rather, section 8(b)(4) proscribes specified conduct if it is engaged in with
specified objectives. Section 8(b)(4) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
Title 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976) defines the terms "person," "commerce," and "affecting commerce," and provides in relevant part that:
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations,
partnerships, associations, [or] corporations. ...
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, .. or between any foreign country and
any State. ...

(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead
to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce.
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organization has no dispute (the neutral or secondary employer), to

cease doing business with the primary employer. By causing a cessation of business between the primary and secondary employers, the la-

bor organization attempts to further its goals in the dispute with the
primary employer (the primary dispute). As a result, the labor organi3

zation entangles the secondary employer in the primary dispute.
In InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation v. Allied International,
Inc. ,' the United States Supreme Court declared that a labor organiza-

tion's politically-motivated boycott of Soviet goods constituted a secondary boycott prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. 5 To reach
this conclusion, the Supreme Court addressed three major issues:
(1) whether the union's conduct was within the commerce jurisdiction
of the NLRA;6 (2) whether the union's conduct constituted a secondary

boycott within the NLRA proscription;7 and (3) whether prohibiting
the union's conduct infringed upon the first amendment rights of the

labor organization and/or its members.8

The purpose of this casenote is to analyze the Supreme Court's

resolution of each of these issues and the guidelines its reasoning provides for lower courts that will confront these issues in the future. This
note suggests that the Court's resolution of the commerce jurisdiction
issue injected some confusion into the traditional test of commerce ju-

risdiction while establishing only that the effects of union conduct are
relevant to determining whether secondary activity is "in commerce."
In addition, this note will show that the Court's analysis of the secon-

dary boycott issue simply reaffirmed the "ruin or substantial loss" test
used to determine whether secondary union conduct violates section

8(b)(4)(B), yet contributed little to the definition of ruin or substantial
loss. Finally, because the Court failed to consider the political motivation behind the International Longshoremen's Association's conduct
3. The following hypothetical presents an example of a successful secondary boycott:
A union is involved in a dispute with employer A. A is, therefore, the "primary" employer and the dispute between A and the union is the "primary" dispute. A does business
with B, another employer, whose employees are represented by the union; B is not involved
in the primary dispute. Therefore, B is the neutral or "secondary" employer. The union
induces B's employees to refuse to work for B unless B ceases doing business with A. To
avoid the costs of a work stoppage, B ceases doing business with A. As a result, A is forced
to choose between losing further business as a result of further union action or capitulating
to the union's demands in the primary dispute. Thus, A is pressured into complying with
the union's demands in the primary dispute.
4. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
5. Id. at 218.
6. Id at 220-22.
7. Id at 222-26.
8. Id at 226-27.
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and based its resolution of the first amendment issue entirely on its

determination that the union's conduct was an illegal secondary boycott, its reasoning and holding simply reaffirmed the general rule that

unlawful conduct is not protected by the first amendment. Therefore,
this note will conclude that the Court's reasoning established only very
broad general guidelines for the resolution of these issues in future
cases.

9

II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In January, 1980, Thomas Gleason, President of the International
Longshoremen's Association (hereinafter ILA), issued a directive ordering ILA members to cease handling cargo bound for or originating

in the Soviet Union. The boycott was announced to be a political protest of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As a result of the
directive, longshoremen refused to service ships carrying Soviet
cargo. °
Allied International, Inc. (hereinafter Allied) is a Massachusetts
corporation which imports Soviet wood products for resale in the
United States. Allied contracted with Waterman Steamship Lines

(hereinafter Waterman), a New York freight company operating ships
of United States registry, to ship wood from the Soviet Union to six

ports in the United States, including Boston. Waterman employed a
Massachusetts stevedore company, John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc.

(hereinafter Clark) to unload its ships in Boston."

Clark employed

ILA longshoremen pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement be-

tween the ILA, Local 799, and the Boston Shipping Association, of
9. Courts may confront these issues again in the context of a politically motivated secondary boycott because, in December of 1981, the ILA announced a boycott of Polish cargo
to protest the imposition of martial law in Poland. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1981, at 11, col. 4.
The announcement stated in part:
Out of sympathy with our striking Polish brothers, the ILA is directing its
members not to handle any cargo to and/or from Poland on any vessel until such
time as martial law, the detention of trade union leaders and the denial of the civil
rights of the Polish people come to an end.
N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 22, 1981, at 2, col. 3.
10. 456 U.S. at 214-15.
11. Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Mass.
1980). Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass.
1980), was consolidated with Walsh. Therefore, some facts of 411ied are found in Walsh.
Walsh grew out of the same unfair labor practice charge filed by Allied against the ILA.
NLRB Regional Director, Michael F. Walsh, petitioned the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts for a section 10(e) injunction pending the NLRB's resolution
of Allied's unfair labor practice charge.
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which Clark is a member.' 2 As a result of the ILA boycott, Clark was
unable to obtain longshoremen to unload Waterman's ships which
shipments of
were carrying Allied's imports.' 3 Consequently, Allied's
4
Soviet wood products were completely disrupted.'
Allied sued the ILA in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, alleging that the ILA was engaging in a secondary boycott in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. Allied
sought damages under section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act.' 5 The court dismissed the complaint, 6 stating that it failed to allege a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) because the ILA action was a
political 'primary boycott of Russian goods, with incidental effects
upon those employers who deal in such goods."' 7 As a primary boycott, the ILA action was not within the scope of section 8(b)(4)(B).' 8
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that Allied had alleged a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B).' 9 The court found
12. 456 U.S. at 215.
13. 488 F. Supp. at 526.
14. 456 U.S. at 215-16.
15. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334, 336 (D.
Mass. 1980). Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976),
creates a private damages remedy for secondary boycott victims and provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or
conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [oil any
violation of subsection (a). . .may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States. . .and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
16. 492 F. Supp. at 339. Allied advanced three theories to justify injunctive and monetary relief from the ILA's action: (1) violation of the NLRA secondary boycott provision;
(2) violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibition on restraints of trade; and (3) international interference with contractual relations. Id at 335-36. The court held that Allied had
failed to state a cause of action under any of the three theories asserted. Id at 339.
17. Walsh, 488 F. Supp. at 531 (emphasis added). See 492 F. Supp. at 338 (ILA's boycott is "wholly politically oriented with no apparent economic benefit accruing to the union
or its members.").
18. Title 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) contains a proviso which states "[t]hat nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The district court in Walsh determined
that the ILA action was a primary boycott of Soviet goods because
[t]he ILA has not induced a strike against Allied, Waterman, or Clark; nor does it
seek to pressure those employers not to deal with one another. No picket lines
have been established and no other employees have been prevented from work.
Union members have simply declined to accept employment on certain ships, as a
form of political protest.
488 F. Supp. at 530-31.
19. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1379 (1st
Cir. 1981). The court determined that the district court had properly dismissed Allied's
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that: (1) the ILA conduct was within the commerce jurisdiction of the
NLRA;2 ° (2) the ILA action constituted prohibited secondary activity;2 and (3) prohibiting the ILA from ordering employees to cease

handling Soviet goods would not infringe upon the first amendment
guarantee of free speech.22 The United States Supreme Court granted
the ILA's writ of certiorari,2 3 adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals and affirmed its ruling. 24

III.

HiSTORICAL SETrING

A.

Legislation

Prior to 1932, there were no federal statutes designed to govern
labor relations. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189025 functioned as a significant curb on secondary union activity because federal

courts used it as authority to issue injunctions against "virtually every
collective activity of labor as an unlawful restraint of trade. ' 26 Re-

sponding to union protests, Congress enacted the Clayton Act of
1914,27 which prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in controversies "involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment. ' 28 Subsequent judicial interpretation -ofthe
Clayton Act revealed that it immunized primary, but not secondary,
union activities from the antitrust laws. 29 Thus, federal courts could

still enjoin secondary union activities as unlawful restraints of trade.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193230 was the first legislation
allegation of (1) violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and (2) international interference
with contractual relations. Id at 1379-82.
20. Id at 1371-74.
21. Id at 1374-78.
22. Id at 1378-79.
23. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
24. 456 U.S. at 218.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
26. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44 (1976).
28. 386 U.S. at 621 (quoting § 20 of the Clayton Act).
29. Id at 621-22. See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
30. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976). The belief that industrial strife interfered with the public interest in the free flow of commerce led Congress to enact labor legislation pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 371 U.S. 224,226 (1963). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
reprintedin93 CONG. RFc. 6369 (daily ed. June 4, 1947) ("experience has demonstrated that
certain practices by some labor organizations have the effect of burdening commerce
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which
impair the interest of the public in the free flow of commerce"). See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power.. . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
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designed to regulate employer-employee relations. It prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute."'" Because the term "labor dispute" was defined broadly, federal courts could enjoin neither primary nor -secondary union activities. 32 Therefore, the Norris-LaGuardia Act severely
limited the use of injunctions to halt secondary boycotts. As a result,
unions were free to engage in secondary boycotts without judicial
interference.
Violence associated with disputes between newly formed unions
and employers led Congress to enact the NLRA.33 The NLRA secured
to employees the right to organize3 4 and bargain collectively with em-

ployers.35 It required employers to bargain in good faith and proscribed certain forms of employer conduct as unfair labor practices.36
and among the several States. . . ."). Consequently, the federal labor laws govern only
labor controversies which are "in commerce" or are "affecting commerce." See supra note 2
for statutory definitions of "commerce" and "affecting commerce." Congress sought to put
workers in a bargaining position equal to that of employers by ending easy access by employers to injunctions against workers attempting to organize for the purpose of improving
working conditions. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1932), reprintedin R.
KORETZ & B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANI-

ZATION 173-74 (1970) (primary object of Norris-LaGuardia Act to protect rights of employees to freedom of association, to organize, and to be represented by unions in negotiations
with employers).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Section 101 provides that "no court of the United States...
shall have jurisdiction to issue any. . injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter. .. ."
32. 386 U.S. at 622-23. See also H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1932). Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
33. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976)). The NLRA
is also known as the Wagner Act. Section 141(b) sets forth the intent and purpose of the
NLRA and reads in part:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations
whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
35. Id at § 159(a).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). Interference with the formation or administration of un-

1984]

SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

However, the NLRA imposed no similar requirement on unions, nor

did it prohibit abusive union conduct. Furthermore, because Congress
did not repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act, union abuses could not be
enjoined. As a result, secondary boycotts became powerful weapons
used by unions to gain recognition and economic benefits for their
members. Thus, instead of equalizing bargaining power, the NLRA
had the effect of tipping the balance in favor of the unions. 37
To restrain union abuses which arose under the Norris-LaGuardia

Act and the NLRA, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.38 As an amendment to the NLRA, the statute proscribed union unfair labor practices, including secondary boycotts, 39

and revived the use of the labor injunction to a limited extent by permitting the NLRB (but not private parties) to obtain injunctive relief
from union unfair labor practices without the restrictions imposed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.4" In addition, it gave employers a private

right of action in federal court for damages caused by union unfair
labor practices.4 1

The prohibition of secondary boycotts was originally incorporated
into the NLRA as section 8(b)(4)(A).42 The secondary boycott prohibiions and discrimination against employees on the basis of union membership were two of
the proscribed employer practices.
37. See generally R. DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BoycoTTs 124-25
(1972). See also 93 CONG. REc. 3428 (daily ed. April 15, 1947) ("But times and conditions
have changed and the unions are now strong and powerful--the employer-especially the
one who gives a few jobs, is weak.") (statement of Rep. Hoffman).
38. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Other proscribed union labor practices included discrimination against employees who are not union members and the refusal to bargain collectively
with an employer. Id
40. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). Section 160(1) provides that:
If, after. . . investigation, the [NLRB] officer or regional attorney. . . has reasonable cause to believe such charge [of an unfair labor practice] is true. . . he shall,
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court. . . for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to
such matter.
41. Id at § 187(b). Section 187(b) provides that "[wihoever shall be injured in his business or property by. . . any [unfair labor practice] violation. . . may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States. . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained and
the cost of the suit." 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976).
42. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 141
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976)). Senator Taft said of its
purpose:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between
an employer and his employees. . . . [U]nder the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott ... . All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.
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tion was intended to preserve the right of unions to bring pressure to
bear on offending employers in primary disputes and to protect neutral
parties from pressures resulting from controversies in which they are
not directly involved.4 3 It thus prohibited unions from inducing or encouraging "the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or
concerted refusal. . . to. . . handle. . . any goods" of a primary employer. In an effort to close major loopholes which had emerged from
its language, Congress subsequently amended section 8(b)(4)(A) in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 4 However, these changes did not alter the basic thrust of the secondary boycott prohibition.
B. Pre-Allied JudicialInterpretations
1. Commerce jurisdiction
The ILA boycott of Russian goods generated several lawsuits in
addition to Allied: Baldovin v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association,4 1 New Orleans S.S. Association v. GeneralLongshore Workers,46
93

REc. 4198 (daily ed. April 29, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
43. The Senate Committee Report characterized the conduct prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(A):
CONG.

Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against employer A
for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B;
nor would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses
or otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom
the union has a dispute).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1947). See also Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (Congress "aimed to restrict the
area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious,
widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that
conflict: the coercion of neutral employers . . . ."); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (secondary boycott provisions serve the "dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear
on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers
and others from pressures in controversies not their own.").
44. Three major loopholes had emerged from the language of § 8(b)(4)(A). Because
only inducement of "employees" was proscribed, direct inducement of a supervisor or the
secondary employer was not prohibited. Because only a "strike or a concerted refusal" was
proscribed, pressure upon a single employee was not unlawful. Finally, because railroads
and municipalities were not "employees" within the NLRA, inducing or encouraging their
employees was not forbidden. Subsequent to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (also known as the Landrum-Griffin amendments), § 8(b)(4)(A) became
§ 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and
Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1964).
45. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), affldsub nom., Jacksonville Bulk Term., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
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and Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Association."7 In
Baldovin,48 the most significant of these cases for purposes of understanding the significance of the Allied decision, the Fifth Circuit held,

contrary to the Allied Court,4 9 that the ILA boycott of Russian goods
was not within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA. 0 The
Baldovin court was asked to determine whether the NLRB had jurisdiction over the ILA's action in accordance with section 10(a) of the

NLRAI which defines the powers of the NLRB with respect to unfair
labor practices. Section 10(a) provides that "[t]he Board is empowered
. . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
. . affecting commerce. ' 52 Because unfair labor practice charges had
been filed against the ILA,53 the NLRB petitioned for injuctive relief
*

pursuant to section 10(1) of the NLRA

4

Stating that "[t]he object of

the dispute determines whether or not it is 'in commerce,' -55 and ob-

serving that the object of the ILA's boycott was Soviet military policy
in Afghanistan, the court determined that the ILA's dispute was not

remediable by domestic action. 6 Therefore, the boycott was not "in

commerce" within the meaning of the NLRA5 7 and the NLRB lacked
47. 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980).
48. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. See infra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
50. 626 F.2d at 449-50.
51. Id at 449.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
53. 626 F.2d at 448. The ILA was charged with violating section 8(b)(4)(B). Id See
supra note 2 for text of statute.
54. Section 10(1) of the NLRA requires the Regional Director of the NLRB to petition
for a temporary injunction when an unfair labor practice charge has been filed and he has
reason to believe that the charge is true. Section 10(1) provides in relevant part:
(1) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of [§ 8(b)(4)] . . . . [a] preliminary investigation of such
charge shall be made forthwith. . . . If, after such investigation, the officer...
has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court...
for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with
respect to [the unfair labor practice charge] ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). Section 10(1) creates a narrow exception to the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Walsh, 630 F.2d at 871.
55. 626 F.2d at 453.
56. Id at 453-54.
57. Id at 449. Citing § 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976), the court noted
that "[t]he NLRB's jurisdiction over secondary boycotts is also confined to secondary activity 'affecting commerce."' id Moreover, the court recognized the general limitation of the
NLRA that activities governed thereby must be in or affect commerce. Id Thus, the court
also determined that the ILA boycott was not "in commerce" within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(4). Id Furthermore, the court determined that the ILA refusal to handle Soviet
cargo was a secondary boycott within the meaning of § 8(b)(4). Id Analyzing the language
and intent of the statute, the court stated:
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power to enjoin the boycott.58
Prior to Allied, the Supreme Court had determined that primary

labor disputes between American unions and foreign entities are not
within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA when assertion of jurisdiction would inescapably interfere with foreign labor relations, foreign
trade, and comity among nations. This principle derived from a series
of decisions59 involving primary labor activity undertaken by American unions against foreign carriers. Those cases, however, raised no
questions concerning injury to American neutrals.
In the leading case, Benz v. CompaniaNavieraHidalgo, S. 4 ,6o the

Supreme Court held that the NLRA was not applicable to primary laThe ILA's dispute is exclusively with the Soviet government which is the only authority capable of responding to its protest. The stevedoring, shipping, exporting
or importing companies. . . are completely neutral with regard to the ILA's dispute with the Soviet Union. . . . [Therefore, the ILA boycott] violates the purpose
of the secondary boycott ban: to compel the union to confront the employer with
whom it has its real or primary dispute ....
Id
Noting that § 8(b)(4) prohibits unions from pressuring neutral secondary employers
when one of the union's objectives is to cause a cessation of business between neutrals, the
Baldovin court cited NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980), for the
proposition that secondary picketing violates § 8(b)(4)(B) when it predictably encourages
consumers to cease patronizing the neutral employer's business altogether. 626 F.2d at 449.
See infra text accompanying notes 92-98. Thus, the court found, in accord with the Allied
decision (seeinfra notes 140-153 and accompanying text), that the ILA boycott was a secondary boycott within the NLRA prohibition. Id
58. Id at 453. In Walsh, 630 F.2d 864 (lst Cir. 1980), the First Circuit concluded that
Baldovin had preclusive effect over the NLRB's petition for a section 10(1) injunction. Id at
867. Walsh resulted from the unfair labor practice charge filed with the NLRB by Allied
against the ILA. NLRB Regional Director, Michael F. Walsh, petitioned the Untied States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a § 10(1) injunction pending the NLRB's
resolution of Allied's unfair labor practice charge. Id at 866-67. The district court determined that it was not bound by the prior district court decision in Baldovin. 488 F. Supp.
524, 528 (D. Mass. 1980). The court held that the doctrines of issue preclusion, res judicata
and collateral estoppel by judgment, were inapplicable to § I0(1) petitions. Thus, the court
declined to follow Baldovin and concluded that the controversy was within the commerce
jurisdiction of the NLRA. Id However, because the court found that the ILA activity was a
primary boycott exempted from § 8(b)(4), it denied the injunction. Id at 530-31. On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the § 10(l) injunction but on the
ground that the action was barred by the decision of the district court in Baldovin, i.e., that
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction because the controversy was not "in commerce." 630 F.2d at
875.
59. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974); International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Ltd., 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Incres S.S. Co. v.
International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
60. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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bor disputes between foreign employers and their foreign employees.
Benz involved picketing by three American unions against a foreign
vessel in support of a strike by its foreign crew against their employer, a
foreign shipowner.6 The foreign employer sought damages in federal
court under the NLRA.62 The Court held that the controversy was
outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA because the United States
labor laws were not intended to govern labor disputes between foreign
nationals arising under foreign laws.63 The Benz Court relied upon the
legislative history of the NLRA to determine that Congress intended
the NLRA to govern only labor strife between American employers
and employees.' In addition, the Benz Court recognized the strong
likelihood that assertion of NLRB jurisdiction in this setting would
promote international discord because it would directly interfere with
the laws governing foreign-flag carriers and thus contravene principles
of comity in international trade. Consequently, the Court held that
the controversy was outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA and
deferred to Congress the task of determining American policy in such a
"delicate field of international relations. 66
61. Id. at 139-41.
62. Id at 138-39.
63. Id at 143. The foreign seamen were employed under a British form of articles of
agreement setting forth employment terms. Id at 139.
64. Id at 142-44. The Court noted the statement of Representative Hartley, coauthor of
the Labor-Management Relations Act, that "'the bill herewith reported has been formulated as a bill of rights both forAmerican workingmen and for their employers."' Id at 144
(emphasis added) (quoting H.R. RaP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). Thus, the
Court concluded that "Congress did not fashion. . .[the NLRA] to resolve labor disputes
between [foreign] nationals . . . . mhe Act is concerned with industrial strife between
American employers and employees." 353 U.S. at 143-44 (footnote omitted).,
65. Id at 146-47.
66. Id at 147. The Court stated:
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It
alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision
where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action
so certain.
Id The41lied Court noted that a similar analysis was followed six years later in McCulloch
v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), and Incres Steamship
Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963). 456 U.S. at 220 n.16. In
MeCulloch, an American union petitioned the NLRB to order an election aboard a foreign
vessel to determine union representation of foreign seamen employed by a foreign shipowner. 372 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1963). In Incres, foreign shipowners sought injunctive relief
under the NLRA from organizational picketing by an American union seeking to represent
foreign seamen aboard a foreign vessel. 372 U.S. 24, 26 (1963). In both cases, the Supreme
Court held that the controversy was outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA because
"maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in 'commerce'
within the meaning of [the NLRA]." Id at 27; MeCulloch, 372 U.S. at 13. The Court fo-
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The Court's application of the Benz rationale in Windward Sh vping (London)Limited v. American Radio Association6 7 and its companion case, American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamshp Association,

Inc. ,68 established that when assertion of jurisdiction over union conduct interferes in the realm of international affairs, it is immaterial to
resolution of the commerce jurisdiction issue whether the union's conduct is characterized as "primary" or "secondary." In Windward,
American unions picketed foreign vessels to protest low wages paid for-

eign seamen by foreign shipowners and to publicize the adverse impact
of these low wages on American seamen.6 9 The Court found that be-

cause the unions' picketing sought to force the foreign shipowners to
pay their foreign crews higher wages and thus raise the operating costs

of the foreign vessels, it had a significant impact on the maritime operations of the foreign vessels. 7 0 Therefore, the Court held that the unions'
conduct was controlled by the Benz rationale and thus was not within
the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA.71
The secondary effects of the conduct at issue in Windward came
before the Court in Mobile. In Mobile, American stevedores and shippers employed to service the picketed foreign vessels in Windward
sought injunctive relief from the unions' picketing.7 2 They contended

that the Windward Court held only that maritime operations of foreign
vessels were not "in commerce" and that a different result was required

when picketing was viewed in the context of its effect on American
employers clearly engaged "in commerce.

' 73

The Mobile Court re-

cused on the degree of intrusion into the "internal management and affairs of [foreign] vessels" which assertion of jurisdiction would entail and concluded that Congress did not
intend the NLRA to have such far-reaching effects in the field of international relations.
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-21; Incres, 372 U.S. at 27-28.
67. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
68. 419 U.S. 215 (1974). International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping
Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), is the only case in the Benz series in which the Court held that the
controversy was within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA. Id at 200. InAriadne, an
American union picketed a foreign-owned vessel to protest substandard wages paid American longshoremen by foreign shipowners. Id at 196. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
application of the NLRA to the controversy "threatened no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law." Id at
200. Consequently, the union's picketing was held to be within the commerce jurisdiction of
the NLRA. Id
69. 415 U.S. at 106-07. The difference between foreign and domestic seamen's wages
gave foreign vessels a substantial competitive advantage over domestic vessels which resulted in a decline in the number of jobs available to union members. Id
70. Id at 114-15.
71. Id at 115.
72. 419 U.S. at 220.
73. Id at 221-22. The Court noted the fundamental inconsistency between the unions'
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jected this argument and determined that the Benz line of cases did not

allow a "bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of pickets
....

"74

Accordingly, the Court held that the change in complainants

did not alter the jurisdictional reach of the NLRA and therefore, as in
Windward, the unions' picketing was not in commerce and thus not
governed by the NLRA.7 5
The determination in Mobile that the picketing was not "in commerce" rested upon the primary nature of the activity--the attempt to

directly pressure foreign shipowners to raise the wages paid their
seamen-and the necessary effect of this primary activity on foreign
maritime operations. Therefore, the combined effect of the holdings in
Windward and Mobile is that primary conduct which interferes with

foreign maritime operations is not within the commerce jurisdiction of
the NLRA, regardless of whether the complainant is a primary or secondary employer.
2.

Secondary boycott

Due to the "chameleon-like qualities of the term 'secondary boycott,'

"76

the Supreme Court has relied upon the legislative history and

purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) to determine whether union activity constitutes a prohibited secondary boycott.7 7 From its analysis of the legislative history of section 8(b)(4)(B), the Court has determined that

Congress intended section 8(b)(4)(B) to shield neutral employers and
others from pressures in controversies not their own 78 by prohibiting

union conduct
"tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
79
elsewhere."
Because the term "secondary boycott" does not appear in section

8(b)(4)(B), the Court has recognized that its prohibitions donot recogargument in Windward that their picketing was primary activity protected by the NLRA and
their argument in Mobile that the picketing was a secondary boycott prohibited by the
NLRA. Id at 220.
74. Id at 222.
75. Id at 225. The Court stated that:
The effect of the picketing on the operations of the stevedores and shippers, and
thence on these maritime operations, is precisely the same whether it be complained of by the foreign-ship owners or by persons seeking to service and deal
with the ships. The fact that the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case is inyoked by stevedores and shippers does not convert into "commerce" activities
which plainly were not such in Windward.
Id
76. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967).
77. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
78. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
79. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. at 644.
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nize a distinction between primary and secondary activity."0 Instead,
the Court has interpreted section 8(b)(4)(B) to proscribe specific union
conduct engaged in with specific objectives which experience has
shown to be undesirable.8 '
The Supreme Court has described the elements of a prohibited
secondary boycott as follows: "Employees must be induced; they must
be induced to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be
to force or require their employer or another person to cease doing
business with a third person."" 2 Furthermore, the Court has stated that
it is not necessary to find that the sole object of a union's strike or
boycott is to cause a cessation of business between neutral parties; the
objective prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) need only be an object of
union activity. 83 Recognizing the difficulty of assessing the object of
union conduct under section 8(b)(4), 84 the Court has held that a union's
intent or purpose may be shown by the nature of its conduct.8 5
In NLRB v. Fruit& Vegetable PackersLocal 760 ("Tree Fruits"), 6

the Court held that union secondary product picketing targeted at one
of many products sold by a secondary employer does not violate section 8(b)(4)(B).87 In Tree Fruits, a union picketed Safeway stores to
induce customers not to purchase Washington State apples because of a
labor dispute between the union and fruit packers and warehousemen
in Washington. 88 The picketing was carefully limited to the struck
product, Washington State apples, which was "only one of numerous
food products sold in the [Safeway] stores." 89 Noting that "the prohibition of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the [union's] conduct," 90 the Court held that the union's picketing did not coerce neutral
80. See supra note 2.
81. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1964),
82. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958).
83. DenverBldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 688-89. Section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits specified union activities where "an object thereof' is one of the specified results. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 2 for text of statute.
84. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674
(1961) (to determine object of union conduct under § 8(b)(4)(B), the NLRB and the courts
have "attempted to devise reasonable criteria drawing heavily upon the means to which a
union resorts in promoting its cause.").
85. Id See also NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 30405 (1971) (union responsible for foreseeable consequences of its conduct).
86. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
87. Id at 72-73.
88. Id at 59-60.
89. Id at 60.
90. Id at 68.
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parties and therefore did not violate section 8(b)(4)(B). 91
On the other hand, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001,92 the Court held that the kind of union conduct which vio-

lates section 8(b)(4)(B) is conduct "that reasonably can be expected to
The
threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss . . . .
Court also provided a guideline to aid lower courts in determining
what constitutes "ruin or substantial loss." In Retail Store Employees, a

union which represented employees of Safeco Title Insurance Co., a
title insurance underwriter, picketed five title companies, asking customers to cancel their Safeco policies because contract negotiations be-

tween the union and Safeco had reached an impasse.94 The Court
determined that, because the picketed title companies derived over
ninety percent of their gross income from the sale of Safeco policies 95
and because the union's picketing effectively asked customers to cease

patronizing the title companies altogether, the title companies were
forced to become involved in the primary dispute between the union
and Safeco by the threat of financial ruin.96 Therefore, the Court held

that the union's product picketing contravened the intent of section
8(b)(4)(B) "to protect secondary parties from pressures that might embroil them in the labor disputes of others"9 7 and thus constituted a
prohibited secondary boycott.98

At the time Allied was decided by the Supreme Court, the lower
courts were generally in agreement that the absence of a primary labor
dispute does not preclude a finding that section 8(b)(4)(B) has been
violated. 99 The courts, however, disagreed as to whether the NLRB
91. Id at 72-73.
92. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
93. Id at 614-15.
94. Id at 609-10.
95. Id at 609.
96. Id at 613-14.
97. Id at 612.
98. Id at 615.
99. Title 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976) defines the term "labor dispute" to include "any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
In Soft Drink Workers Union, Local 812 v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 8(b)(4)(B) is applicable even when
there is no primary labor dispute to which the union conduct could be secondary. Id at
1259. In Soft Drink Workers, a union picketed a retail beverage store asking customers to
purchase only locally manufactured soft drinks. Id at 1255-56. Finding a violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(B), the NLRB issued a cease and desist order against the union. Id at 1256-57.
The court rejected the union's argument that, because there was no conventional labor dis-
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may exercise jurisdiction absent a labor dispute as defined by section
2(9) of the NLRA.' °
3.

First amendment

The first amendment' 0 ' guarantee of free speech applies to unions
as well as individuals.10 2 However, the Supreme Court has held con-

sistently that conduct made unlawful by legitimate legislation is not
protected by the first amendment.1 0 3 Therefore, in InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers v. NLRB, " 4 the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he [NLRA] prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure . . . carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free
speech." ' Thus, before Allied, the Court had determined that because
pute, the NLRB lacked jurisdiction to issue the order. Id at 1258. In addition, the court
concluded that a primary labor dispute need not be identified to find a violation of section
8(b)(4)(B). Id at 1259. Accord National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411,417 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
100. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1964)
(NLRB lacked jurisdiction to enjoin union boycott because "there can be no [NLRB] jurisdiction where the complaint presents a controversy unrelated to the resolution of a 'labor
dispute' as defined [by § 2(9) of the NLRA]."). Accord United States Steel Corp. v. UMW,
519 F.2d 1236, 1247-48 (5th Cir. 1975) (union strike to protest importation of South African
coal was an unarbitrable political dispute and therefore not exempt from Norris-LaGuardia
Act), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Danielson v. Fur Dressers, Local No. 2F, 411 F.
Supp. 655, 657-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (NLRB petition to enjoin union picketing of fur processor which, in compliance with requirements of foreign governments, imported only
processed skins, denied because no labor dispute or because protected primary picketing);
Douds v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 28, 101 F. Supp. 273, 278-79
(E.D.N.Y. 1951) (no secondary boycott in absence of primary labor dispute between union
and heating company). Cf. Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445,
450 (5th Cir. 1980) (union refusal to load grain bound for Soviet Union to protest Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was secondary boycott despite absence of primary labor dispute);
National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (NLRB empowered to enjoin union's conduct in dispute with rival union despite the absence of conventional labor dispute), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB,
342 F.2d 538, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1965) (union picketing to induce work stoppages among employees of secondary employers constituted a secondary boycott even though picketing was
a retaliative measure against rival union rather than a conventional labor dispute), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1966).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech.
...).
102. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
103. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228-32 (1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Carpenters Union,
Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). The constitutionality of the NLRA was
established in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
104. 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
105. Id at 705.
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secondary boycotts are illegal under the NLRA, they are not protected
by the first amendment.
IV.

REASONING OF THE COURT

The threshold issue for the Allied Court was jurisdictional in nature: whether the ILA's work stoppage was within the scope of the
NLRA, i.e., whether it affected commerce. The Court began its analysis of the commerce jurisdiction issue by interpreting the language of
section 8(b)(4). The Court reasoned that because Allied, Waterman
and Clark were engaged "in commerce," the ILA's action "affected
commerce" within the statutory definitions." °6 Consequently, a literal
interpretation of the statutory language invoked the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA.
In addition, the Court rejected the ILA's contention that its action
was not "in commerce" as the Court had previously interpreted that
term.107 The Court distinguished Benz and its progeny,' 0 8 determining
that the ILA's work stoppage did not affect the maritime operations of
foreign vessels. The Court reasoned that, by refusing to handle Soviet
goods, the ILA did not attempt to alter the terms of employment for
foreign seamen aboard foreign ships and did not seek to extend to foreign seamen and shipowners rights given American employees and employers by the NLRA. Moreover, this "drama was 'played out by an
all-American cast'" and involved no dispute with a foreign employer.
Consequently, the Court reasoned that the international trade policy
considerations prevalent in the Benz cases were irrelevant in Allied. As
a result, the Court held that the ILA conduct did not fall within the
Benz limitation of NLRA commerce jurisdiction and therefore was
governed by the NLRA. 1°9
By analyzing the language and legislative intent of section
8(b)(4)(B), theAllied Court held that the ILA's refusal to handle Soviet
cargo constituted a prohibited secondary boycott.' 10 Section 8(b)(4)(B)
prohibits union conduct where "an object thereof' is forcing any person to cease doing business with another person."' As a result, the
Court's method of analysis required it to find that one of the objects of
106. 456 U.S. at 221-22. See supra note 2 for text of statutes.
107. Id at 221.
108. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
109. 456 U.S. at 221-22.
110. Id at 222-26. "By its terms the statutory prohibition applies to the undisputed facts
of this case." Id at 22. See supra note 2 for text of section 8(b)(4)(B). For a discussion of
the relevant legislative history, see notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See supra note 2 for text of statute.
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the ILA's action was to disrupt business among Allied, Waterman and
Clark. To make this determination, the Court focused on the foreseeable economic effects of the ILA's action'1 2 and stated that "when a
purely secondary boycott 'reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss' the pressure on secondary parties must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott
... "1 However "understandable" and "commendable" the ILA's
ultimate objective of protesting Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan might have been, the predictable result of the ILA's action was to
threaten Allied, Waterman and Clark with financial ruin or substantial
loss. Therefore, the Court held that the disruption of their business was
"an object" of the ILA's action." 4
The Court rejected the ILA's argument that section 8(b)(4) was
inapplicable because the ILA boycott involved a political dispute with
a foreign nation rather than a labor dispute with a primary em-

ployer." 5 The Court recognized that the ILA sought no labor objective
from, nor had any labor dispute with, Allied, Waterman, or Clark and
that the ILA refusal to unload Soviet cargo was entirely politically motivated." 6 The Supreme Court, however, declined to limit the applica-

tion of section 8(b)(4)(B) to secondary boycotts involving labor
disputes,'

and instead held that Congress had purposefully given sec-

tion 8(b)(4)(B) a broad scope to protect neutral parties from economic
pressure resulting from the disputes of others."'
112. 456 U.S. at 224.
113. Id (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980)
("Product picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss simply does not square with the language or the purpose of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).")). The Court characterized the ILA's boycott as purely secondary activity
because the boycott was directed against Allied's goods even though the ILA conceded it
sought no labor objective from, nor had any dispute with Allied, Waterman or Clark. The
boycott was designed to protest Soviet foreign policy and thus was clearly calculated to
achieve union objectives elsewhere. 456 U.S. at 222 n.19.
114. Id at 224.
115. Id at 224-25.
116. Id at 222-25. The Allied Court's reasoning parallels the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
the labor dispute jurisdiction issue. In New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit determined that "a strike called to further
the political goals of the union" does not involve a labor dispute. Id at 465. Upholding two
injunctions issued by district courts against the ILA, id at 458, the court found that because
the ILA boycott did not "involve or grow out of any labor dispute," the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were inapplicable. Id at 464-65.
117. 456 U.S. at 224-25.
118. Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1947) (secondary boycott
prohibition designed to protect "helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at
all.")). The Court also noted that Congress had refused to narrow the socpe of section
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In addition, the Court declined to exclude politically-motivated

secondary boycotts from the scope of section 8(b)(4), noting that to do
so would create a "far-reaching exemption" from a statute purposely
drafted in broad terms.11 9 The Court further noted that section 8(b)(4)

contains no exception for political disputes. 120

The Allied Court held that application of section 8(b)(4)(B) to the

ILA's boycott of Soviet cargo would not violate the first amendment
rights of either the ILA or its members.12

The Court reiterated its

position that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of sec22
tion 8(b)(4) is not protected activity under the first amendment.
Therefore, "[i]t would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to
8(b)(4)(B) in response to a claim that all secondary boycotts were not harmful. 456 U.S. at
225 n.23.
119. 456 U.S. at 226. Recognizing that the "distinction between labor and political objecfives would be difficult to draw in many cases," the Court was apparently concerned that, if
political disputes were exempted from section 8(b)(4), a union could engage in secondary
activity and escape sanctions simply by proclaiming that its activity was a political protest.
Id See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. 456 U.S. at 226.
121. Id The Fifth Circuit had reached the same conclusion in New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v.
General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980). In New Orleans, the court recognized that, although first amendment guarantees extend to labor unions, union conduct
made unlawful by legislation enacted for purposes other than to suppress free expression is
not protected by the first amendment. 626 F.2d at 462-63. Therefore, because the ILA's
boycott violated the arbitration provisions of the NLRA, it was not protected by the first
amendment. Id at 463.
122. 456 U.S. at 226 (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447
U.S. 607, 616 (1980); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31
(1974); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)). The cases
cited by the Court stand for the proposition that union conduct which violates section
8(b)(4)(B) is not protected by the first amendment. In Retail Store Employees, the Court
held that section 8(b)(4)(B) does not abridge constitutionally-protected speech when applied
to "picketing that predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business ..
447 U.S. at 616. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
The Mobile Court held that a state injunction of union picketing did not violate the first
amendment because states are allowed wide discretion in "protecting various competing
economic and social interests." 419 U.S. at 229. In Mobile, the state enjoined union picketing of foreign ships designed to protest substandard wages paid foreign seamen and to publicize the adverse impact of these wages on American seamen. Id at 217. The Court found
that the state's injunction was supported by a "valid public policy" in favor of preventing
wrongful interference in business and consequently did not violate the first amendment. Id
at 230-32. However, because the Court held that the union's conduct was outside the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA, it did not address the issue of whether the union's conduct
was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B); nor did it decide whether prohibiting such conduct
under section 8(b)(4)(B) would violate the first amendment. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
In Electrical Workers, the Court held that peaceful union picketing was not protected
by the first amendment because its object was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(A). 341 U.S. at
705. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration under the
First Amendment."' 2 3 Moreover, noting that the labor laws reflect a

balancing of interests,' 2 4 the Court concluded that the ILA and its
members could express their political views regarding Soviet foreign

other ways which would not infringe upon the rights of
policy in
25
others.

V.

ANALYSIS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLIED

A.

Commerce Jurisdiction: Object or Effect?

To determine that the ILA boycott was within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA, the Court focused on the domestic effects of the

ILA's action-interference with contractual relationships-rather than
26
its foreign objective-to protest Soviet foreign policy in Afghanistan. 1
Thus, although the Allied Court claimed that it was "[a]pplying the
principles developed in.

.

. [the Benz line of] cases,"'12 7 it actually de-

parted from the Benz analysis, 128 which emphasized the objective
sought by the union to determine whether the union's conduct was

within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA.' 29 Consequently, it is

123. 456 U.S. at 226 (citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers ("Tree Fruits"), 377 U.S.
58 (1964)). The Court apparently recognized that section 8(b)(4) does not prohibit all secondary activity by unions but only certain secondary activities designed to achieve specific
prohibited objectives.
The Tree Fruits Court noted that "a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide
with the guarantees of the First Amendment." 377 U.S. at 63. In Tree Fruits, a union involved in a labor dispute with employers of fruit packers and warehousemen in Washington
picketed retail stores which sold Washington State apples packaged by the primary employers. The picketing was limited to asking customers of the retail stores not to buy Washington State apples. The Court held that the union's conduct did not violate section 8(b)(4)
because it was directed only at the struck product and did not ask customers to cease dealing
with the retail stores altogether. Id at 71-72. Therefore, the union's conduct did not coerce
neutral parties to become involved in the primary dispute. Id at 68. The Court stated that
"the prohibition of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the [union's] conduct, whether
it be picketing or otherwise." Id Consequently, non-coercive secondary activity is not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) and is protected by the first amendment.
124. Id (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Justice Blackmun concurred in the result in Retail Store
Employees because he was reluctant "to hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife."
447 U.S. at 617-18.
125. 456 U.S. at 227.
126. Id at 222-23.
127. Id at 221.
128. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
129. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (object of union's picketing
was representation of foreign seamen aboard foreign vessel); McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
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unclear whether theAllied Court (1) implicitly overruled the Benz "object" approach; (2) reaffirmed the object approach but limited its appli-

cation to situations which involve the maritime operations of foreign
vessels; or (3) adopted the bifurcated view rejected in Mobile, 13 thus

implicitly overruling that decision and permitting courts to focus on
effects in unfair labor practice cases and objectives in all other

situations.
Although the Allied decision created some uncertainty as to when
the Court will focus on the objective rather than on the effects of union

activity involving foreign entities to determine whether commerce jurisdiction exists, the Allied Court's focus on the effects of the ILA's ac-

tion was nevertheless appropriate because Allied involved no primary
dispute that affected the rights of foreign entities. 3 ' In each of the

Benz cases, with the exception of Mobile, foreign primary employers
(the foreign shipowners) sought relief under the NLRA from primary
union conduct. 3 2 In Mobile, secondary domestic employers sought in-

junctive relief from primary union conduct directed against foreign entities.1 33 Assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA would have

required the Court in these cases to determine the rights of foreign entities under domestic law, thus interfering in the area of foreign relations.

In contrast, the domestic secondary employers in Allied sought damages under the NLRA for purely secondary union conduct. 34 Assertion of jurisdiction required the Court to determine only the rights of

domestic entities, resulting in no interference in foreign relations.

35

The United States Constitution specifically gives Congress and the
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (union's objective was to conduct
representation election aboard foreign vessel employing foreign seamen); Incres S.S. Co. v.
International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (union's objective to conduct
representation election among foreign seamen aboard foreign vessel); International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Ltd., 397 U.S. 195 (1970) (union's objective to
increase wages paid American longshoremen by foreign shipowners); Windward Shipping
(London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (union's objective to publicize
adverse effects on American seamen of substandard wages paid foreign seamen); American
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (same objective as in Windward). See
supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for discussion of Court's reasoning in each of
these cases.
130. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
131. "[It is not even arguable that Allied was feeling the secondary effects of aprimary
dispute protected by the Act." 456 U.S. at 224 n.22 (emphasis in original).
132. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
134. 456 U.S. at 224.
135. The Court stated that "Ithe longstanding tradition of restraint in applying the laws
of this country to ships of a foreign country. . . is irrelevant to this case." Id at 221.
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President concurrent power over international affairs.1 36 Thus, when
foreign relations would be affected directly by determining the rights of
foreign entities under federal labor laws, as was the case in Benz and its
progeny, it is more appropriate for the Court to use the object approach
to the commerce jurisdiction issue. Otherwise, the Court would exceed
the scope of its power under the Constitution by exercising a power
reserved to Congress and the President. When, however, the determination of rights under the federal labor laws threatens no interference
in the realm of foreign affairs, as was the case inAllied, it is appropriate
for the Court to analyze the effects of union conduct to determine
whether or not the conduct is in commerce. In this situation, the
Court's assertion of jurisdiction does not exceed its constitutionally
granted power.
The Allied Court's focus on the effects of the ILA's action rather
than on its foreign objective was appropriate because a secondary boycott allegation was at issue. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA prohibits
union conduct which furthers union goals in a dispute with one employer while adversely affecting another employer.1 37 Thus, section
8(b)(4)(B) is designed to shield neutral secondary employers from the
adverse effects of union activity in disputes in which the secondary employer is not otherwise involved. 38 Because section 8(b)(4)(B) is concerned with the secondary effects of union conduct, it would be
anomalous for the Court to focus exclusively on the object of the primary dispute to determine the commerce jurisdiction issue and disregard the secondary effects of that dispute which section 8(b)(4)(B)
specifically prohibits. To accomplish the purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B),
the Court must consider how and in what degree a secondary employer
is affected by union conduct. Therefore, the object of the primary dispute should not be dispositive of the commerce jurisdiction issue in the
context of a section 8(b)(4)(B) action.
Furthermore, in secondary boycott situations involving foreign entities, strict adherence to the "object" approach to resolve the commerce jurisdiction issue could potentially undermine the purpose of
section 8(b)(4)(B)-to prevent neutral secondary employers from bearing the economic burdens of the disputes of others. InAllied, the object
of the ILA's conduct-Soviet military policy in Afghanistan-was arguably not in commerce within the meaning of the NLRA. 139 If only
136.
137.
138.
139.

U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
See supra note 2.
See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
456 U.S. at 222-23.
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the object of the union's conduct were considered in resolving the commerce jurisdiction issue, the ILA's conduct would probably fall outside
the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA and section 8(b)(4)(B) would
not be applicable. The result would be that injured secondary employers would be barred from recovering under the NLRA.
Carrying the "object" analysis to its extreme, a union could circumvent the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA and engage in
otherwise prohibited secondary activity by claiming that its action was
a political protest against the policies and/or actions of a foreign nation. For example, to protest the imposition of martial law in Poland,
the plumber's union might have refused to install a particular brand of
pipe because it was made from copper mined in Poland. The object of
the union's conduct would have been to protest Polish military policy.
Therefore, even though American manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of that brand of pipe would have been injured by the union's
action, the "object" analysis would deny them recovery under section
8(b)(4)(B) because the union's object was not "in commerce." Because
the United States engages in a large volume of trade with numerous
foreign countries, great potential exists for unions to undermine the
purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) by claiming to have political disputes with
foreign nations. Therefore, because a secondary boycott allegation was
at issue inAllied, the Court properly focused on the effects of the ILA's
action to resolve the commerce jurisdiction issue.
B. Secondary Boycott
1. Ruin or substantial loss: how forseeable?
The Court's conclusion that the ILA's action was prohibited by
section 8(b)(4)(B) rested on its finding that the cessation of business
between Allied, Waterman and Clark was an object of the ILA's action. 4° To make this determination, the Court applied the standard set
forth in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001,141 which
established that union activity violates section 8(b)(4)(B) if it "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial
'
loss." 142
Thus, Allied stands for the proposition that when union conduct foreseeably threatens neutral parties with financial ruin or substantial loss, that effect is an object of the union's conduct prohibited by
section 8(b)(4)(B).
140. Id at 224. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
141. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 614.
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TheAllied Court extended the applicability of the Retail Store Employees "ruin or substantial loss" test in the area of secondary boycotts.
Retail Store Employees involved secondary product picketing, i.e.,
union picketing designed to persuade customers of a secondary employer not to purchase a product sold by the secondary employer because that product is manufactured by an employer with whom the
union has a dispute.1 43 Allied, however, did not involve secondary
product picketing. The ILA did not actually picket Allied, nor did it
ask Allied's customers not to purchase Soviet products. Instead, the
ILA simply refused to handle Soviet goods.'" Because the Court did
not distinguish the union conduct at issue in Retail Store Employees
from that inAllied, it appears that the Court does not intend the Retail
Store Employees test to be confined to secondary product picketing
cases, but intends it to have a broader application.
Moreover, theAllied Court employed the "ruin or substantial loss"
test to determine both that the cessation of business between Allied,
Waterman and Clark was an object of the union's conduct and to determine that the ILA's conduct violated section 8(b)(4)(B). 145 However, in
Retail Store Employees, the Court held that the union's picketing violated section 8(b)(4)(B) because it threatened the secondary employers
with ruin or substantial loss.' 46 Thus, after Allied, the "ruin or substantial loss" test is applicable to determine not only whether union conduct violates section 8(b)(4)(B), but also to determine what objective is
sought by a union secondary boycott. As a result, the "ruin or substantial loss" test may now apply in all secondary boycott situations.
The Allied Court's holding narrowed only slightly the parameters
of the "ruin or substantial loss" test as defined by Retail Store Employees and Tree Fruits. Retail Store Employees established that when the
secondary employer derives ninety percent or more of its income from
sales of a struck product, secondary product picketing threatens neutrals with ruin or substantial loss. 147 In Retail Store Employees, the
secondary employers (the title companies which sold Safeco insurance
143. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
145. 456 U.S. at 224. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
146. 447 U.S. at 615. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. Cf. Tree Fruits, 377
U.S. 58 (1964). See also supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
147. 447 U.S. at 609. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. The Court noted in
Retail Store Employees that "[i]f secondary picketing were directed against a product representing a major portion of a neutral's business, but significantly less than that represented by
a single dominant product, neither Tree Fruits nor today's decision necessarily would control." 447 U.S. at 615 n.ll.
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policies) derived ninety percent of their business from the sale of the
struck product (Safeco insurance policies).1 48 The Court found that the
union's product picketing threatened the secondary employers with
financial ruin because it effectively asked customers to cease patronizing them altogether. 149 Therefore, the Court held that the union's conduct was an illegal secondary boycott.' 50 Tree Fruits, on the other
hand, established that when the struck product is but one of many
products sold by the secondary employer, secondary product picketing
limited to the struck product does not coerce neutral parties and therefore does not violate section 8(b)(4)(B). 151
In holding that the ILA's action had the objective of causing a
cessation of business between the neutral secondary employers and
thus violated section 8(b)(4)(B), the Allied Court followed the reasoning of Retail Store Employees. Approximately eighty-five percent of
Allied's imports, amounting to twenty-five million dollars annually,
came from the Soviet Union. 152 Therefore, the Court held that the
ILA's refusal to handle those imports threatened Allied with ruin or
substantial loss.' 53 As a result, the holding in Allied moved the upper
limit of "ruin or substantial loss" from ninety percent or more of the
secondary employer's income to eighty-five percent or more of the sec-

ondary employer's income-not a substantial change. Consequently,
the holding inAllied contributed little to the definition of "ruin or substantial loss" which will render union conduct violative of section
8(b)(4)(B).
2.

Nature of primary dispute irrelevant to
section 8(b)(4)(B) violation

The Allied Court's holding that section 8(b)(4)(B) is applicable
even in the absence of a primary labor dispute recognized the legislative purpose and intent of section 8(b)(4)(B). Section 8(b)(4)(B) was
drafted to prevent neutral parties from becoming the victims of controversies in which they are not involved.1 54 To limit application of section 8(b)(4)(B) to union secondary activity that involves only laborrelated primary disputes would destroy the protection Congress in148. 447 U.S. at 609.
149. Id at 614.
150. Id at 614-15.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91. See also Soft Drink Workers Union v.
NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
152. 257 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1084 (1981).
153. 456 U.S. at 224.
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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tended to give neutral secondary employers. Such a limitation would
permit unions to engage in secondary activity and avoid the prohibition
of section 8(b)(4)(B) simply by claiming to have a primary dispute
which is not labor-oriented.
The potential danger for abuse by unions would be even greater if
political disputes were exempted from section 8(b)(4)(B). A union
could readily find some political justification for its conduct and thus
escape the prohibition of section 8(b)(4)(B).1 5 As a result, secondary
employers would lose the protection afforded them by section
8(b)(4)(B) and would have to endure secondary pressure simply because the union's action was politically motivated. As the Allied Court
noted, such a result would be contrary to both the language and purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B).' 56
C FirstAmendment: Illegality v. Compelling Government Interest
To determine that enjoining the ILA boycott did not infringe upon
the ILA's freedom of speech, the Allied Court applied the established
principle that illegal activity is not protected by the first amendment. 5 7
Thus, once the Court found that the ILA's conduct violated section
8(b)(4)(B),15 8 it summarily concluded that it was not protected activity
under the first amendment.' 59 The Court relied upon laborpicketing
cases to determine that the ILA's boycott was illegal and thus not protected by the first amendment. 160 Allied, however, involved neither labor picketing nor any labor controversy. Rather, to voice its opposition
to Soviet military policy in Afghanistan, the ILA simply declined to
handle Soviet goods. 6 ' Thus, the ILA's action did not entail the physi155. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
156. 456 U.S. at 224-25. In addition, the Court, agreeing with the court of appeals, stated
that:
[l]t is "more rather than less objectionable that a national labor union has chosen
to marshal against neutral parties the considerable powers derived by its locals and
itself under the federal labor laws in aid of a random political objective far removed from what has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate
union activity."
Id at 225-26 (quoting Allied, 640 F.2d at 1378).
157. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
158. 456 U.S. at 223-24. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text for analysis of
Court's reasoning.
159. 456 U.S. at 226.
160. Id ("We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment.") (citing
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) and American
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974)).
161. 456 U.S. at 214-15.
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cal obstruction and/or intrusion ordinarily associated with picket
lines.' 62 Therefore, the Court's reliance upon labor picketing cases to
determine the first amendment issue was inappropriate.
The Allied Court's summary resolution of the first amendment issue failed to consider adequately the political motivation behind the
ILA's boycott. Assembling for the purpose of peaceful action is not
unlawful.' 63 Moreover, political expression is the kind of speech most
jealously protected by the first amendment. 164 The ILA's action was
political expression by an organized group and thus constituted an exercise of the union members' right to associate to express political beliefs. The fact that the group expressing its political beliefs was a union
should have no bearing on whether the group's conduct was or was not
protected by the first amendment.
The Allied Court could have reached the conclusion that the ILA's
boycott was not protected activity under the first amendment by a different means less restrictive of first amendment rights. Incidental infringement of first amendment rights may be justified if there exists a
compelling government interest.1 65 The NLRA was enacted to protect
and promote the free flow of commerce. 66 Section 8(b)(4) was specifically designed to prevent the spread of industrial strife. 6 Either or
both of these objectives may be considered sufficiently compelling to
justify infringement of the ILA's first amendment rights.
A balancing of interests would have been a sounder approach to
the first amendment issue than the Allied Court's analysis because it
would have considered the political motivation behind the ILA's boycott. Moreover, it would not have required the Court to adopt the
somewhat strained analogy between the ILA's refusal to handle Soviet
goods and labor picketing.
162. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) ("'Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular
locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.' ") (quoting
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (concurring opinion))).
163. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 293 (citing Bldg. Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539
(1950)).
164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269 (1964) ("The general proposition
that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has
long been settled by our decisions.").
165. Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
166. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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D. ProceduralDistinctions."Another Facet of Russian
Boycott Litigation?
Although the dispute in Allied, like that in Baldovin v. International
Longshoremen'sAssociation,168New Orleans S.S. Association v. General
Longshore Workers,'6 9 and Walsh v. InternationalLongshoremen'sAssociation,1 7 ° originated in the ILA's boycott of Russian goods, the procedural context in which Allied arose differed in several respects from
that in which the other three cases arose. Allied was an action between
private parties. Baldovin and Walsh were actions brought by the
NLRB. 171 In addition, Allied was an action for damages, whereas
Baldovin, New Orleans, and Walsh were each actions for injunctive relief. 7 2 As a result of these differences, the jurisdiction of the NLRB
under section 10(a)' 73 and the procedural requirements of section
10(1) 174 were not at issue in Allied; nor were the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."' Therefore, the Allied Court distinguished the issue addressed by the courts of appeals in Baldovin,
New Orleans and Walsh-the jurisdiction of the NLRB over union unfair labor practices under section 10(a) of the NLRA-from that
presented in Allied-the scope of the secondary boycott prohibition of
the NLRA. 7 6 Thus, the Court framed the issue in Allied narrowlydetermination of the scope of section 8(b)(4) in the setting of a boycott
of foreign goods.' 7 7 The distinction drawn by the4llied Court can be
made only by reading the phrase "affecting commerce" which appears
in both sections 8(b)(4) and 10(a) of the NLRA as though it had a different meaning in each section. This seems a somewhat artificial dis168. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
169. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), afdsub nom, Jacksonville Bulk Term., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
170. 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980).
171. New Orleans, like.411ied, was an action between private parties. However, because
New Orleans involved the enforcement of arbitration awards, and thus the arbitration provisions of the NLRA, it is factually distinguishable from Allied See New Orleans, 626 F.2d at
465.
172. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
174. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
176. 640 F.2d at 1371. InAllied, the Supreme Court stated that it "granted certiorari to
determine the coverage of the secondary boycott provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act in this setting." 456 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). The court of appeals in Allied Int'l
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1981), stated that "this
case does not, as did Baldovin and Walsh, require consideration of the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board ... ." Id at 1371 (citations omitted).
177. 456 U.S. at 218. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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tinction: NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices extends to
178
persons engaging in unfair labor practices "affecting commerce,"
whereas the secondary boycott prohibition protects any person "engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce" from certain
179

union activities.

It is difficult to imagine a situation where a prohibited secondary
boycott would not affect commerce given that the victim of the secondary boycott must be engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to fall within the proscription. Moreover, the definitions of
the terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce" in section 2(6) and
(7)180 apply whenever those terms appear in the NLRA."s Therefore,
the distinction made by the Court in Allied is tenuous at best.
Because the Allied Court did not overrule Baldovin and because it
implicitly affirmed the lower court's narrow statement of the issue in
Allied, it is conceivable that Baldovin and Walsh still have preclusive
effect over section 10(1) injunctions in the context of a boycott of foreign goods.'3 2 The court of appeals inAllied held that the NLRA applied to the action brought by a private party against a union even
though the NLRB's jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice was
barred by res judicata.' s3 Therefore, it is an open question whether the
NLRB may enjoin this type of unfair labor practice even though it
would sustain a private damages remedy. From a practical standpoint,
it is unlikely that the Court would deny NLRB jurisdiction to enjoin a
secondary boycott while simultaneously granting private parties monetary relief from the boycott. To do so would allow the boycott to continue and thus allow recoverable damages to increase unnecessarily.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court framed the issue presented in Allied narrowly-determination of the scope of section 8(b)(4) in the context of a politicallymotivated boycott of foreign goods. 8 4 The Court's opinion is carefully
tailored to address only that issue. Therefore, Allied's effect on subsequent cases that arise in a different procedural setting may be limited.
Because the Court framed the question presented in Allied so nar178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). See supra text at note 105.
See supra note 2 for text of § 8(b)(4)(B).
See supra note 2 for text of § 2(6) and (7).
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
640 F.2d at 1370. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
456 U.S. at 218. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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rowly, its resolution of each of the three major issues involved may also
carry little weight in future litigation. Although the Court focused on
the effects of the ILA's conduct to determine the commerce jurisdiction
issue, it implicitly affirmed the Benz "object" approach.1" 5 Thus, the
Allied Court injected some confusion into the traditional test of commerce jurisdiction. Because the Court's resolution of the secondary
boycott issue was based on the fact that eighty-five percent of Allied's
imports came from the Soviet Union, 186 its holding will provide little
guidance in cases where the amount of lost income is less than eightyfive percent. Finally, because the Court's resolution of the first amendment issue was based on an inappropriate analogy to labor picketing
cases and did not consider the political expression aspect of the ILA's
boycott, its reasoning is of little value for future litigation. Therefore,
the holding in Allied is extremely narrow and provides only general
guidelines for lower courts to decide these issues in future cases involving politically motivated secondary boycotts.
Leslie A. Watts

185. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.

